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Preface 
SUMKMAR Y 
In this thesis a set of interlocking arguments is fashioned. Each argument 
serves a dual purpose: it contributes to the acceptability of the main theme 
developed In the thesis and it increases the acceptability of the other 
arguments. At all stages the price paid for refusing to accept the conclusions 
drawn is cited. 
There are two driving forces behind the construction of the set of 
arguments. The first involves a recognition that there is a need for some 
'underiabouring' work to be done for the Social Sciences; the second, relatedly. 
that there is a need to relocate the current debate in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy on, 
the question of Personal Identity. 
The colligation of the arguments accomplishes an 'underlabouring' task for 
the Social Sciences. This task consists of the identification of some of the 
Implications of the acceptance (whether tacit or explicitly stated) of two 
notions: the notions of what constitutes a person and what constitutes society. 
it Is argued that Possible uses of the concept of a person, inherent in any 
Interpretation of social phenomena, will constrain the explanatory power of any 
social scientific theory (or even ofa common system of beliefs) In which the 
interpretation is embedded. If one accepts a social scientific theory (or any 
common system of beliefs) which subsumes a concept of a person which does not 
see persons as essentially subjective, essentially social and essentially 
knowledge-seeking then one has to pay a series of penalties. Foremost among the 
penalties Is the sacrifice of the possibility of the expansion of the 
understanding of social phenomena. 
There are two concepts of society, embedded in contrasting systems of 
beliefs, whose acceptance has the effect of reinforcing the constraint on the 
explanatory power of the systems. One concept Involves a view of society as an 
object with causal powers, the other sees only Individuals as social causal 
agents. Whether it is Implicit or explicitly stated, the acceptance of either 
concept of society will cement the constraint on the expansion of one's 
understanding of social phenomena. The arguments go on to show that only the 
acceptance of a concept of society seen as an ensemble (itself devoid of 
detectable causal power) of social structures with causal powers can induce a 
lifting of some of the restrictions on the expansion of one's understanding of 
social phenomena. 
At the core of the arguments lies a fundamental distinction. This is the 
distinction which needs to be made between the functions of epistemological and 
ontological concepts which underpin one's understanding of social phenomena. It 
Is argued that, while such a distinction needs to be made, the relationship 
between the two functions is a symbiotic one - neither can operate without the 
other. The differentiation between the two functions is achieved by focusing on 
the distinction between knowledge and being - encapsulated in Chapter 2 by the 
distinction made between 'cultural environments' and 'social environments'. 
Linked to, and sustaining, the distinction between social and cultural 
environments is a distinction between two aspects of cognitive interactions 
between Individuals. These two aspects Involve a contrast between an 
Individual's sense of 'Interacting with' and a sense of 'being with' other 
Individuals. The former Involves Individuals in operating 'social kinds' while 
the latter involves them in sustaining the operating parameters of social kinds$ 
operations of social kinds are needed for changes in states of understanding to 
occur (in other words the operations have epistemological significance); by 
contrast the sustaining of the operational parameters of social kinds is 
significant with respect to the functions of ontological concepts. 
The failure of many theories of Personal Identity to address the problems 
generated by conflating epistemology and ontology In the social sciences renders 
such theories Inadequate to the task of providing a comprehensive analysis of 
Personal Identity. The arguments In the thesis pinpoint the nature of this 
Inadequacy, and show how it might be avoided. 
PRE FACE 
This essay consists of an examination of one aspect of the basis on which 
our understanding of social phenomena is built. This aspect consists of the 
concept of a person. The discussion in the essay itself enables one to 
substantiate the proposition that the concept of a person forms part of such a 
base. It also enables one to understand some of the constraints which have to 
be placed on the development and use of all concepts, including the concept of a 
person, If one is to be able adequately to carry out certain tasks. As such the 
essay consists of a discussion in which an abstract structure is put together - 
an abstract structure into which concepts will have to be placed. At each stage 
of the discussion the price to be paid by anyone who wishes to deny the claims 
being made is cited. This means that the nature of the necessity identified in 
the essay is contingent upon the prior acceptance of the desirability of the 
avoidance of the payment of the price cited in the discussion. 
The nature of the subject-matter makes it difficult for the discussion to 
take the standard form of Introduction followed by exposition followed by 
conclusion - the introduction and conclusion cannot differ in any significant 
respect. The difficulty should become more apparent to the reader as he or she 
proceeds through the text. The reason for directing the reader to the first 
three parts of Chapter 5 for the Introduction to the essay should also become 
apparent; these three parts constitute the introduction to the essay. At the 
end of Part 3 of Chapter 5 the musical Instruction DC will be found. This 
Instructs one to go da capo - return to the beginning - which, in this case, 
involves returning to the beginning of Chapter 1. For convenience the first 
page of Chapter 5 is reproduced Immediately after the listing of the contents. 
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A CR ITI QUE OF THE DEBATE 
ON PERBONAL I DENT i TY 
Parts 1,2 and 3 of Chapter 5 serve a dual function; they both Introduce 
the arge . nts set out in this essay and provide a oonclusion for them. 
PART 1. INTRODUCTION (to Chapter 5) 
In this chapter two tasks will be carried out. In the first of these, to 
be developed In Part 2, the various elements of the arguments In Chapters 1 to 4 
will be brought together and synthesised Into a coherent basis from which a 
theory of Personal Identity could be constructed. The acceptance of this basis 
will involve the reader In accepting a relocation of the current debate on 
Personal Identity. Within the scope of this relocation the second task will be 
carried out in Parts 3 and 4. In Part 3 the issues raised In Part 2 will be 
brought together to show how the concept of a person may be developed. This 
will lead, in Part 4, to a critique of some current and traditional theories. 
Bringing together the various elements of the arguments in Chapters 1 to 4 
will enable one to focus on the main principle which has underpinned those 
arguments. It is the acceptance of this principle which leads to the relocation 
of the debate on Personal Identity. The principle was not explicitly stated 
until Chapter 2, Part 1: 
The Id ntity of the self is not a if le Instance of aars general 
notion of Id ntity. but gwima / not lays of Idsnt ity neat &pon an 
already Ox/sting 0a Of the not/on of PW-som/ /drn! /ty. ... (P1) 
It will be demonstrated that the arguments in this essay have themselves 
X1 
Introduction 
ratified the principle which underpins them. This means that any theory of 
Personal Identity is built on the somewhat paradoxical proposition that the 
concept of Identity is logically posterior to the concept of Personal Identity; 
in other words Personal Identity and non-person Identity are distinct types of 
concepts which need to be analysed differently. 
It will be shown that the arguments in the previous four chapters have 
demonstrated that the paradox is unavoidable; indeed, one of the few certainties 
when dealing with questions of Identity is that this particular paradox is 
unavoidable. The source of the paradox is found in the relationship which 
exists between Individuals and social structures - the social structures being 
those which operate in the cultural environments within which concepts of 
identity are developed. It Is this relationship which lies at the centre of the 
relocated debate on Personal Identity. 
The paradoxical nature of the subject-matter is derived partly from the 
( The Introduction to the may oontinues on pS 202) 
xll 
Part 1o lntroductlon 
UNEERLABOUR ING 
PERSONAL- 
Chapter 1 
FOR THEORIES OF 
IDENTITY 
PART 1s INTRODUCTION" 
Theories Of Personal Identity As Underpinning Theories In The Social Sciences 
The main purpose of the study carried out in this essay is the 
clarification of our understanding of one of the bases upon which theories in 
the social sciences are constructed. This basis consists of the concept of a 
person. It will be argued that the concept both underpins the development of, 
and supports the acceptability of, any given explanation of social phenomena. 
The concept of a person, whether tacitly assumed or explicitly stated within a 
given system of explanations of social phenomena, will be seen to be parasitic 
upon a unique and symbiotic relationship. This relationship is the one which 
exists between the oonoeptualisations of Individuals and the development of 
social structures. 
The mutual dependence arises from the operations of processes by which 
concepts are developed; processes which consist of the manifestation of the 
properties of social structures. The development of concepts is facilitated by 
the operations of objects whose behaviour Is dependent upon the 
conceptualisations of some Individuals. Any analysis of the relationship Is 
therefore bound to Involve an element of circularity: a circularity which stems 
from the fact that conceptualisations determine, and are determined by, the 
behaviour of social objects. 
The acceptance of the symbiotic nature of this relationship will be seen to 
*NOTE: As stated In the Preface, the Introduction to this study is presented at 
the beginning of Chapter 5- which serves both as conclusion and introduction. 
I 
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The acceptance of the symbiotic nature of this relationship will be seen to 
lead to various conclusions, not all of which are widely accepted by modern 
philosophers. Not least of these conclusions consists of the assertion that the 
concept of the identity of an object, which is not a person, Is logically 
dependent upon the concept of a person; and so upon the symbiotic relationship 
referred to above. Personal Identity is not a particular instance of a general 
notion of identity; and general notions of Identity are not Independent of the 
subjective, and partly non-analysable, forces which generate concept 
development. 
The arguments will lead to further conclusions about the essentially 
paradoxical properties of persons. These arguments will be of a similar type: 
In each the price to be paid by anyone wishing not to accept Its conclusions 
will be cited. In particular It will be seen that the circularity can only be 
avoided at a price. The price consists of restricting the application of 
explanations developed In the given social theory only to those social contexts 
in which concepts cannot alter. 
The groundwork for the development of the arguments is laid in this 
chapter. Here the structure within which concepts in general - and concepts of 
personal Identity in particular - are developed, Is examined. The results of 
the examination lead to the identification of the need for further examinations. 
The further examinations, concerning the relationships between the individual 
and his social and natural environments, will be undertaken In subsequent 
chapters. No excuse is offered for the seemingly arbitrary starting point of 
the examination. Indeed, since one of the main tenets of the thesis developed 
here is that 'linear' (*1) analyses of social phenomena cannot be carried out 
without the implicit acceptance of a restricted concept of social change, 
preference for a particular starting point cannot be justified. Further, any 
starting point will necessarily seem abrupt and condensed. Clear, precise 
starting points with concepts which are simple to grasp, can only be offered If 
2 
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those concepts can be grasped in Isolation from the other concepts in the 
analysis. One of the claims being made here is that such isolation Is not 
possible. With this in mind the arbitrary starting point for the examinations 
which are to be carried out subsequently. Is an analysis of the concept of the 
self. 
The Analysis Of The Concept Of The Self 
The analysis of the concept of the self Is rooted In a cultural system of 
Inter-related concepts. as Indeed Is any analysis. In Part 2 below, there will 
be an examination of some of the constraints which the rootedness and such an 
analysis place both on the concept of the self and on the system of concepts 
within which the concept can be applied. This will be done by noting that a 
general recognition of the need for an analysis of a concept of the self carries 
with it some assumptions. (*2) 
The acceptance of these two assumptions enables one to claim that, in order 
for the analysis of a concept to get off the ground, there exists a system of 
concepts which is used by beings which have certain capabilities (*3). These 
capabilities include the capability (a) to have conscious experiences, (b) to 
interpret those experiences, (c) to communicate the Interpreted experiences and 
(d) to act - or to initiate changes which result in the alteration of both their 
own experiences and those of others. An acceptance, that this last capability - 
(d) - is needed by beings who use a system of concepts, Itself Involves a 
presumption of two further assumptions, 
(i) that these active, experiencing and interpreting beings can distinguish 
between the means, or mechanisms, by which they communicate their experiences 
and the beings with which they are communicating - in other words the 
possibility of the operation of agency presupposes the existence of objects in 
an environment which are distinguishable both from the agent and from the object 
which is altered by the agent's activities= 
3 
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(ii) that It is possible both to effect a change in the state and to affect 
changes In the state of understanding of another being - in other words it Is 
possible to bring into play a learning process. 
Each of these last two assumptions (d) (i) and (il) will be seen to play 
significant roles In the examination of the relationships between the self and 
the social environment (Chapter 2), between the self and the natural environment 
(Chapter 3) and between self and the forces which drive the self's own conscious 
experience (Chapter 4). Of particular significance to most of the arguments 
will be (d)(10: that it Is possible that changes in states of understanding not 
only occur but that they can be brought about as a result of intentional acts. 
w 
PART 21 INDIVIDUATION AND THE ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS 
Definitions And Persons 
There is something of a paradox attached to analyses of concepts. In order 
to analyse something one must already have some understanding of what Is to be 
analysed. However, with the conscious awareness of this understanding, the need 
for the analysis changes. It may recede if one is merely interested in using 
the concept, as when one learns to use the word for bread in another language, 
or It may become sharper as when one comes to understand what a stable marriage 
is. The function of the analysis is then not to describe and pinpoint some 
entirely new and previously inexplicable phenomenon but rather either to make 
explicit some of the understanding which is already existent regarding the 
phenomenon or to develop the understanding of a partly understood phenomenon. 
So It Is with a person. When attempting to analyse the concept of a 
person, one must already be versed in some aspect of what one thinks a person is 
- so that one already has a yardstick against which to assess the analysis. 
This tacit understanding would be a common sense notion. It would Include most 
4 
Part 2. Individuation and the Analysis of Concepts Chapter 1 
of the commonly held preconceptions of what a person Is. These would probably 
include: a person is someone/thing which (a) has a physical body with certain 
enduring characteristics, (b) In general has the ability to move that body, (c) 
has the ability to interact with other persons and (d) has the capability of 
having and generating emotional experience; having and inciting aesthetic 
experience; exercising and Inciting the use of the Imagination; etc... 
It is not being suggested that any combination of (a), (b). (c) and (d) Is 
either necessary or sufficient for the development of an acceptable analysis of 
the concept of a person. But what will now be suggested is that any criterion 
of Personal Identity which is to be included in such an analysis will have one 
thing in common with (a), (b). (c) and (d). This sharing of a condition will 
Involve the acceptance of the presupposition of an already existent body of 
knowledge within which the analysis - and the development of any concept flowing 
from the processes which sustain the body of knowledge - can acquire meaning. 
It will be seen that the use of this body of knowledge will itself Involve a 
presupposition of the existence of a group of 'knowledgeable beings' 04) who 
sustain the body of knowledge. 
It should be noted that inherent In the argument in this essay is the 
assumption that the use of the concept of a person must, at minimum, enable any 
Individual who uses concepts to Individuate certain specific Individuals. 
These are the Individuals who are active agents In the formation and development 
of concepts. The acceptance of this assumption carries with it the acceptance 
of the possibility that persons can learn or come to understand concepts of 
which they were not previously cognizant. In other words, the use of the 
concept of a person must enable one to individuate beings with the capability to 
learn the use of concepts. 
The argument will also focus attention on the forces which generate an 
Individual's need to develop an understanding of her environment. It is the 
drive to satisfy this need which underpins the requirement for the existence of 
6 
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understandable processes by which concepts are formed and developed. The 
acceptance that there Is a need for a process by which concepts are formed and 
developed carries with it some constraints. These constraints place 
requirements on the range of qualities which can be properly attributed to 
persons. It will be seen below that any analysis of the concept which 
facilitates the Individuation of Individual members of the group of beings who 
sustain a given body of knowledge needs to allow for the incorporation of 
certain specific characteristics. 
Particular Concepts Of Individuals In Specific Bodies Of Knowledge. 
There is no necessary connection between (I) the concept which enables one 
to Individuate Individual members of the group of beings who, through their 
agency in the formation and development of concepts, sustain the body of 
knowledge within which concepts are developed and (li) the specific concept of a 
person in a given body of knowledge. It is perfectly possible for a particular 
group of beings to endow personhood to trees and horses - Caligula made his 
horse, Inoitatus, a consul of Romel Whether there are any non-'knowledgeable 
beings' conoeptualised as persons Is contingent upon the mechanisms which exist 
within the cultural environment (formed by the group of 'knowledgeable beings') 
for individuating persons. In order not to stray totally Into the realm of 
arbitrary conceptualisations, it will be assumed here that the use of the 
concept of personal Identity in any cultural system Incorporating a given body 
of knowledge, must enable one to Individuate the members of the group of 
'knowledgeable beings' who help to sustain and modify that body of knowledge. 
Whether or not the concepts enable one to Individuate anything else is a 
contingent characteristic of the given body of knowledge. 
Further, while the specific form which a definition of a person takes may 
be contingent upon the cultural system within which it is developed, the process 
of analysis which leads to such development is not itself context specific: 
S 
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Personal Identity cannot be subsumed into a thorough-going relativistic world 
view. There are characteristics of persons which any process of analysis of 
concepts in any cultural system must take on board. These characteristics will 
be identified in the remainder of this chapter. 
The Identification will be achieved by carrying out two tasks. The first 
will consist of an analysis of the conditions which must hold in order that a 
group of 'knowledgeable beings' can differentiate themselves one from another; 
this being seen as a condition of their being able to formulate a concept of a 
person. Secondly there will be an analysis of how a mechanism by which 
individual persons are individuated is developed and of how it can change. 
Individuating Knowledgeable Beings 
In order for individuals to differentiate themselves one from another, 
certain conditions must hold. These are Identified and analysed extensively 
below. The satisfaction of these conditions necessitates the possession of a 
given set of characteristics by each member of the group of 'knowledgeable 
beings'. This set of characteristics includes: the ability to have 
experiences, the ability to Interpret experiences and the ability to communicate 
these interpretations. 
Each member must be able to have and Interpret experiences - since the 
possession of such capabilities is a precondition for an individual's ability to 
grasp a concept. Each member must also be able to communicate the 
Interpretations of his experiences since this is a precondition for the 
existence of a body of knowledge shared and sustained by a group of beings. The 
ability to communicate knowledge Itself has as a precondition the ability to 
affect both one's own and the experiences of another being. The ability to 
affect experiences, both her own and those of others, will be termed an 
individual's "ability to act". 
This would mean that, In order that any analysis of any concept may yet off 
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the ground, there exists a body of knowledge whose use has, as a precondition, 
the existence of a group of beings which are capable of: 
(a) Experiencing 
(b) Interpreting their experiences 
(c) Communicating their Interpretations 
(d) Action, or at minimum affecting the conscious states of others. 
It should be noted that justification for the claim supporting the existence of 
individuals within the group has sprung from a perceived need for the analysis 
of concepts. Symbiotically linked with this need, are the possibility of, and 
need for, changes in knowledge or states of understanding. 
In other words the possibility that sore Individuals can learn Is a 
precondition of the Intelligibility of the analysis of any oonospt 
Normal practice in current literature on Personal Identity, has tended to 
Ignore this principle. Rather, there have been attempts to particularise 
general specifications for the Identity of objects into a specific requirement 
for the identity of an Individual. There seems to be no recognition of the 
Impact which the general requirements have on the specific ones or vice-versa. 
The Identified Individual is seen as typical of those capable of changing both 
his own and others' states of understanding (*5). However, as is demonstrated 
below, the Interplay between the general and the specific requirements will have 
constraining effects on both. These constraining effects will set some 
necessary conditions such as (a), (b), (o), (d) - and perhaps others - on the 
formation of a concept of a person (*6). 
The bulk of the argument in this essay will result from examinations of the 
constraining effects alluded to In the previous paragraph. In Chapter 2 the 
social structures underpinning the Interpretation and communication of 
experiences will be examined with regard to the constraints they place on the 
development of the concept of a person. In Chapter 3 the actions of Individuals 
will be examined with regard to 
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(I) the constraints these Impose on an Individual's conceptualisations of a person 
and of the the objects which persons find In their environment (restricting 
attention to that part of the environment whose operations are seen by the 
persons as not being dependent on the Interactions between persons) and 
(ii) the relationships between the persons and such Independent objects. 
In Chapter 4 experiences themselves will be examined. The examination will 
be confined to one aspect of experiences: the emotional aspect. This 
confinement is designed to serve the interests of brevity and to fulfil the 
expectation that this one aspect will permit some generalisation with regard to 
other aspects of the affective domain of experience. 
The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with preparing the ground 
for these examinations. This will begin with an analysis of the relationships 
between experiences, Interpretations and actions in the context of the ways in 
which they affect, and are affected by, individuals. The reason for focussing 
on these relationships Is the recognition that experiences, interpretations, and 
Interactions constitute necessary requirements for the satisfaction of the need 
to analyse concepts. 
An examination of the relationship between an Individual and other 
Individuals will now be undertaken - this relationship may be either a binary 
relationship between two Individuals or a multiple one between several 
individuals. The chapter will conclude with some references to current theories 
of Personal Identity so laying the foundations for their critique In Chapter 5. 
PART 3a EXPERIENCES. INTERPRETATIONS AND ACTIONS 
(a preliminary examination) 
Interpretations of experiences are here equated with changes in states of 
mind involving changes of knowledge or belief. This means that 'interpretation' 
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and 'experience' are in some sense technical terms. By 'experience' what is 
meant is the occurrence of something In the consciousness of a being whether or 
not the occurrence is brought about by the being itself, some other agency, or 
the being and some other agency in combination with each other. By 
'Interpretation' what is meant Is the ordering, separating, uniting - in other 
words the analysis of - experiences, together with the attaching meaning to 
experiences. 
Prima facie, there seem to be no a priori conditions which can be affirmed 
regarding the exact relationship between sets of experiences, sets of 
Interpreters of experiences and sets of agents who can act. Indeed, some 
writers have postulated possibilities of one set of experiences being shared by 
more than one Interpreter (*7), of one agent and/or Interpreter of experiences 
branching Into more than one agent (*8), and of more than one agent and/or 
interpreter fusing into a single one (*9). It will be seen that the apparent 
lack of an a priori link between experiences, Interpreters of experiences and 
agents is illusory. A priori arguments can be adduced. These rest on 
conditions for the possibilities of two types of occurrences the first consists 
of learning processes and the second of communication which either induces 
learning processes or makes Individuals aware that such learning processes have 
occurred. 
Given the meanings of the terms outlined above, an argument will now be set 
out using the format of a rigorous mathematical proof. The argument will 
support the contentions that (1) Individuals who interact cognitively with 
others are structured entities (ii) such individuals operate In a structured 
social environment and (iii) this structured social environment pre-exists any 
particular Individual but cannot be sustained without the Interpreted actions of 
the individuals. Underpinning these contentions, and simultaneously justified 
by their acceptability, is a conception of the Individual as a second order 
monitor of her own activities. The individual not only has access to the 
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mechanisims which make up her own structure, but she can also monitor the 
access, and so has the capability to alter the structure itself. 
The reasons for offering a rigorous analysis of the Interactions between 
individuals rather than a straightforward commonsense analysis are themselves 
straightforward. A rigorous analysis will lead to the Identification of the 
precise areas in which the supporters of objective analyses of social phenomena 
face their greatest difficulties. The argument will show that the structure of 
the individual Is such that the connections between experience. Interpretation 
and action are not arbitrary. This means that some theorists, such as those 
referred to in (*7). (*8) & (*9). who arbitrarily break these connections will 
pay a price - see Chapter 5, Part 4. The argument will also enable one to 
appreciate the significance of the role played by the intentionality of the 
Individual In the formation and maintenance of the social structures which 
sustain and facilitate changes in interactive processes between 'knowledgeable 
beings'. 
The argument hinges on the unaooeptability of denying one of Its main 
premises. This premiss. C6 below, consists of the statement that communication 
which leads to alterations in states of understanding does, in practice, occur. 
The denial of the acceptability of this statement is either self-contradictory 
or self-defeating; for such a denial involves an attempt to alter the state of 
understanding of a being who is capable of cognitive experience. 
The reader who is unfamiliar with the format of rigorous expositions In 
mathematics will note that each symbolically presented stage Is accompanied by a 
'lay' Interpretation. The claims made In the argument are set out In the form 
of nine statements, C1 - C9. The 'lay' Interpretation given after C3 provides a 
simple synopsis of the complete argument In Part 4, page 16, the validity of 
each statement is justified and the final compound claim (C9) is substantiated. 
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Suppose we gather together all the experiences of all individuals and place them 
in a set E. ... (C1) 
(* The very possibility that one can list experiences in a set Involves a 
presupposition that experiences can be separated from one another. The 
arguments in later chapters, particularly in Chapters 2 and 4, shows that such 
separation leads to the imposition of restrictions on the nature of change in a 
given cultural environment. In other words a 'linear' analysis of the concept 
of a person affects the structure of the cultural environments in which the 
concept Is formulated and used, see note (*1). The arguments in later chapters 
also show that some of these effects are unavoidable in any given analysis of 
cognitive interactions - since any formulated analysis by any given individual 
must be 'linear'. The unavoidability of these effects forms the basis of the 
arguments which establish the essentially subjective nature of persons. *) 
Subsets of the set of all experiences E, however formed, are to be termed 
E1, E2. E3,.... Ek. These subsets may be formed according to any desired 
'gathering' principle: temporal contiguity and/or psychological connectedness 
are variously used as gathering principles which then are assumed to yield a 
means by which individuals may be Individuated. ... (C2) 
Suppose we similarly gather all the interpretations into a set I with subsets 
1,. 12.... In and gather all agents into a set A with subsets A, . A2.... Ap.. 
So Eq represents a set of experiences (0<q< k+1 ) 
Ir represents a set of 1 torpret. uona (0<r< h+1 ) 
At represents an agent (0<t< p+1 ) 
.. (C3) 
(* The subsets can be considered to be all the possible subsets of sets E, I and 
A. The Intention is to demonstrate that the constraints which communication 
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places on action and interpretation ensure that the relationships between the 
interpretations, experiences and actions of a 'knowledgeable being' are not 
arbitrary. They are based on relatively stable functions - symbolically 
identified below as f,, f2,91,92 etc... - which make the communication 
possible; and with communication, they make concept development possible. *) 
We now focus on a requirement which individuating processes need to fulfil. 
If individuating processes are to serve as means by which to pick out a specific 
'knowledgeable being' then the formation and development of concepts which 
facilitate the individuation of such beings becomes possible. ... (C4) 
We now draw attention to one of the premisses of the argument. 
Communication leading to alterations in states of understanding Is possible - 
since it Is by such communication that the formation and development of concepts 
occur. ... (C5) 
The argument will now direct attention towards the need to facilitate and enable 
the activation of two tasks: the permitting of communication between individual 
'knowledgeable beings' and the facilitation of changes In their states of 
knowledge and/or belief. 
The individuation of a 'knowledgeable being' Is adequate to such tasks only if 
each 'knowledgeable being' has a unique relationship with a given set of 
interpretations of experiences. ... (C6) 
Further. these Interpretations In turn are uniquely related to the experiences 
of which they are Interpretations. ... ACT) 
Finally, both the interpretations and the experiences are uniquely related to a 
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single agent. ... (C8) 
In the formal terms set out below, this claim indicates that functions f1, f2 
and f3 can only relate one individual with agency A. to one set of experiences 
and to one set of Interpretations of experiences. The only access agent An has 
to the agency and interpretative faculties of another individual is through 
functions such as g2 by which the experiences of the individual with agency A. 
can be affected. 
In other words. It Is Impossible 1br aºe as an agent to have access to the 
interpretations of experiences which accompany the actions of a distinct agent 
It Is also Ipso facto, laºpossib/e ! br we to experience what another individual 
is experiencing. 
The claims made In C1 to C8 can be collated into a single claim 
(the mappings and functions refer to Fig. 1 on page 15)ß 
An Individuating process, which Itself depends upon the nature of the Identity 
of the individuated object, can only be carried out it 
(I) there exists a one-one mapping f, from a set E. onto a set I. (where E. 
and I. are sets of experiences gathered together under the auspices of belonging 
to an individual who Is a 'knowledgeable being') 
(ii) there exist functions f2 and f3 which relate all the elements in 1  
and E. respectively to a single agent A . ... (C9) 
Claim CO will be substantiated in the next two sections. 
t* 11 is a function which oonnecta experlenoea with their Interpretation,. 
This "esns that a set or experiences can be uniquely oonnected with a set of 
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interpretations. The operation of f, will be seen to be such that only the 
individual with agency Am has access to that operation - the use of this access 
is usually thought of as involving the use of the imagination. 'External' 
agencies will only have indirect access to this function through affecting 
experiences. 
f2 is the function which makes the activities of an agent meaningful. It 
is by the invocation of f2 that an individual interprets his actions. Since f, 
maps each set of interpretations onto a set of experiences, each action, being 
interpreted. is also part of an experience. This means that function f, can be 
expressed in terms of f, and f2. *) 
Experiences Em 
(I: 
91 9? 
I nterpretations11:: 
fi 
f3 
f5 
f6 
Experiences E 
Ent 
E., s 
Ens 
Interpretations In 
Agents (A,. A2,.... A, ý,... Aý,... > 
Figure 1 
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Referring now to Figure 1, the following points will be substantlateds 
(i) fi (or fa) is a one-one mapping from E. (or E) onto I. (or I) 
(* the uniqueness of individual Interpretations of experience *) 
(ii) f2 and f3 (or f6 and fe) are functions from sets E. (or E) and I. 
(or I) to set A relating all the elements In E. and I. (or E and 
In > to a single element A. (or An) In set A 
(* the uniqueness of the agency of the experiencing Individual *) 
(iii) fli (or 92) is a relationship but not a mapping between A. (or A) 
and the elements of set En (or E. ) 
(* a relation which enables one to affect another's experiences *) 
(IV) There are no relationships such as f3 from Aw to set Ir if there 
Is a function f relating Aw to l where u does not equal r. 
(* the uniqueness of the experience of Individual agency *) 
The argument is partly logical and partly rests on experience. The logical 
aspect turns on the nature of the concept of experience and its relationship 
with the notion of an interpretation. The empirically based part of the 
argument rests on the consequences of accepting, or the price paid by rejecting, 
the possibility of the occurrence of certain processes. 
In the more logical part it will be argued that the notion of an experience 
which can form the basis from which a 'knowledgeable being' might communicate 
understanding carries with It the requirements that the experience Is 
interpreted and that the interpretation is Itself Interpreted. In other words 
the nature of the concept of a communicable experience is such that It 
necessitates the possession of a second order monitoring device by the 
individual having the experience. The more empirical part will consist of an 
examination of the preconditions which must hold if communication which induces 
changes In the cognitive contents of experience is to be possible. 
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PART 4: INTERPRETATIONS and EXPERIENCE 
In examining the relationship between experiences and Interpretations it is 
fruitful to draw a distinction between an experience which is devoid of 
cognitive content (*10) and one which is not. The distinction will help to 
highlight the impact which changing interpretations have on experiences. 
An experience is principally a psychic phenomenon. If it makes sense to 
talk of such a thing as being devoid of cognitive content then one might be 
talking of the experiences of an animal or perhaps the awareness In 
consciousness of the motor functions of one's body. Such phenomena may be seen 
to be indistinguishable. In category, from the registering of a picture on a 
camera film when the shutter opens or the alteration of the contents of a 
particular address In the main memory of a computer when an Input device sends 
an impulse along a particular address bus. However, when an experience is 
Interpreted it cannot be devoid of cognitive content. Similarly an experience 
which has cognitive content must be in some sense Interpreted otherwise It could 
not be known that it had cognitive content. 
The significance of the cognitive content of an experience Is that, because 
it is necessarily accompanied by an interpretative process, it ensures that the 
experience must be subjective. This subjectivity does not preclude the 
possibility that the experience can have an objective component to it. The 
subjectivity of an experience with cognitive content does, however, preclude the 
possibility that the experience can be shared by more than one interpreter of 
experiences. Since an interpretation of an experience giving it cognitive 
content changes not just the status of the experience but also the experience 
itself, the simultaneous interpretation of a cognitive-free experience by more 
than one Interpreter would simultaneously alter the putatively single experience 
into more than one experience! If the Interpreters were to fuse Into a single 
interpreter (or were to exchange bodies and so exchange operations gi and 92 as 
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well as the current uninterpreted experience; with f, remaining as It Is while 
f2 and f3 have to be reformulated! ) then the experience would revert to being 
subjective (*11). But it Is logically impossible for the cognitive content of 
the experience to survive either the process of fusion or of body exchange. It 
is, of course, logically possible for two separate interpreters to give separate 
cognitive content to a single 'cognitive-free' experience but the result would 
be that there would be two separate experiences. 
What is being argued in short is claim C9, p. 14 aboves (1) that each 
experience with cognitive content is uniquely linked to an interpretation and 
that each interpretation can only be an interpretation of a particular 
experience and no other - so that f, Is a one-one mapping from a set of 
experiences E. onto a set of interpretations I. - and (ii) that both the 
Interpretations and the experiences are linked to a single interpreter. This 
last point begins the analysis which justifies the claim that the relationships 
f2 and f3 are functions relating the experiences and Interpretations in sets E. 
and I. with a single agent A . 
The individual whose agency is manifest through A. has the ability through 
process 92 to affect experiences other than his own. Functions f2 and f3 are 
also such that the Individual can affect his own experiences by operating 
through either f2 or f3 or both. The affecting of experiences via the operation 
of f, involves the use of the faculty of imagination while the affecting of 
experiences via the operations of g2, f2 and f3 Involves action. 
The operations of these functions, which involve action are necessary for 
the operations of communicative processes and so are necessary for the 
development of concepts. The relationships between an individual's interpreted 
experiences and her actions is central to the process of concept development. 
This centrality stems from the role played by the individual's actions both in 
individuating other individuals and In communicating even partially understood 
concepts. It is with an examination of action that the analysis will now 
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proceed. 
Coweuninoation And Cognitively Interpreted Actions 
(I) The Transmitter Of Signals 
The analysis of experiences and interpretations has spotlighted the 
subjectivity of experiences which have cognitive content. The emphasis will now 
shift to intentionality. The specific type of intentionality (*12) which 
circumscribes the analysis of action will be that which is seen as the 
characteristic of consciousness which points beyond itself. 
It was argued above - *p. 7 - that the ability of a 'knowledgeable being' to 
affect both her own experiences and those of others is a precondition of the 
existence of a cultural system centered on a body of knowledge within which a 
'knowledgeable being's' state of awareness might be altered. The precise 
mechanism by which this is achieved In a specific setting was not described 
(*13). What was seen as necessary was the possibility that each member of the 
group of 'knowledgeable beings' should either be able to communicate or be able 
to learn to communicate her interpretations to other members of the group. The 
communication of experiences with cognitive content involves the presupposition 
that both transmitter and recipient are aware that they are transmitting and 
receiving respectively. If the transmitter is aware that he is transmitting 
then this awareness will affect the content of what is present in his 
consciousness and so affect the nature of his experience. The awareness of the 
transmission alters the interpretation of the experience and so modifies the 
experience. 
It is the awareness of either the transmitter or receiver of the 
communication which is intentional in the sense referred to above. The 
transmission itself might be routinlsed and. at a conscious level, not 
deliberate. But since interpretation is inseparable from an experience with 
cognitive content, it is Impossible that the transmitter of the experiences is 
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not also the the Interpreter of the same experiences. I cannot coacunicate 
your experiences nor you line, and the hwpossibility is a logical rather than 
just a practical one. 
One interesting result which follows from this analysis of the logic 
associated with the communication of concepts is that, while 'knowledgeable 
beings' might actually be machines, they can never see themselves as such. This 
point is crystailised by R. D. Laing when he states: "A man who says that men are 
machines may be a great scientist. A man who says that he Is a machine is 
depersonalised in psychiatric jargon. " (Laing's emphasis) (*14). What Laing is 
driving at is a feature of Interactions between 'knowledgeable beings' which 
obliges each one to see himself as the sole being with access to his 
experiences. In these interactions consciousness has to perform a dual role: 
first, it has to point to something which Is beyond itself namely to the 
transmitted signal and to the recipient as well as to the experience being 
transmitted which, like a novel, once written, leaves Its author for a public 
domain (*15); secondly, consciousness has to turn Inwards and comply with the 
subjectivity required by an experience with cognitive content. 
it is in attempting to satisfy consciousness' requirement to point to some- 
thing beyond itself that the Individual acts (*16). Being part of 
communication, the action must be Interpreted by the agent= in this case the 
agent is a 'knowledgeable being'. Since It is interpreted, the action must 
modify the experience. So g2 (the process by which the agent An affects the 
experiences of 'knowledgeable beings' whose agency is manifest through other 
agents such as A. ) Is Itself an interpreted process. 
an The Recreiver Of Signals 
When you, with agency A., are talking to me, agent An, I must be effecting 
changes in the environment which In turn affect your conscious states. I effect 
such changes by operating gi. I must be letting you know that 1 am listening. 
The process gi, by which a 'knowledgeable being', whose agency is 
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manifest through A,,, affects the experiences of the 'knowledgeable being', whose 
agency is manifest through An, must also be operational during communication 
even if it Is A. which is the agent deemed to be 'transmitting' the experience. 
Process g, would be a feed-back process by which 'knowledgeable being' with 
agency A, could become aware that the receiver of the communication was actually 
becoming aware either of the cognitive content of the communicated experience or 
simply of the fact that communication was being attempted. Process g, would 
then also be an interpreted process and become part of the experience within 
which a 'knowledgeable being' with agency A. communicates with a 'knowledgeable 
being' with agency An. In other words it is impossible for one Individual to 
communicate with another unless each individual is affecting the conscious 
states of the other. 
Action And The Concept Of Otherness 
Focussing attention for the moment on the 'knowledgeable being' who 
operates as agent A. one can, without loss of generality, Identify the factors 
which any theory of personal Identity must Incorporate If the persons Identified 
are to be capable of communication. If action by such a 'knowledgeable being' 
is to take place In the context of communication as outlined above, then the 
'knowledgeable being' must have some notion of herself as being distinct from 
things which are 'beyond herself'. She must also have a notion of the 
operations of processes 92, f2 and f3 by which she affects the experiences of 
others. She need not have a concept of f,, the function relating experiences to 
her interpretations of those experiences; but. of course, in using imagination 
she will operate function fi. Further, If she is to be capable of interpreting 
both the process g$, by which she affects the experiences of others, and the 
process gi, by which her experiences are affected by others, then she must also 
have a concept of another being 'beyond herself' - she must have a generalised 
concept of 'the other' with which she is communicating. 
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It is through action that this generalised concept of 'the other' is 
developed. For It Is only through the operation of the self's agency that an 
awareness of the separation of the self from what is other than the self Is 
achieved. So the manifestation of the agency of the Individual both generates 
the need for, and Is determined by the notion of, the separateness of other 
individuals. 
individuation Prooeaes And Their Associated Structures 
The discussion so far has indicated that the analysis of the notions of 
experience, interpretation and action reveals a mutuality of dependence between 
two requirements. The first is the requirement that 'knowledgeable beings' be 
able to differentiate themselves one from another (p. 7 above); In the second 
requirement we find that such 'knowledgeable beings' are both operators of, and 
assimilators of, the results of the operations of processes and functions such 
as fit f2. fat fl, and 92 - functions which describe the relationships between 
the agency and Interpreted experiences of Individuals who interact with each 
other. Both these requirements flowed from the need to facilitate 
communication, which itself stemmed from the need to facilitate changes in the 
states of understanding, which in turn rested on a need to facilitate the 
formation and development of concepts. 
The analysis has been logical in nature in that it has concentrated on the 
relationship between concepts such as experience, interpretation, understanding 
and communication. Such a logical analysis has not, however, been carried out 
In an abstract world. The processes referred to in the analysis are rooted In 
the contingencies of what can occur In any possible world, so that fulfilling 
the requirements outlined In the last paragraph is itself not a logical process. 
The core of the argument in this essay rests on an attempt to fulfil these 
requirements. Chapter 2 Involves a detailed analysis of the conditions and 
constraints which must apply if the operations of q, and g' by which 
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individuals interact wth one another, are to facilitate the occurrence of 
learning by 'knowledgeable beings'. Chapter 3 involves an analysis of the 
context or environment which both supports processes such as g1 and g2 and which 
is seen by the 'knowledgeable beings' as being 'beyond themselves'. Chapter 4 
Involves an analysis of the functions f2 and f3 to the extent that they are 
affected by both the structure of the individual - outlined in the remainder of 
the present chapter and in Chapter 2- and by the structures within which gi and 
92 operate. The remainder of this section of this chapter will begin the task 
of specifying the conditions which have to apply if individuation of 
'knowledgeable beings' through the operations of processes such as g, and 92 Is 
to be possible. 
The Ontological Underpinning Or Prooess Involving Individuation 
Until now the discussion has revolved around the examination of phenomenal 
experiences, processes and functions have been the objects of analysis. Some 
references have been made to the 'knowledgeable beings' who have and Interpret 
experiences. No attempt has been made as yet to examine the nature of such 
beings or even to specify. in a similar manner to Hume's and Kent's analyses 
(*17), the limitations to which any such examination might be subjected. No 
attempt has yet been made to determine the constraints placed upon functions and 
processes f,, f2, f3, q, and 92 by the requirement to facilitate processes by 
which 'knowledgeable beings' might be individuated (functions and processes f,, 
f2, fa, g, and 92 are those which relate the experiences, actions and 
interpretations of an Individual to each other). Given that communication 
between such beings can only take place if a process of Individuation exists, 
the determination of the constraints becomes relevant to any theory in which 
attempts are made either to explain the behaviour of persons or to determine 
their nature. 
Further. no attempt has yet been made to specify what sort of things change 
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in order that both the processes of individuation and its component processes 
ti, f2, fa, gi and 92 can occur. In short there has been no attempt to provide 
any ontological underpinning for the phenomena which have been examined. 
The route which will be followed in order to provide this ontological 
underpinning will begin with the justification of two claims: firstly, that the 
facilitation of individuation processes requires the presence of certain 
structures; and secondly, that the specific facilitation of processes which 
Individuate 'knowledgeable beings' itself constrains the process which it 
facilitates. It will be seen that a distinction has to be made, among 
individuating processes, between two types of individuating process. There is a 
fundamental distinction between processes by which 'knowledgeable beings' 
individuate objects which Interpret experiences and processes by which they 
individuate objects which do not Interpret experiences: the former objects, but 
not the latter, through their interpretations contribute both to the operation 
of the processes of individuation and to the formation and development of the 
criteria for determining valid and Invalid individuating processes. 
The existence of a process by which a 'knowledgeable being' can individuate 
another is a prerequisite of the occurrence of communication between such beings 
as long as the communication Is temporal (across time). Both the transmitter 
and the receiver of the signals involved in the communication must have some 
means of ensuring that they continue to communicate with the same individual 
while the communication Is taking place, otherwise communication would break 
down. In these circumstances the individuating process will take into account 
the fact that each 'knowledgeable being' Involved in the communication assents, 
usually tacitly, to the proposition that the other 'knowledgeable being', 
through Interpreting his experiences, contributes to the individuating process. 
In this section two claims will be substantiatede they flow from these 
general points. The first Is that an individual 'knowledgeable being's' 
subjectivity is an integral part of the process, not only by which she 
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Individuates others, but also by which she Is Individuated (*18). In the second 
claim one notes that as well as contributing to the process by which he is 
individuated, a 'knowledgeable being' also contributes to the formation, the 
development and possibly the codification of the process Itself - and so also to 
the formation, development and possible codification of the use of concepts In 
general. The mechanisms Involved In such formulations, developments and 
possible codifications will be examined in Chapter 2. 
Types Of Objects Involved In Individuation Processes 
Now, communication between two or more 'knowledgeable beings' involves each 
one of them utilising a process such as g, (see fig. 1 p. 15) to affect the 
experiences of another 'knowledgeable being'. Such a utilisation necessitates 
each 'knowledgeable being' having the capacity to distinguish between the 
process pi, which he activates, and the changes in experiences which are brought 
about by the process. This capacity can only become operational If each 
'knowledgeable being' can individuate, and In so doing activate, the mechanism 
by which process y1 becomes functional. 
In order to avoid attempting to Interpret an Infinite regress of processes 
which affect experiences,, each one Itself forming part of an Interpreted 
experience, a 'knowledgeable being' must assume that at least one of the 
mechanisms by which she affects the experiences of another 'knowledgeable being' 
does not itself experience and interpret the changes she Is undergoing as part 
of the process of communication between the 'knowledgeable beings'. If a 
mechanism were to experience and interpret the changes it would thereby modify 
the changes and so modify the communication process. In such a scenario the 
'knowledgeable beings' would be communicating with the mechanisms as well as 
with each other. The communication with the mechanism would require a process 
similar to gi. A regress would set In, only to be stopped by a mechanism which 
did not experience and interpret the changes It underwent In the communication 
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process between the 'knowledgeable being' and, either another 'knowledgeable 
being', or some mechanism which had and interpreted experiences (*19). (In 
cases where the mechanism which facilitates the communication either is a social 
structure, such as a multinational company through which a message is sent, or 
is an individual acting as language Interpreter, it is reasonably easy to see 
that Interpretations by the mechanism or its parts can modify the process by 
which communication takes place. ) One can conclude that communication between 
'knowledgeable beings' involves them in assuming both that there is a medium 
through which mechanisms which affect others' experiences and interpretation of 
experiences operate and that some of the mechanisms and their operations are not 
Imbued with subjectivity. 
This means that 'knowledgeable beings' must be capable of individuating 
objects which either have or lack the ability to contribute cognitively to the 
individuating process. The ability to make such a contribution ranges from the 
participation In the formation and development of processes of individuation. to 
their cognitive use and possibly to the codification of such processes. 
The reason why an object might lack the ability to make a contribution to 
the formation, development and possible codification of Individuating processes 
is either because it cannot communicate any interpreted experiences it might 
have (e. g. It is a stone, book, tree or an electomagnetic Impulse) or because 
the 'knowledgeable beings' either Ignore or fall to understand any such 
interpreted experiences as may be the case with animals and perhaps even plants. 
So far it has been argued that the need to accommodate the conditions which 
are necessary for the existence of processes of concept development has 
generated a requirement that a distinction be drawn between two types of objects 
those objects which are members of the group of 'knowledgeable beings' who 
utilise the concepts used in processes of Individuation and of concept 
development and those which are not members of the group. 
Within this fundamental difference lies the distinction between the human 
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and the natural sciences. An object whose behaviour is studied in the natural 
sciences does not, as far as is known, through its own interpretations of Its 
relationships with the 'knowledgeable beings' (who comprise the group in whose 
body of knowledge concepts are formed and developed) alter, or have the capacity 
to alter, the processes which Individuate, and so distinguish one from another, 
the members of the group of objects to which it belongs. Some objects studied 
in the human sciences, such as persons, have this capacity, while some others 
operate by means of objects which have the capacity, such as social 
institutions. 
Objects which, because of their inability to interact cognitively with 
'knowledgeable beings', cannot participate in the processes of concept formation 
and development will be categorized as objects of Type-1. Objects which do have 
the ability to participate, whether or not they actually do so in practice, will 
be categorized as objects of Type-2. Because objects of Type-2 can Interact 
cognitively with 'knowledgeable beings' they must be capable both of 
interpreting experiences and of activating processes such as 92 which affect the 
Interpreted experiences of 'knowledgeable beings'. 
Objects every one of whose component parts is an object of Type-1 will 
normally also be objects of Type-t. So a motor car which consists of components 
which do not have and Interpret experiences will Itself not have and Interpret 
experiences. The possibility that emergent properties of compound objects may 
Include the ability to have and Interpret experiences Is not here ruled out a 
prior!. The question regarding whether an object whose component parts consist 
of objects of Type-2 should also be an object of Type-2 is also not ruled out a 
prior# this Issue is discussed in Chapter 2. 
The method which will be employed to examine the Implications of drawing 
the distinction between Type-1 and Type-2 objects concerns itself with the 
relationship between two processes: the process of formulating and developing 
concepts and the process of individuation in whioh use is made of such developed 
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concepts. It is by looking at the practical uses which are made of concepts in 
operations such as individuation that it will be possible to determine the areas 
in which one has to look in order to specify any a prior/ conditions which 
constrain the conceptualisation of what a person is in any given body of 
knowledge. 
The processes by which objects of Type-1 and Type-2 can be individuated can 
be represented diagrammatically as in Figures 2 and 3. 
Model(A) 
Ei 
Ii 
PI 
'3 
Object of Type-1 
E3 
Figure 2 
PI - Paradigm Individuator -a model member of the group of 'knowledgeable 
beings' who has the oapability to Individuate objects and so use concepts. 
E, - Experiences of the PI which are brought about by the operation of its 
own causal agency 
Ea - Experiences of the PI which are brought about by causal agencies other 
than the Pi's 
I, - PI's Interpretation of El 
13 - PI's Interpretation of E3 
1, /EI and 13/E3 are the Interpreted experiences which permit the PI 
correctly to individuate a specific object of Type-1 
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Model(B) 
Ei 
Ii 
Yi 
12 Y2 
Chapter 1 
Pi E2 Object of Type-2 
Y3 
I3 
EA 
Figure 3 
I, /E, and i3/E3 are the same as they are in Fig. 2 except that E3 does not 
Include the PI's experiences which are brought about by the causal agency of the 
object of Type-2. 
E2 - Experiences of the P1 brought about by the causal agency of the object of 
Type-2 which Is associated with Its capacity for cognitive Interactions with the 
PI. 
*NOTE, If an object Is abstract In nature, such as 'happiness' or '42's or 
Indeed Is Itself a concept, then it may be the case that experiences E3 may be 
either non-existent or only Indirectly related to the object being Identified. 
Y,. Y2 & Y3 are the object of Type-2's Interpretations of what It 
conceives the PI's Interpretations 1,. 12 & 13 to be. Should Y,. Yz & Y3 affect 
E,. E2 & E3 In any way then new experiences E4, E5 & Es would be generated with 
Interpretations 14, 15 and I. which In turn generate Y4. Ys a Ye. 
The process of generation 18 Potentially Infinite but, In practice, If 
Individuation is to ocour, It will be finite. * 
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Processes Of Individuating Objects 
Chapter 
Since it is not a single experience but a set of interpreted experiences 
which are needed in a process by which a PI individuates objects of either 
Type-1 or Type-2, the PI must have the capability not just to Interpret 
experiences and give them meaning, but also to Interpret sets of the Pi's own 
interpreted experiences. So the process of Individuation involves a PI In 
operating a second order monitoring device by which Interpreted experiences are 
fNOTES (a): The distinction between E2 and E3 would be captured by the 
experiences of a PI who heard an Individual utter a word (experience E2) while 
seeing the shape and colour of the Individual's face (experience E3). Neither 
are brought about by the PI 's agency but the former and not the latter is 
brought about by the agency of the object of Type-2 (the individual being 
Identified). 
(b)s In both Mode/U1 and Mode/(B) the appearance and behaviour of the 
Individuated object is central to the process of individuation. So that the 
movements, colour, shape, texture etc... of the Individuated object are noted 
and the note is interpreted by the PI. In the case of Mode/(B), it is also the 
Type-2's own Interpretations of its own behaviour which is Interpreted by the 
PI. So the Pt will generate a series of Interpreted experiences -- 
Interpretations of its experiences brought about by the Impact of functions such 
as f, , f2 and f3 described In Figure 1, page 16. 
(c): The series of interpreted triples (I1/Ei. 12/E2 13/E3); (14/E4. 
Is/Es, Is/Es): ... etc... will permit the P1 to Individuate objects of both 
Type-i and Type-2. In the case of an object of Type-1 being identified, E2 is 
empty and Yi, Y2 and Y3 are not operational so only the first triple is used. 
As Indicated above, this means that an analysis of the processes Involved In 
Individuating objects of Type-2 will, ipso facto, Include an analysis of the 
processes Involved in Individuating objects of Type-i. 
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themselves interpreted. 
In the light of the diagrammatical representation of the processes of 
individuating objects of Type-2, it can be seen that such objects, by means of 
their interpretations (Y1, Y2, Ys), (Ya, Y., Ye), ... contribute In a subjective 
way to their own individuation. If, further, an object of Type-2 has access to 
the concept-developing mechanisms which determine the parameters which permit 
individuation (at minimum this Involves being able to substitute for a PI), then 
it will also contribute to the formation and development of concepts of objects 
In general and of Itself in particular. It ras the atteapt to actuall. e the 
possibility of such access which set in notion the underlabouring process of 
this chapter. 
The next part of this chapter will concern itself with the nature of 
concept-developing mechanisms, but first a little more needs to be said about 
the nature of a Paradigm Individuator (P1) and the criteria which apply if an 
object of Type-2 is to substitute for a PI In an individuating process. The 
criteria will include the possession by the object of Type-2 of the second order 
monitoring device referred above. Being a necessary characteristic of a P1, the 
possession of a second order monitoring device must also be a characteristic of 
anything which can substitute for a P1. The criteria for substitution for a PI, 
will also include the condition that the Type-2 object has access to the 
concept-developing mechanisms operational in the cultural system. Arguments 
Justifying the inclusion of this condition, will be incorporated into a brief 
examination of the notion of a Pl. 
Proossses Of Individuating Objects And The Possibility Of Teaching/Learning 
Central to the acceptability of the model is the conception one has of the 
Paradigm Individuator. Should the P1 be specified by some entity which is 
exogenous to the cultural system within which the conceptions (used in 
Individuation processes) are formed. then there would be no need for the 
31 
Dart 4: Interpretations and Experience Chapter 1 
development of concepts In the cultural system. The criteria determining 
whether a given attempted process of individuation were valid would be specified 
by the exogenous entity. The need for the analysis of concepts would always be 
met by the entity's decrees. In cultural systems where there Is disagreement 
over the validity of any process of individuation, and the requirement for 
teaching and learning processes involves an assumption that such agreement does 
not exist, there are two possibilities regarding the exogenous entity. Firstly, 
it may be assumed that it exists and that means have to be discovered to find 
out what its decrees are such that disagreements regarding meanings can be 
settled. Such an assumption underpins the cultural system In Plato's Republic 
where the Guardians are charged with the task of discovering the decrees. 
Secondly, It may be assumed that no such exogenous entity operates, in which 
case the means of determining the validity of processes of individuation must be 
developed within the cultural system itself. In both these oases there will be 
mechanisms to which 'knowledgeable beings', who can determine valid 
individuations, have access which themselves determine whether a given object of 
Type-2 can substitute for a P1. Without such access individuation of objects 
would not be possible. This impossibility is accompanied by the Impossibility 
of the occurrence of learning and teaching (*20). 
Nat ony are the seem of detsrein/ng which objectta can substitute for Pis 
to be available to the abject. which can make the substitution, but also Type-2 
obJeats which aan subst/tutOP ifar pis must have access to the processes which 
del nine valid and Invalid individwtona. 
Justification for this claim would follow similar lines to the argument in 
the previous paragraph. As In that argument, should there be no disagreements 
In need of settlement regarding valid individuations of objects then the need 
for access to the processes would disappear. 
There is a mutuality of dependence between the two arguments. If a 'know- 
ledgeable being' can Individuate an object and then subsequently, through access 
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to the mechanism by which individuation processes develop, alters the manner in 
which he Individuates a given object, then that 'knowledgeable being' will have 
changed his own powers and capabilities. He will then need to be individuated 
by a different procedure. So if 'knowledgeable beings' who use concepts have 
access to the development of the processes by which they individuate objects, 
they must also have access to the development of the processes by which they 
individuate each other. The absence of access to such development processes was 
seen, above, to carry with it unacceptable consequences. 
Further, we can conclude that, since the process of individuating an object 
Is parasitic upon the process of formulating a concept of the object, 
'knowledgeable beings' who Individuate each other contribute to the process by 
which each one of them Is defined. And finally, we can conclude from the same 
argument that these 'knowledgeable beings' must have access to the means by 
which the meanings of concepts are both developed and reaffirmed - the history 
of Ideas is not Independent of the individuals who use them in communicating 
with each other (*21). 
This last point, which has flowed from an analysis of the process of 
communication, is not surprising. Communication involves the assumption by the 
participants that there is an equivalence of meaning among the concepts they 
use. This, in turn, involves the assumption that each individual has access to 
the means by which meanings of concepts can change. The arguments in Part 4 
have made these points In rather a detailed fashion. Part 5 will consist 
principally of the fashioning of an analysis of the means by which the meanings 
of concepts can change or by which they are reaffirmed. 
Before producing this analysis a small gap in the present analysis will 
need to be filled. There Is a presumption in all the arguments above that 
'knowledgeable beings' have some second order activating and monitoring devices 
by which they operate and control the functions such as fi, f2, f3 and 92 in 
Figure 1, page 16. The justification of this presumption is to be found in the 
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entire essay, but put succinctly one might state that it rests on the price paid 
by anyone who attempts to deny Its validity. The denial would be accompanied by 
the absence of the intelligibility of processes Involving concept communication. 
PART 5. THE DETERMINATION OF CONCEPT EQUIVALENCE 
(The dial/nctlon between social and natural structures vindicated) 
Mechanisms Which Determine Meaning Equivalence 
Once one accepts that the application of concepts involves processes 
whereby objects are individuated, one recognises the need (within a system in 
which concepts are used) for the existence of mechanisms which determine the 
equivalence of the meanings of the concepts which are used. The need becomes 
more acute If the meanings of the concepts are liable to shift or change in any 
way. 
There are at least three conditions which such mechanisms have to meet. 
Firstly, they must be accessible to any individual who can communicate concepts 
and so can individuate others and other objects. The justification for 
accepting this first condition was given in the last section. Secondly, the 
operation of the mechanism must utilise a process such as gi in fig. 2 in order 
to affect the experiences of an individual and thereby affect the individual's 
interpretative functions (captured by the operation of f, in fig. 2). The 
necessity to accept this second condition stems from the requirement that future 
operations of functions such as f1, f2 and f3 have to take into account any 
changes In meaning of the concept. The interpretations and actions of 
individuals need to account for alterations in meanings if communication Is to 
be possible when meanings alter. Thirdly, it must be possible for the 
mechanisms which determine meaning equivalence to be available for use during 
any Interaction between individuals. The lack of availability of such a 
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mechanism during an interaction, would prevent communication from occurring if 
differences existed, between the communicating individuals, concerning the 
meaning of a concept. 
If one Is to take the point (that individuals who communicate have access 
to the mechanisms by which meanings change) seriously, then the second and third 
condition outlined In the last paragraph oblige one to accept that the 
mechanisms must operate through interactions between Individuals. Since 
interactions must Involve constant mutual Individuation by the Individuals 
involved in the Interactions, Model(B) *page 30 for individuating objects of 
Type-2 can be used with the minor amendment that the Type-2 object can also 
substitute for a PI (*22). The model for an interaction between Individuals 
which incorporates the mechanisms for determining concept equivalence between 
the concepts held or understood by the individuals, can be represented 
diagrammatically in figure 4 below. 
In the operation of the model, it is asumed that individuals P and 0 are 
going through a process by which they are determining whether their respective 
eonoeptualisations of some object correspond sufficiently closely for them to be 
able agree to the Identification of the object and communicate that agreement. 
Individual P holds concept Cp and Individual 0 holds concept Co. 
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Model(C) 
INDIVIDUAL P INDIVIDUAL 0 
E0i 
E P, 
ý 
ý2 
E 
13 
ýEP 
Figure 4 
Figure 4 represents the interaction by which individuals P and 0 attempt to 
determine the equivalence of the concept CP and Co 
EP3 and E03 = Experiences of P and 0 respectively which are brought about 
by neither P's nor 0's causal agencies 
EP, and EQ2 = Experiences of P and 0 respectively which are brought about 
by P's causal agency 
EP2 and EQ, = Experiences of P and 0 respectively which are brought about 
by O's causal agency 
(Ii. 12 & 13) & (Y,. Y2 & Y3) = interpretations by P and 0 respe ctively of (EP,. 
EP2 & EP3) & (EQi, EQ2, EQ3) "(See foot of page 37) 
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The acceptance of any interactive model, such as Model(C), which represents 
part of the operation of a concept equivalence det Twining mechanise. commits 
one to the assumption that each individual. such as P or 0, Interacts with the 
other In accordance with a structured set or Intersubjeatively accepted 
principles. As was claimed earlier In the chapter, each Individual brings his 
own subjectivity to the interaction= and the claim that the subjectivity 
operates in a structure which is also accepted by the other subjectively 
operating Individual. Is Justified by reference to the conditions which have to 
apply if the interaction is to be intelligible. The intelligibility cot each 
individual's participation In the Interaction would be lost unlesss firstly, 
each Individual assumes that the other is attempting to interact using the same 
or similar weohanismsi secondly, each Individual assumes that bath Interacting 
fNOTEs The diagram is simplified by the fact that here Individual P will also 
interpret what he or she conceives Individual Q's Interpretations Y,. Y2 & Y3 to 
be, giving rise to Is. Is & Is and modifying EP,, EP2 & EP3 giving rise to the 
possibility of further Interpretations as was the case with Model(B ). But here 
the picture is more complex since individual a Is also interpreting; and 
uncertainties regarding the sequence of Interpretations can, and, In practice, 
often do set In. 
This complex Interplay of Interpretations was exploited by Peter Sellars in 
the comic film Dr. Strangelove where, as s spy, he informs one government that 
the other knows a sensitive fact then Informs the first that the second in fact 
knows that It knows, then informs the second that the first knows that it knows 
that It knows this sensitive fact. The process of Informing each government 
that the other knows that it knows etc... continues until at last the point was 
reached when Dr. Strangeiove actually tells one government a piece of 
Information of which It was not cooniscent that the other knows that It knows 
etc... This last piece of Information is deemed to be highly significant! 
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individuals are using structures which are in harmony and which. not only 
facilitate communication, but also allow for reciprocity in the interactive 
process; and thirdly, each assumes that the results of the operations of the 
interactions in determining new. or reaffirming existing, meanings of concepts 
are transferable to other interactions. 
The reciprocity and transferability of its results ensure that the 
interaction is structured and that the structure Influences the means by which 
each Individual affects the interpreted experiences of the other. Incorporated 
in such a structure would be the language, and the rules by which language is 
used, along with all other social structures which allow meaning to be 
associated with non-linguistic experiences. If the structure is to be used then 
its parts will consist of objects which can be Individuated and so consist of 
objects of Type-1 and Type-2. 
Since each individual involved in the interactive processes which determine 
concept equivalence must recognise that the other individual's subjectivity is 
needed for the processes to achieve their purpose. one can conclude that an 
individual assumes, even tacitly. that her own participation in the Interaction 
is necessary for its operation. In other words the Individuals assume that they 
sustain the structure which facilitates the Interaction through using the self- 
same structure. 
Bringing together the points made in this section one finds that 
Interactions involving the development or reaffirmation of concepts have, as 
necessary conditions for their operation: 
(a) the pre-existence of a 'social structure', and possibly a 'natural 
structure', which facilitate concept-developing and meanIng-reaffirming 
interactions between Individuals which the Individuals can recognise as such 
Interactions when they occur; 
(b) the existence of individuals who can recognise themselves as, on one 
hand, sustaining and being partly defined In tems of that 'social structure' 
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through their interactions yet. on the other hand, as not being derivatives of 
the operations of that structure. 
These points will be developed more fully in the next two chapters. The 
present purpose is to record the foundations on which the points rest. The 
final section of this chapter will involve an outline of how all the points 
raised so far are likely to impinge upon theories of Personal Identity. 
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The scenario painted above enables one to see much of the modern analytical 
philosophy which concerns Itself with Personal Identity In a wider perspective 
than such philosophy usually sees itself. Such philosophy concerns itself 
largely with the problem of codifying the characteristics of what is assumed to 
be the archetypal individual. These are concerns which are met by the use of, 
rather than an analysis of, processes represented by Model(C). Attempts are 
made to discover the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for an object to be 
defined as a person (*23). These attempts base themselves on often unrecognised 
assumptions, not only that the group within which the individual Is located, 
presumably the whole of humanity, and the individuals within the group, have at 
least some fixed characteristics In the same way as the objects of enquiry in 
the natural sciences are seen to have fixed characteristics, but also that these 
fixed characteristics can be determined or discovered from observations of the 
behaviour of people and from the construction of theories based on these 
observations. 
P. F. Strawson (*24) went some way towards casting aside the shackles of 
these assumptions. He pointed out firstly that definitions of individuals are 
dependent upon the cultural system within which they are located. 'Secondly, he 
pointed out that such definitions should not contravene the rules of the use of 
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the language within which they are formulated (in view of his contention that 
such rules reflect or embody the structure of the cultural system). 
Unfortunately Strawson's insight has lain dormant for some time and only his 
conclusions regarding a speotlo cultural system have been criticised - and these 
have been criticised as if he were making universal claims about persons rather 
than a specific claim about a specific cultural system (*25). 
Strawson's Insight, If accepted, leads one to examine the 
Inter-relationships between individuals, who through their interpreted 
experiences and action sustain the structures of the cultural system. it also 
leads one to examine the structures themselves. This examination would also 
highlight the static nature of Strawson's own argument as well as the 
unproductive nature of those arguments which Involve a priori assumptions of the 
possibility of discovering criteria of personal identity which are not tied to a 
specific cultural system. Even those who, following Thomas Reid and Joseph 
Butler (*26), assert that the self is unanalysable, tend to reach their 
conclusion by arguing that the search for criteria is unreasonable rather than 
illogical. With his argument stemming from the first-person perspective Madell 
(*27) offers a different route to the conclusion that the self Is unanalysable. 
Had he only delved a little more deeply into Strawson's argument, he would have 
found some support there for his thesis of the importance of the first-person 
perspectives Strawson argues that the concept of a person is a primitive one in 
our cultural system, so giving the basis for arguments suggesting that a 
first-person perspective Is significant. One of the main tasks of this essay is 
to provide, with an extended Strawsonian argument, support for the twin theses 
of the significance of a first-person perspective and of an incompletely 
analysable (rather than unanalysable) self. 
The significance of the Inability to analyse the self does not lie in the 
uniqueness of such an inability; for there may be other objects which can be 
Individuated yet cannot be completely analysed. The significance lies rather in 
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the uniqueness of the type of inability to give a complete analysis: this 
inability is of neoess/ty found in all cultural systems In which the development 
of concepts is seen to occur. No cultural system can exist In which the 
concepts, by which one Individuates Individuals who sustain the cultural system, 
can be reduced completely to other concepts within the system. The concept of a 
person is necessarily a primitive concept. 
in making this provision. a more extensive understanding of what a 
'knowledgeable being' is will be developed. As has already been Indicated, a 
'knowledgeable being's' relationships with other such beings and with the struc- 
tures which enable him to interact with these other beings, will be 
Investigated. It will be assumed that any successful theory of Personal 
Identity will designate all 'knowledgeable beings' who are "good-enough 
Individuators" as persons. Theories which do not do this will be seen to be 
incomplete in an Important way. 
w" 
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THE SELF AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
"The direct activities out of which thought grows are social acts" (*1) 
"In other words, man is not also a social being, but he is social In every 
respect of his being that is open to empirical investigation" (*2) 
"But because we have defined consciousness not as a static form but as a process 
involving interaction between individual and environment, as human relations 
have been transformed during the evolution of society, so human consciousness 
too has been transformed. " (*3) 
"... a creature cannot have thoughts unless it Is an Interpreter of the speech of 
another" (*4) 
PART 1s INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this chapter is to make a contribution to the understanding 
of the relationship between self and society. In Chapter 1 the subjective 
element in the Individuating and the Ind/vldu~ self was emphasised. 
Attention will now be focussed more on the objective element. In Chapter 1, it 
was argued that If the concepts which enable us to communicate are to do the 
work required of them we must incorporate in our system of concepts two types of 
concept. The two types of concept refer to the two types of object (Type-1 and 
Type-2, Ch. 1 p. 27-8) which need to be distinguished and individuated if a 
cultural system is to be able to sustain various activities. As well as 
communication, it was noted that processes such teaching, learning and 
evaluating an individual's competence to carry out these activities each would 
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disintegrate If Individuals who sustained the cultural system were not 'unified' 
Individuals (with second order monitoring capabilities) and did not distinguish 
between Type-1 and Type-2 objects. 
in pursuing the main aim of this chapter the analysis will be pushed 
further. The focus will be on the nature of the structures which enable the 
occurrence of Individuating processes represented by Model(A) and Model(B) (p. 
27-28) and concept-developing and meaning-reaffirming process represented by 
Model(C) (p. 35). In any cultural system, these structures will be Individuated 
as either Type-1 or Type-2 objects. Since one of the purposes of this study is 
to throw light on the basis upon which we develop our understanding of social 
phenomena, it seems natural to investigate the distinction between Type-1 and 
Type-2 objects more deeply. 
Rather than do this directly, a different distinction will be specified. 
The distinction is underpinned by the Type-1/Type-2 differentiation, but is not 
embodied by it. The distinction which constitutes the focus of attention in 
this chapter Is the one between 'natural kinds' and 'social kinds'. 'Social 
kinds' will be defined as objects whose operations are dependent upon the 
Intentional operations of objects of Type-2, that is, on the operation of 
objects which can conceptuallse and have causal powers whose use they can 
conceptualise. Obviously, objects of Type-2 will, by definition, be social 
kinds. it will be argued that objects of Type-1, or objects which do not 
conceptualise, can also be 'social kinds'. The existence of objects which do 
not conceptualise, yet whose operations are dependent upon objects which do, 
will be justified by establishing a mutual ontological dependence between these 
objects and 'conceptualising Individuals' - all of which are Type-2 objects. An 
example of this mutual ontological dependence would be found in the relationship 
between a prison officer and the penal structure operating In a given social 
environment. 
Social kinds will be placed Into further subcategories: those which can 
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alter their own causal powers and conceptualise the alterations are 
distinguished from those which do not have this capability. Persons will be 
found in the former category. It will be found that different 
conceptualisations of what a person is have different effects on one's ability 
to sustain an adequate account of the notion of society. Different 
conceptualisations also have different constraining effects on possible 
conceptualisations of the relationships between persons. It will be seen that 
the rejection of the conditions for the formulation of a concept of a person 
which are set out here leads to Inadequate conceptualisations of 
(II what society Is and 
(ii) the nature of the relationships between Individuals (at least the 
relationships between those individuals who sustain the cultural 
environment in which understanding of relationships is sought). 
By contrast, the acceptance of such a concept of a person will enable one 
to conceptualise two categories of relationships between persons which are 
central to the understanding of the development of concepts In any cultural 
environment. These are the relationships between persons which Involve them in 
Interactions with and those which Involve them in being with (*5) other persons. 
The deeper understanding of the basis on which concepts develop will, Inter 
alle, permit one to find a solution to Hume's problem of a missing subject of 
experiences (*6), and thereby gain a deeper understanding of the basis upon 
which the concept of a person Is developed. 
Underlying the whole exercise is the same principle which both underpinned 
and resulted from the analysis in Chapter 1: 
it Is not the . Identity of 
the self which is a spsoMc Instance of general 
Identity, but rather that general notions of Identity rest upon a prior grasp of 
the notion of Personal Identity. 
44 
Dart is Introduction Chapter 2 
The second concern of the argument in this chapter will be the development, 
into the areas governing social change, of the Ideas already outlined. An 
analogy with the natural sciences will be used. It will be suggested that, just 
as changes of state of natural kinds are only possible when there are 
alterations among balancing forces, so changes of state of social kinds are only 
possible when there are alterations among balancing social forces. The concept 
of force in nature is conceived as being interlinked with the concepts of space 
and distance so, it will be argued, a concept of a social force can be 
interlinked with concepts of social space. 
Such an elementary particle sociology will involve an investigation into 
the relationships between the concept of a person, which will be given in 
schematic form, and the sources of our understanding of social change. It will 
be argued that a person conceived as an entirely objective entity, whether or 
not that objectivity is embedded in cultural relativism, will relegate social 
change to the realm of natural change. While this may be a welcome development 
for some, it has the unwelcome effect of dissolving the distinction between 
natural and social kinds. and so merging phenomena with thought and rendering 
the transfer of concepts through communication meaningless, eventually leading 
to the evaporation of all intentional action. 
w 
PART 2e FROM NATURAL KINDS TO SOCIAL KINDS 
Natural Kinds 
The development of any notion Is dependent upon conceptualisations of 
other, related notions. The development of the notion of a social kind will 
rely heavily on an analysis of what it is to be a natural kind. A distinction 
will be drawn between natural and social kinds, in this particular case, the 
distinction drawn has to depend on the already extensively analysed (by other 
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writers) concept of a natural kind. It Is with a rehearsal of the more familiar 
and accepted properties of natural kinds that the processes by which the 
distinction is drawn will begin. These properties will be asserted without 
offering any justification for their acceptability. The assertions will be made 
in the form of assumptions. Further, since the analysis of natural kinds is not 
the central concern of this essay, the water-tight validity of the assumptions 
is not central to the validity of the central argument in the essay. 
Four assumptions regarding natural kinds will be made: firstly. it will be 
assumed that natural kind concepts make a conceptual link between questions of 
Identity and the causal and dispositional properties of members of the natural 
kind (*7). Swondly, natural kinds are not nominal essences nor are captured by 
"law-cluster concepts" (*8). Arguments against such formulations of natural 
kind concepts are to be found In Roy Bhaskar's work (*9). Thirdly. It will be 
assumed that there is a distinction between natural kind concepts and 
mathematical and logical concepts, and this distinction is not restricted to the 
type of object the concepts designate (*10). Fourthly, it will be assumed that 
the formulation of natural kind concepts involves two interactive processes, 
(a) processes involving interactions between identifier, usually termed 
person. and putative examples of the natural kind and 
(b) the Interactions between individuals which determine the development 
of, and the reaffirmation of the meaning of, natural kind concepts as they 
are conceptualised by the various interacting individuals. 
Together (a) and (b) lead to the specification of the acceptable applications of 
a concept. 
Outline Of The Path From Natural To Social Kinds 
The path which will be followed in specifying what is meant by a social 
kind is determined by the similarities and differences which exist between 
natural and social objects. The similarities are found in the ascription, to 
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each type of object. of powers to affect its environment. The ascription of 
causal powers to an object Is central to the concept-learning, 
concept-development and meaning-reaffirming processes in which Individuals need 
to be capable to participate if they are to be able to communicate concepts. 
The differences between natural and social kinds are to be found in the 
relationship between the conceptualisation of the powers of the object and the 
exercise of those powers. 
The development of those concepts which designate objects with powers to 
affect their environments is dependent upon the operations of both Individuating 
processes and concept-developing processes. This will be the case whether the 
development occurs in the natural or the social sciences. In other words such 
developments are dependent upon the operations of processes represented by 
Models (A). (B) and (C) - (*p. 28,29, & 36). The operations of these models 
Involved assuming that the object being Individuated had causal and 
dispositional properties which would be Identified by Interpreted experiences - 
categorised on (*p. 30) as the triples (i, / E,. 12/E2,13/E3)- So the 
Interpretation of experiences lies at the heart of the development of the 
conceptualisation of any object deemed to have causal Influence on its 
environment. However, the interpretation of experiences does not necessarily 
lie at the heart of the operations of the objects which have been 
conceptualised. 
The discussion in the preceding paragraph indicates that the fourth 
assumption regarding natural kinds (*p. 46) also applies to social kinds. The 
formulation of social kind concepts also Involves Interactions of the type 
described above. It was established in Chapter 1 that the acceptance of this 
fourth assumption involves further assumptlonse these being the relatively 
enduring structured nature of both (1) the objects which are to be Identified 
and (11) the set of Inter-relationships between Individuals which enable them to 
sustain and develop concepts. 
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It has been argued elsewhere (*11) that the Intelligibility of some of 
these Inter-relationships (which Involve the use of scientific training 
programmes and the accepted practices of the transfactual application of 
knowledge discovered in such programmes) justifies the claim that natural kinds 
operate independently of any conceptualisation of their operations. By contrast 
however, it would seem that that there Is a prima facie case for suggesting that 
any structure of the Inter- relationships cannot Itself operate Independently of 
the conceptualisations of the individuals involved in the inter-relationships. 
These relationships, being between conceptualising Individuals are, 
ex-hypothesi, ones involving conceptualisations. 
It is, however, logically possible that a structure of relationships 
between Conceptualising Individuals (Cis) itself operates independently of any 
conceptualisations. Further. and independently of the possibility, the 
structure Itself could generate changes in the conceptualisatlonsof the Cis. 
The notion of such an Independent structure would be consistent with the 
reification of society and with holistic explanations in the Social Sciences. 
The refection of this possibility will not be attempted by direct 
contradiction, it will be achieved obliquely. The existence of objects (within 
the structure of relationships between individuals) whose operations are not 
Independent of conceptualisations will be postulated. The purpose is to justify 
the claim that such objects exist. The justification will be achieved by naming 
a price to be paid by anyone denying the claim (*12). The objects are to be 
characterised as 'social kinds' and it will be claimed that it is only an 
example, or an instance, of a social kind which has causal and dispositional 
properties. Neither the imprecisely conceptualised relationship between 
Individuals nor the equally fuzzily conceived 'society', can reasonably have 
causal and dispositional properties ascribed to them. The price to be paid by 
one who makes such an ascription will be specified in Part 4 below. 
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Preparing for the Definition of a Social Kind 
Before attempting a schematic definition of a social kind It is worth 
examining a few of the characteristics which will form part of that schema. A 
fruitful way of achieving this is to undertake a comparison with the natural 
kind schema already outlined. As has already been stated one of the d/ffarences 
between natural kinds and social kinds Is that the ft-wer, but not the latter, 
are conceived as operating independently of any conceptualisations of those 
operations. The similarity lies in the requirement that both have causal and 
dispositional properties. 
If social kinds are to be brought under concepts then these concepts must 
make conceptual links between questions of identity and the causal and 
dispositional properties of the members of the kind. The shared need, between 
social and natural kinds, to make this conceptual link justifies the claim that 
the second, third and fourth assumptions (*p. 46) made regarding the properties 
of natural kinds also apply to social kinds. The justification rests on the 
dependence of these three assumptions on the first assumption. 
There will, however, be significant differences between some of the 
processes Involved In the formulation. maintenance and development of social 
kind concepts and processes with similar functions Involving natural kinds. 
With social kind objects these processes may themselves involve the use of the 
social kind object; so that the formulation, maintenance or development of a 
social kind concept could alter the social kind itself. 
The constant use of financial institutions, and with that use the 
maintenance of the concepts which identify such institutions, may easily alter 
the confidence individuals have in a particular institution's operation and so 
alter Its causal and dispositional properties. By contrast, it is assumed that 
no amount of use of the concept of an electron, or even use of an electron 
Itself. will alter Its causal and dispositional properties. 
A further and equally sharp distinction exists. The conceptualisations of 
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some individuals may not only affect the operations of social kinds they might 
also affect their ontological status. The defeat of Italy in the Second World 
War led to the disintegration of the Fascist Party associated with the 
government. Few would admit to belonging to the party and those who previously 
had attempted to use its powers both as officials and as outsiders ceased to do 
so. In these circumstances a party which once had considerable causal and 
dispositional properties ceased to exist - it was more like the scattered parts 
of the remains of a burnt out motor vehicle than an unused stationary one which 
is only waiting for petrol and a driver in order to move. 
Distinguishing Natural From Social Kinds: (I) (Conceptualisations) 
It may be argued that the distinctions being drawn are not significant in 
that natural kinds can both change their causal and dispositional properties as 
well as 
cease to exist If their constituent parts change or disintegrate. Extinct 
animals, such as the mammoth or some micro-organisms which are no longer 
produced, might be examples analogous to the Italian Fascist Party. Further, it 
seems that the causal and dispositional powers of micro-organisms can change, 
and such organisms are thought to operate independently of any 
conceptualisations which we may have. 
The significance of the distinctions does not lie in the nature of the 
operations of natural and social kinds. It lies in the procedures which control 
the formulation, maintenance and development of natural and social kind 
concepts Since natural kinds are assumed to operate Independently of any 
conceptualisations of their operations, that Independence can be incorporated 
into the control procedures. 
This does not imply that the Independence from conceptualisations must be 
incorporated Into the control procedures for the development of natural kind 
concepts: as Galileo found to his cost after his reply of "e pur SI muove" (and 
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yet it moves) was rejected. At the time, control procedures for the development 
of concepts rested on consistency with church dogma which was not independent of 
eonoeptuallsations - and church dogma did not allow for the possibility that the 
Earth might move. By contrast, in modern science the continued use of the same 
natural kind concept, encapsulated by the use of the term 'carbon', to describe 
both graphite and diamonds is justified by the continued similarity of the 
behaviour of the two substances in specified controlled conditions. The 
creation, by the scientists, of the controlled conditions involves assumptions 
about the independent operations of the dispositional properties of the 
substances. 
Further complications exist. In the cases of social kind concepts the 
control procedures for the development of concepts often constitute some of the 
operational components of the social kind itself. The application of concepts 
such as 'bankrupt' and 'deviant' to an Individual constitutes part of what It Is 
to be a bankrupt or a deviant and involves the exercise of some of the causal 
and dispositional properties of the bankrupt and the deviant. Both a bankrupt 
and a deviant have causal and disposltional properties which depend upon the 
application of their concepts to the individuals termed bankrupt and deviant. 
These properties include the engendering of fear and mistrust by other 
Individuals; and the properties would not exist if no-one were to use the 
concepts. Indeed if no-one were to use the concepts, all the causal and 
dispositional properties of bankrupts and deviants would disappear. Unless one 
claims. along with some behaviourists and all materialists, that interactions 
between Individuals can be analysed, without remainder, with no reference to the 
conceptualisations of individuals, these examples justify not only the 
distinctions between natural and social kinds but also the claim that the 
distinctions are significant for the social analyst 013). 
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Distinguishing Natural from Social Kinds: (/! ) (Explanations) 
This discussion highlights a problem encountered by explanations, generated 
in Social Science, of the behaviour of social kinds. In contrast with 
explanations of the behaviour of natural kinds they seem encircled in a 
perennial relativism. As Andrew Weigert has put it "Identities, like all 
socially constructed realities, are structured with internal logics of action, 
thought and feeling that direct behaviour, Interpret experience and provide the 
only materials Individuals have for making sense out of their lives" (emphasis 
added) (*14). If Weigert is right and socially constructed realities, some of 
which are being categorised here as social kinds, are structured with their own 
Internal logics of action, thought and feeling, then explanations of their 
behaviour would have to be culturally relative. More precisely, no individual 
could offer any explanation of the behaviour of a social kind except through the 
concepts which formed part of the operational matrix of the social kinds such an 
explanation would only make sense in the cultural environment in which the 
social kind operated. Indeed, since in Weigert's terms identities provide, as 
socially constructed realities, the only means Individuals have of making sense 
of the world, it could be argued that natural kind concepts also restrict 
themselves to a particular cultural environment. 
The cultural relativism would be reinforced if one were to situate persons 
among social kinds. The causal and dispositional properties of persons, qua 
social kinds, would be dependent upon the conceptualisations of individuals. 
They would be socially constructed realities, with Internal logics of action, 
which directed behaviour and Interpreted experience. Personal Identity would be 
a non-transferable notion restricted to the cultural environment In which It was 
formed. Problems of translatability between cultures would, In such a scenario, 
become Insoluble 015). It would, ex-hypothesl. be impossible to convert 
someone to the beliefs of a faith of another culture not merely because it would 
Involve the destruction of an Identity In one culture with the simultaneous 
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creation of another in the second culture. but also because there would be no 
way of identifying or communicating with an individual in another culture who 
might be a candidate for conversion. 
Two courses of action commend themselves to the social analyst at this 
points either to accept relativism, work with it and put up with Its limitations 
(*16) or to look for areas where it is possible to justify claims for a certain 
level of cultural Independence so that some yardsticks may be found against 
which one can guage the strength of any theory about the nature of a given 
social kind (*17). The course a philosopher might take would be to attempt to 
clarify the extent to which relativism has to operate - as well as the areas in 
which it cannot operate - specifying the reasons why relativism does not extend 
into these areas. The last course of action will be followed. 
This course will start with a statement of a more formal, if schematic, 
definition of a social kind. Secondly, what will be termed 'social 
environment'. 'cultural environment' and 'social space' will be specified. 
Thirdly, an argument which claims that the evaluations of theories of the 
behaviour of social kinds across the divisions of social environments must be 
possible. Finally, the proposition that cultural environments have sufficiently 
organic properties to permit the expansion of the boundaries within which 
cultural relativism operates will be ratified. 
The argument supporting the possibility of evaluating theories across the 
boundaries of differing social environments will rest on the requirement that 
conceptualising individuals must commit themselves, to some degree, to the 
maintenance of the social kinds which operate in a given social environment (so 
it always remains possible for the individual to shift his commitment). 
Both the maintenance of the commitment and the possibility of shifting that 
commitment must be present even if the reasons for the individual's commitment 
are different from any reasons given in an explanation of the behaviour of the 
social kinds. The garbage collector's commitment to sustaining the operations 
53 
Part 2s From Natural to Social Kinds Chapter 2 
of social kinds such as municipal authorities is not given for the same reason 
as the reason given in any explanation of the behaviour of the municipality. 
Also, any attempts to alter the individual's commitment must be based upon 
criteria which are common to the various social environments from and to which 
the commitment Is taken away and given. The Intelligibility of attempts to 
convert Individuals to a given set of beliefs rests on the assumption that the 
commitment of the individuals' beliefs sustains some given social structure. 
(The relationship between an individual's commitment to sustaining the 
operations of social kinds and the development of the concept of what it is to 
be a person is investigated in detail In Chapter 4 below. ) 
The Social Kind Defined 
The drawing of a distinction between natural and social kinds enables one 
to lead towards the specification of characteristics which 'persons' must have 
In any cultural environment. The conclusion to be drawn, from the discussion in 
which the distinction has been made, consists of a set of assertions about the 
nature of the relationships between individuals and social kinds. 
If social kinds are to be capable of exercising their causal and 
dispositional powers then 'persons' cannot be adequately specified by using the 
concepts of a particular cultural environment in which they, as social kinds, 
operate (*18). A person cannot be a fully analysable entity: her scope cannot 
be restricted to a specifiable cultural environment without the payment of a 
penalty. The Inadequacy of the specification of the person's causal and 
dispositional powers is the price paid for the attempt to restrict the scope of 
action of the person to a specifiable cultural environment. The Inadequacy lies 
in the inability of the restricted person to sustain the operations of those 
social kinds which facilitate the development of concepts. 
Indeed, the notion of a Conceptualising Individual, (defined below *p. 57). 
although necessarily incorporated into any notion of a person. is too narrow to 
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sustain the work required by individuals In maintaining the operations of social 
kinds; especially when these operations involve the alterations of the 
properties of other social kinds. In order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
conceptualisation of a person as a CI, a more detailed examination of the 
properties ascribed to social kinds, and the objects which sustain the 
operations of social kinds, will need to be undertaken. 
A reasonably formal definition of a social kind will now be constructed. 
The definition is a schematic one allowing for definitions of specific social 
kinds to incorporate in them those properties which are, in any given context. 
accidental and those which are essential. 
A social kind Is an object which has causal and dispositional properties which 
are manifest in alterations in the behaviour. perceptions and conceptualisations 
of some individuals. The exercise of these causal and dispositional properties 
is itself causally dependent upon the conceptualisations of some Individuals. 
Further. the causal and dispositional properties are manifest in the alteration 
of the behaviour of some objects which do not have the ability to conceptualise. 
At the Dore of the definition one finds that alterations of 
... (D1) 
conoeptualisatlons of individuals are seen both as the causes and as the effects 
of the manifestation of causal and dispositional properties of the social kind. 
It makes the manifestation of such alterations an essential property of a social 
kind. It is worth noting that similar alterations would constitute an 
accidental property of a natural kind. Being schematic the definition will 
constrain rather than determine the conceptualisation of any particular social 
"NOTEs it can be seen that the acceptability of this definition rests on the 
prior acceptance of the existence of Type-2 objects, that is of objects which 
can both conceptualise and act 
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kind. Within those constraints it will permit any conceptualisation to specify 
the limits of the object's dispositional properties. 
The definition of 'Finland' will be couched in terms which specify the 
dispositional properties which manifest themselves in the production both of the 
distinctly Finnish music of Sibelius and of Finnish cooking. Further, an 
attempt to define a specific social kind such as 'the Snoopy Party' which 
consists of the Snoopy Fan Club and the British Labour Party might fail if it 
could be shown that it was not one object but two. In such a case It would not 
have properties appertaining to the Snoopy Party which were not identifiable as 
being properties of either of the distinct component parts. It would then turn 
into a nominal essence gaining its properties entirely from Its name. 
It should also be noted that the social kind has natural kind properties in 
that it affects the behaviour of some objects which do not have the ability to 
conceptualise. At minimum it will, In affecting the conceptualisations of 
Individuals, affect the sense receptors of the Individuals and the sense 
receptors will be partly made up of operational or active natural kind objects. 
It can also be seen that what a Conceptualising Individual is thought to be 
will fall under the gathering sweep of the definition (D1) - If such an 
Individual has, and exercises, the power to communicate concepts. The 
communication of concepts both causally affects, and Is causally dependent upon, 
the conceptualisations of other Individuals. A normal conversation involves at 
least two Individuals affecting each other's perceptions and conceptualisations. 
The speaker is both attempting to alter conceptualisatlons of the listener by 
the manipulation of both natural and social structures and being affected by the 
listener's responses. Both elements are needed in communication. 
ConoeptuallsinS Individuals And Social Kinds 
The definition of the social kind spawns the need for a definiton of a 
conceptualising Individual as a type of social kind but with an extra 
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characteristic. 
Chapter 2 
A Conceptualising Individual (Cl) is an instance of a type of social kind which 
bath has the power to conceptualise the effects of the exercise of its own 
powers qua social kind and whose conceptualising capabilities can be triggered 
by the activities of social kinds whose operations the CI does not conceptualise 
" as its own. ... (D2) 
The Cl has characteristics similar to those which H. Blumer's exegesis 
(*19) of G. H. Mead ascribes to human beings: "We are given, then, a picture of 
the human being as an organism which confronts Its world with a mechanism for 
making Indications to Itself. This Is the mechanism that is Involved in 
interpreting the actions of others. " Definition (D2) goes a little further in 
suggesting that the CI has a mechanism for Interpreting its own actions as well 
as those of others. It is easy to see that the existence of individuals who 
fall under (D2) is a condition for the possibility of the operation of. and so 
existence of, objects which fall under (D1). This Is hardly a surprising 
conclusion! The existence of Cis is a necessary condition for the existence of 
social structures. 
What is slightly more surprising is that the existence of social kinds, as 
defined in (D1), but not falling under the scope of (D2), and of a 'social 
space' in which they operate, are necessary conditions for the existence of Cis 
as defined in (D2). The existence of a 'social space' in which social kinds 
operate is also a necessary condition for the existence of Cis. These two 
necessary conditions rest on a requirement stemming from the need to facilitate 
"NOTE: Justification for specifying this sub-category of social kinds will be 
offered below, in Part 4, where the distinction between Cis and non-CI social 
kinds Is vindicated. 
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the operations of Cis. These operations can only occur within a structure of 
Inter-relationships between Cis which is recognised as a means of interaction 
and which differentiates the Cis from natural kinds. (This contention was 
substantiated in Chapter 1. ) 
if further, such a structure Is to sustain the interactions between Cis 
which involve concept communication. then the structure needs to have the 
required causal and dispositional properties which demarcate It as a social 
kind. (The possibility that the structure itself is a CI has been canvassed by 
those who, like Berkeley, have postulated God as the facilitator of all 
Interactions. But this Involves a mere semantic difference, for access to God's 
conceptuailsations is not available, so for all practical purposes Berkeley's 
structure is not a CI. ) We are led to the conclusion that there Is a mutual 
ontological dependence between the social kinds which are and those which are 
not Cis. 
Evidence in support of this mutual ontological dependence is found in two 
well-known cases described by Harold Garfinkel (*20). The first is the 
'counselling experiment' and the second is that of Agnes, born a physiologically 
normal male, who managed to grow up Into a female indistinguishable from other 
females who do not possess a uterus. In the counselling experiment a group of 
individuals assumed, and seemed unable to rid themselves of the assumption, that 
their Interactions with a so-called counsellor were structured. The 
experimentors had, however, ensured that the Interactions were totally random 
and unstructured. In the second case Agnes as well as undergoing the 
appropriate externally Induced physiological changes which were Initiated prior 
to puberty, had both to learn at a conscious level what the social structures 
were that helped to define her as a woman and to manipulate those structures in 
order to facilitate the redefinition. 
This example also lends credence to the validity of definition (02) of a 
'conceptualising Individual' as something which is able to conceptualise the 
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effects of the exercise of his own powers since such conceptualisatin is a 
precondition of the attempt to alter those powers. Other, If less striking, 
examples of the mutual ontological dependence of social kinds and Cis can be 
found In social psychology texts (*21). 
Social Spaces (1) Its Various Forms 
If it can be shown that the analysis of what It Is to be a person cannot be 
divorced from the analysis of the operations of social kinds, then the arguments 
set out below become relevant to the development of theories of Personal 
Identity. it is clear, however, that the context or setting in which a social 
kind's causal and dispositional properties are manifest is Important to anyone 
wishing to offer explanations of Its behaviour and/or alterations of Its 
properties. Problems may arise If the setting in which the explanation of the 
behaviour and/or alteration of properties occurs, is the same as the one in 
which the Interactions between the explanatory process and the social kind 
occurs. Interactions between the behaviour of the object being explained and 
the explanation itself can only be ruled out a prlor4 without the payment of a 
penalty, in the cases of explanations of the behaviour of natural kinds. Indeed 
the ruling out of the possibility of such Interactions constitutes a criterion 
for the ascription of natural kind rather than social kind status to an object. 
With these problems in mind two types of environment In which social kinds 
operate will now be defined: a 'social environaent' and a 'cultural 
envlronaent'. Both will be defined as covering areas of social spaod which 
will also be defined. 
Social space consists of either 'interactive social space' or 'extended 
social space'. 
(I) Interactive $0011/ apnea Is an area where Interactions Involving the 
alterations of conceptualisations of one or more Individuals can be 
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detected. These interactions occur as a result of the activity of at 
least one other Individual who has the ability to conceptualise the 
interaction. 
(11) Extended social space Is also an area where interactions involving the 
alterations of conceptualisations of one or more Individuals can be 
detected. 
... (03) 
Alterations of conceptualisations can. In 'extended social space', occur 
also as a result of the operational Influence of a social kind which cannot 
conceptualise the interaction. The alterations must occur among the Individuals 
whose conceptualised behaviour forms part of the operational matrix of the 
social kind whose operational influence helps to specify the extended social 
space. 
If an apple falls on Isaac Newton's head and he feels pain and becomes 
aware of the force of gravity. then an interaction has taken place which Is not 
In social space. If there happened to be a couple of pranksters shaking the 
tree in order to cause Mr. Newton some discomfort then the Interaction would be 
in social space despite the pranksters' possibly Incorrect conceptualisation of 
the Interaction. 
The effected alterations of the recipient Individual's conceptualisations 
need not be conceptualised accurately by the active initiator of those 
alterations; all that is necessary Is that the Initiator conceptualises the 
Interaction In some form which could also be conceptualised by the recipient. 
If the pranksters had been instructed to cause Mr. Newton discomfort by a 
religious group with an anti-Unitarian policy then the Interaction would be In 
extended social space. In practice, as In this last example, interactive and 
extended social spaces will often overlap, and the notion of Interactive social 
space is mostly a useful analytic device which helps one understand the workings 
of component parts of social kinds. 
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The significance of drawing the distinction between interactive and 
extended social space will be demonstrated In Part 4 below. 
Chapter 2 
A sac/a/ env/rvneent is defined as consisting of the area covering the 
range of detectable influences in extended social space of a given set of social 
kinds. there being no subset of them whose range of Influence does not overlap 
with the range of influence of at least one other kind in the set. ... (D4) 
Two social kinds will have overlapping influence if each of their 
operations can interfere with the operation of the other. So the local 
ex-servicemen's club will have overlapping influence with the local school. 
They may make demands on some people which conflict with each other If they hold 
meetings at the same time or try to hold them in the same place. By contrast 
the local school in Mountainash may have no overlapping influence with the 
Communist Party in the Ukraine. so these two would not generate a social 
environment. 
The reason behind the insistence for no breaks in influence lies in the 
requirements that any explanation of the behaviour of a social kind might have. 
Such explanations will concern themselves with the possible Influence of the 
social kind and the influence of other social kinds. 
A cultural environment is defined as an area in extended social space (with 
no discontinuities except those bridged by the operations of concept-developing 
and concept-reaffirming social kinds) which is specified by the range of 
detectable Influences of the processes of communication of a given set of 
e concepts. ... (D5) 
Social Spaces (11) (Social And Cultural Environsenta Distinguished) 
Both social and cultural environments have blurred boundaries. The blurred 
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boundaries stem from the variable conceptualisations Individuals have of the 
same and similar concepts leading to variable influences of social kinds. The 
examples serve to illustrate the possibility that causal Influence of social 
kinds can alter even while the causal Influence is being exercised. The 
requirement which is placed on some Individuals, such as children, to learn both 
the meanings of terms and behaviour patterns associated with them, involves a 
presupposition. This Is the assumption that the influence of social kinds 
associated with the use of the terms does not extend to individuals In the same 
way prior to and after the individuals have undergone the learning process. 
Further, even when meanings have been learned, the differences In the 
conceptualisations of putatively the same concept by different Individuals will 
lead to variations in the Influence of the associated social kinds as well as to 
possible shifts In the operational matrices of the social kinds. 
The influence of the Women's Institute In the UK has changed during the 
1970s. Having started as an organization which reinforced the traditional 
notion of a woman principally as a home-maker and prime carer of children it 
changed as women, and men, changed their conception of what a woman is. While 
still being fairly traditional, by the 1980s, the Institute had ceased to exert 
pressure on women to fall Into the traditional role. 
The distinction between a social and a cultural environment has been drawn 
fNOTE* (I) A 'social environment' Is the context In which a conceptualised 
social kind operates. A 'cultural environment' Is the context In which the 
conceptualisation of the social kind will operate. 
(II) The Influences of concept communication function through the 
operations of social kinds. Social kinds, because they have causal Impact on 
conceptualisations, operate by means of concept communication. One can 
conclude that social environments will always be cultural environments, but the 
reverse is not the case. 
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In order to reflect 
(1) the differences between the operations of a social kind and 
explanations of those operations and 
(ii) the distinction between the social kind and the concept of the social 
kind. 
The distinction between the two types of environment is highlighted by the fact 
that all cultural environments have a common characteristic (in addition to 
being specified by changes in conceptualisations) while social environments do 
not. Every cultural environment will cover an area of social space generated by 
the operations of at least one of the social kinds which facilitate the 
development of and/or reaffirmation of the meaning of concepts. The various 
uses of scientific concepts such as 'ion', 'charged particle' etc.... will 
incorporate the operations of those social mechanisms by which natural 
scientists reaffirm the validity of the use of concepts. By contrast social 
environments do not cluster around the space generated by the operations of a 
particular social kind. Just as the operations of a given set of social kinds 
may not generate a social environment, so might not the use of a given set of 
concepts. 
Not every given set of concepts will generate a cultural environment. The 
use of some sets of concepts may produce discontinuities in the social spaces 
they generate. This will be the case unless one includes the process of 
examining the disparate concepts ltae/f as the process which embodies the 
operation of a social kind whose influence overlaps those of the social kinds 
which would otherwise be seen as discontinuous. In such a case the 
discontinuity of the area in the social space of the putative cultural 
environment is avoided by the examination of the discontinuity! 
So the conceptualisations of notions such as 'responsibilities' and 
'rights' will affect the operations of the Scottish legal system, the Inner 
London Education Authority and Cornish tin mine companies. They will not, 
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however, affect the legal system of a Moslem country where the notion of 
'nshallah' (it is the will of Allah) is prevalent, nor will they affect the 
Italian legal system where the marginally different notions of 'le 
responsibilita' and 'i dlrittf will have some Impact. 
If the making of distinctions is to be fruitful in social science then the 
process of examining differing concepts cannot count as sufficient to permit any 
collection of concepts to generate a single cultural environment. * 
Soolal Space: llll! (The I portance of the Social/Cultural Environment 
D/st/nation) 
The reason behind the attempt to distinguish a cultural from a social 
environment lies in the fact that every explanation of social phenomena is set 
In a cultural environment while It applies to objects which operate in a social 
environment. 
The mutual ontological dependence which exist between conceptualising 
Individuals and social kinds has led some thinkers in the hermeneutical 
tradition to conclude that the only way to understand the operations of social 
kinds is through using the concepts which form part of the operational matrices 
of the social kinds (*23). By this what is meant is the set of concepts which 
are Involved in the conceptualisations of individuals which, as conceptuali- 
sations, contribute to the operations of the social kind in question. 
On what has been said so far there is no warrant for such a conclusion. 
Indeed, If one were to attempt to understand and explain a social kind's 
"NOTE: It should be made clear that the conceptualisation of a concept aters If 
a different symbol Is used to represent and communicate the concept. The 
conceptualisation of 'a right' is different from the conceptuallsat/on of its 
equivalent in Italian, 'un diritto, pace the different pronunciations of the 
words In the different countries (*22). 
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operations from within its operational matrix it is possible that either the 
successful understanding, or even just the attempt, may irrevocably alter the 
mechanisms which controlled the operations. In such a scenario it would be 
logically impossible to explain the social kind's operations from within its 
operational matrix. 
An attempt at understanding the medieval church whose causal and 
dispositional powers were based on the acceptance of dogma could, if conducted 
entirely by an Individual who operated in the social environment which It 
affected, disturb and Irrevocably alter the range and manner of exercise of the 
powers. At such a point the understanding would become historical and would not 
be achieved using the concepts which were involved in the operations of the 
church. The cultural environment In which the explanation was offered would 
have changed. 
By the same token it is not possible fully to understand the meaning of a 
concept if one ignores the contexts In which It Is used. The operations of a 
social kind which are affected by conceptualisations of a given concept 
themselves have an Impact on the meaning of that concept 024). It Is 
important, therefore, to be clear about the context In which the understanding 
of social kinds can be achieved. As has already been indicated this context 
will be a cultural environment since all possible uses of the concepts used in 
an explanation Influence the efficacy of the explanatory process. 
The operations of social kinds Involve the understanding, however 
Incomplete and Inadequate, of some aspect(s) of their operations by the 
Individuals whose conceptualisations affect those operations. One can conclude 
that the distinction between a cultural and a social environment is built into 
the conditions for the possibility of intentional social Interactions; that Is, 
of the operations of social kinds. Further, since conceptualising Individuals 
themselves operate In social environments but conceptualise their own actions In 
cultural environments the notion of the Individual or even of the self will be 
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understood partly in terms of Its impact on the cultural/social environment 
distinction. 
Social Space: (Iv) (Background To (v): Soolel/Cultural Environaºenta And The 
Self) 
The argument being presented in the section on social space revolves around 
the need to understand and offer explanations of the behaviour of social kinds. 
In this context it is worth considering three general categories of explanation. 
The first is that typical of the natural sciences where the explanation 
cannot itself affect the operations of the object whose behaviour is explained 
and there is a possibility of interfering with the operations In order to 
discover how they work. 
The second applies to some natural sciences de facto and to many of the 
social sciences de re. In this category the explanation also cannot affect the 
operations of the object explained but here there Is no possibility of 
interfering with the mechanisms which bring about changes In behaviour. In 
natural science the explanations offered In astronomy would fall under this 
category since there are no practical ways of interfering with the movements of 
planets, stars and galaxies. In social science. historical explanation and some 
forms of anthropology would fall under this category. 
It is clear that historical explanations can neither affect the objects 
explained nor allow for the possibility of gaining access to the mechanisms 
which generate the changes In the objects. Similarly, if an explanation of the 
behaviour of a particular society's structures is sought with the proviso that 
the methods of gaining the explanation should not Interfere with the operations 
of the mechanisms affecting the structures, then, ex-hypothesi, access to the 
mechanisms is not permitted. Such access would interfere with the operations 
since these operations are dependent upon the conceptualisations of. the 
Individuals who sustain the social structures. As was pointed out in the 
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example of the analysis of the mediaeval church, the analysis would change the 
object being analysed. 
The third category of explanation Is one in which the explanatory process 
itself can, but need not. affect and change the operational processes of the 
object being explained. This category by definition allows for the interference 
with the operations of the object whose behaviour is being explained. It is in 
this third category that explanations of the behaviour of existing social kinds 
will be found. 
Soalal Spaoes (v) (Social And Cultural Environments And The Self) 
It Is by examining the processes by which explanations are formed that some 
light will be thrown on the nature of the self and Its relationships with the 
social and cultural environments in which it finds Itself. In particular, one 
of the philosopher's tasks, or that of a social scientist wearing a 
philosopher's hat, is the analysis of the relationship between explanation and 
object explained. The argument so far has indicated that the social scientist 
should look In a cultural environment for explanations of the phenomena 
generated by social kinds which operate in a social environment contained In 
that cultural environment (the reason for this is that the explanation sought 
falls in category three). An examination of this third category of explanation 
is therefore likely to add to one's understanding of social phenomena. 
It is, however, not just the social scientist who wishes to gain such 
understanding. An individual who interacts with social kinds, whether or not 
these social kinds are also conceptualising Individuals (Cis), must have some 
understanding of their operations and have some means of gaining that 
understanding. It will be seen that the requirement that a C1 should be able to 
gain an understanding of the operations of social kinds helps to render the 
concept of a Cl inadequate to the task of learning how to describe individuals 
who, in an Intentional way. Interact with social kinds. The concept of the CI 
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remains adequate to the task of accounting for the formation and development of 
the 'social forces' which contribute to the construction and maintenance of the 
causal and dispositional properties of social kinds; the CI can operate 
adequately only in atstie cultural and social environments. It is Inadequate to 
the task of sustaining changes of these aspects of social space. 
The notion of a C1, when applied to an Individual, is not up to the task of 
describing, let alone permitting the understanding of, the processes undergone 
by Agnes (*p. 58) in changing from a physiologically normal pre-adolescent boy 
Into an adult woman. It Is also not up to the tasks of explaining, justifying 
or refuting the generally held view that the same individual can operate as 
different social kinds usually, but not always, at different times. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that the same person can, at the same time, be a golf club 
official, a rabbi, a bankrupt and an international athlete, even though the 
combination is uniikelyl It is also possible that the individual social kinds 
which constitute such a person do not generate a social environment if one 
considers them strictly as Cis; the social environments In which two of them 
operate might not overlap. 
The concept of a Cl has to be amended If It Is to cope with the 
requirements. Just outlined, which are normally placed on the concept of a 
person. These amendments will be carried out in Parts 3-7 where the Impact on 
the formation of our understanding of social phenomena exerted by the 
relationship between Individual and society is investigated. The route to be 
taken towards making the amendments will now be outlined. 
Seif And Society: An Outline Of The Arguments 
The point has been reached when the various strands of the argument can be 
brought together so that some insight Into the relationship between seif and 
society can be gained. These insights should themselves throw light on the 
requirements placed upon the concept of self by the phenomenon of social change. 
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The bringing together will be done in four stages. In Part 3, prior to 
beginning the first stage, a formal schematic definition of a person will be 
given. 
The first stage, developed in Part 4, will involve a re-examination of the 
concept of a social kind in the light of the introduction of the notion of a 
'social force'. This will involve an analogy with the concept of a natural 
kind: both the constituent forces which help make up Its internal structure and 
the external forces which interact with/on it in order to change its state will 
be compared with similar forces constituting and acting on social kinds. 
The second stage, developed in Part 5, will develop the concept of a 
'person' as a social kind whose internal structure consists of Cis bound 
together by social forces some of which are controlled by the person. The 
person is seen as having the power of conceptualising that control as well as 
oonoeptualising the operations of her constituent Cis. Some of these last 
operations themselves involve the conceptualisations of the constituent Cis own 
interactions as social kinds. Such a concept of a 'person' can underpin 
explanations of changes which occur in Individuals such as religious 
conversions, ageing, and the adoption of different roles. It can also permit 
one adequately to account for the possibility of conscious Interaction by a C1 
with another social kind which the unamended Cl concept cannot do. 
The argument in the third stage, developed in Part 6, will centre on the 
importance of possibility of the occurrence of changes in the causal and 
dispositional properties of social kinds. The acceptance of this possibility 
obliges one to place requirements on the nature of social environments. These 
requirements are: (1) There exist more than two 'persons' who help to sustain 
the social space specifed by a social environment - the social space cannot be 
sustained by non-'person' Cis, even if they exist. (Ii) The 'persons' who help 
to sustain such a social environment can distinguish between a social 
environment in which their constituent Cis operate and the cultural environment 
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generated by the concepts used by those constituent Cis in their operations in 
the social environment (*25). (iii) Any conceptualisation of a given person 
encapsulates a concept which generates a distinct type of cultural environment. 
The cultural space covered by this distinct environment cannot be covered by any 
combination of cultural environments which is generated by a set of concepts 
which excludes the encapsulated concept of the person. The Individuation of 
each person involves the use of a concept which generates a cultural environment 
which is unique to that person. In other words, objective definitions of 
persons cannot properly be developed. 
The fourth stage, developed in Part 7, will consist of an examination of 
the relationship between the Individual and society. This will begin with an 
attempt to give a broad definition of society. Society will be seen as a 
setting In which social kinds Interact. A definition of society as the cultural 
environment generated by all the concepts known to or used by a given set of 
persons will be offered. The notion that society either Is structured or Is a 
structure will be rejected. Structure Is to be found In the objects which 
operate In society; these objects are natural and social kinds and the 'person' 
is the fundamental social kind. This view of society will be seen both as the 
one which is adequate to sustain the development of concepts of both natural and 
social kinds and as being sufficiently organic to allow for the expansion, or 
more rarely contraction. of the cultural environment which specifies it. This 
will, Inter alia, allow for the understanding of the workings of social kinds in 
one society by persons who previously operated In a separate one. It will also 
facilitate a deeper understanding of what It is to be a person: an understanding 
which accommodates the two different perspectives associated with relationships 
between individuals - these relationships being those of Interacting with other 
persons and being with other persons (analysed In Part 6). 
The chapter will conclude with some brief self-criticism. One of the 
possible objections to the arguments set out here Is that they are circular: 
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they all seem to rest on each other. This will be rejected by showing that they 
all base themselves on the existence of conceptualised experience together with 
the possibility of its communication. which itself is a conceptualised 
experience. A circular argument cannot be refuted but goes nowhere, by contrast 
the argument here can be refuted but the penalty for accepting the refutation is 
seen to be the acceptance of conceptualised experience which cannot be 
purposeful. 
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PART S. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL KINDS (introducing 'persons') 
Social Kinds And Natural Kinds (1) (Their Causal And Dispositions/ Properties) 
The definition (D1) (*p. 55) of a social kind Intimated that It had causal 
and dispositional properties which were manifest in the alteration of the 
behaviour of those objects which do and those which do not have the power to 
conceptualise. In the cases of the objects which do have such power the 
alterations Included alterations in conceptualised behaviour. This means that a 
social kind has the properties which are characteristic of natural kinds as well 
as those which demarcate it as a social kind. Social kinds as varied as armies 
and blood banks exhibit both aspects of their dispositional properties. 
The mobilization of an army for manoeuvres may take place as a result of 
the whims of a political leader. However, the exercise of the army's 
dispositional properties in, say, requisitioning an Island is achieved by 
affecting both the conceptualisations of individuals and the behaviour of 
natural kinds. The owner of the Island will have to accept the requisition 
order which itself will be Issued using some means of communication which 
involves the manipulation of a natural kind. The carrying out of the 
requisition order will also Involve the manipulation of further natural kinds 
such as moving motor vehicles. Similarly a request for a rare blood group may 
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activate a search for a donor with resulting alterations both to natural kinds 
and to some individuals' conceptualisations and behaviour. 
The centrality of the behaviour of natural kinds both In the operations of 
a social kind and in its interactions with other social kinds makes clear the 
moderating influence which natural kinds have on the operations of a social 
kind. It indicates that social kinds have component parts, some of which have 
natural kind characteristics. 
A comparison with natural kinds can be fruitful here. Natural kinds have 
component parts which themselves are seen as natural kinds whose behaviour can 
also be investigated and described. The component parts are seen as Interacting 
through the operations of natural forces. The concept of a force is also used 
to describe the Interactions between natural kinds as well as between their 
component parts. A mountain may interact with the material on which it rests 
and change some of the carbon from a graphite structure to a diamond one. This 
may involve gravitational forces acting on all the mountain's constituent 
molecules while each of those molecules is affected by the Intramolecular forces 
exerted by its neighbours. 
There seems no logical reason preventing the process by which the 
constituent parts of natural kinds are themselves described as natural kinds 
from being a never ending one (*26). The possibility of the existence of such 
an infinite process would necessitate the absence of a fundamental natural kind 
which has only itself as a component part. However, while it may be the case 
that there are such 'ultimate' entities in nature it is impossible that the 
scientist could ever know that they were ultimate (*27). 
Social Kinds And Natural Kinds: (11) (Their Cowponent Parts) 
The question of the existence and nature of component parts is different in 
the case of a social kind. The difference Is found in the mutual ontological 
dependence between the social kinds which are, and those which are not. Cis. 
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This mutual dependence stems from the domain assumptions of all social 
scientific studies - since these must concern themselves with the behaviour of 
social kinds and contrast them with natural kinds. These domain assumptions 
will enable one to justify the claim that a subcategory of Cie contains ultimate 
entities - despite the fact that the assumptions also ensure that ultimate 
explanations of the behaviour of these entitles Is not possible. The 
subcategory will be defined as 'persons'. 
A person is a Conceptualising Individual 
(i) who Includes Cis as his component parts, 
(ii) who can conceptualise the fact that she has component parts, 
(iii) who can activate his own operational component parts, while 
conceptualising the activation, 
(this ensures that he has a quality necessary for him to be competent to 
substitute for a Paradigm individuator and operate Models (B) and (C) in Ch. 1) 
and (Iv) whose conceptualising abilities are engaged by, and whose 
dispositional properties are activated by, the communication of 
concepts which specify a 'cultural environment' ... (06) 
Social And Natural Kinds: (111) (Introducing The Notion Of 'Force') 
The domain assumptions of both the social and natural sciences include the 
acceptance of the notion of a 'force'. or an agency which brings about change. 
Both disciplines, and indeed any attempt at understanding natural and social 
phenomena, place a requirement on those who attempt them to discern two 
functions among forces. The first function manifests Itself either as an 
alteration or as a prevention of an alteration of the behaviour of a social (or 
"NOTE : Built Into the definition is the possibility that any 'person' can have 
the concept of her own Identity as a social kind which interacts in social space 
with other similar social kinds. 
73 
Part So Understanding Social Kinds Chapter 2 
natural) kind. The second function involves the sustaining of the relationships 
between component parts of a social (or natural) kind In order that it may 
retain and exercise Its causal and dispositional properties. The two functions 
represent the external and Internal operations of social (or natural) kinds. 
The domain assumptions of both social and natural sciences Involve the 
acceptance of concepts which help individuate Instigators of change -these 
instigators are normally designated as 'forces'. There follows, In Part 4, an 
analysis of concepts of forces, contrasting their use In the two disciplines. 
One of the main purposes behind the development of the analysis is to 
provide a justification for drawing distinctions between Cis and non-Cl social 
kinds, between Interactive and extended social space, and between two types of 
social force which reflect a similar distinction. In the sections which follow, 
it will be argued that these three sets of distinctions lie at the core of our 
understanding of social phenomena. Further, It will be argued that a necessary 
condition for sustaining the distinctions Is the acceptance of a concept of a 
person such as that developed In Part 5. 
PART 4: EXPLANATIONS AND SOCIAL KINDS 
(natural and social forces) 
Social Forces 
Natural forces are considered, in general, by natural scientists as acting 
on natural kinds through the operations of external agents which bring about 
measurable changes in the natural kinds. 'Force' is the generic term used to 
symbolise the concept of that which affects change= it Is not used to symbolise 
the same notion In every circumstance. Forces which move solid objects are 
conceptualised through or with the term 'newton', while forces which move 
electrons or which sustain nuclear chain reactions are conceptualised 
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differently. But in all varieties of the conceptualisation of the notion of a 
force in the natural sciences there is an assumption of externality of the force 
relative to the changes resultant from its application - pace the changes which 
may occur in an object which is activating the force. The assumption of the 
externality of the agency which brings about the changes in phenomena 
investigated by the natural scientist Itself Involves a dual assumption: that 
the environment or natural space in which the changes occur exists Independently 
of each object which operates in it (*28). " 
The same externality of forces relative to the entities whose behaviour 
they affect does not apply to social kinds: the source of the difference with 
natural kinds is the dependence of social kinds on Cis for their operations. If 
one considers a social force to be that which brings about changes in objects 
which operate in social space then one can isolate two specific types of social 
force: 
A priaary social force 
Is that which brings about change In Interactive social space ... (07) 
This may be anything which induces a Cl to attempt to alter the 
conceptualisations of other Cis. It may range from (1) a particular Imperative 
such as that Inducing a priest to preach a sermon In order to continue to 
sustain his identity as a priest (*29), to (ii) a social obligation such as that 
Inducing a society hostess to ask guests to sit in particular places at dinner 
fNOTE: The externality of the agency of change is analytically Incompatible with 
the notion that there is an Internal relationship between the object and the 
environment in which the object operates. Given the externality of the agency 
of change, the conceptualisation of such an environment is logically prior to 
the conceptualisation of the object. 
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in order to follow certain rules of social priority, to (iii) a mere whim such 
as that described by David Niven in his autobiography when, at the end of an 
address given by an army general, he was induced to respond to the request for 
any questions by asking for the time as he had a train to catch (*30), to (iv) 
the operations of a natural kind such as a volcanic eruption which might Induce 
an individual to contact another and ask for assistance. 
A derived sm/s/ force 
is that which brings about changes in extended social space. ... (D8) 
The use of the terms 'primary' and 'derived', as contrasted with 
'interactive' and 'extended', Is deliberate. The operations of a social kind 
which cannot conceptualise its interactions with the Cis whose 
conceptualisations the social kind is altering, must themselves be dependent on 
the altering conceptualisations of some (other) Cis. These last alterations, 
being constituents of the operations of the social kind, can be considered to be 
more primitive social changes than those brought about by the operations. This 
does not imply that a reductionist analysis of social change is possible. 
The terms are being used purely for taxonomical purposes. There is, at 
this stage, no assumption of logical priority between 'primary' and 'derived', 
although arguments will be produced to indicate that neither term has logical 
priority. 
Soolsl Forces: (II) (The Primary/Derived Distinction Justified) 
The question of the perceived externality of the agency of change is 
closely linked to certain distinctions which have been made above. The 
distinctions between a Cl and a non-Cl social kind, and between Interactive and 
extended social space, and between a primary and a derived social force would 
all become trivial if the agency of social change were to be perceived as being 
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completely external. The externality of agencies of change which brought about 
alterations In the behaviour of Cls would lead to a conflation of explanations 
of the behaviour of Individual and of social structures: one explanation would 
be reducible to the other. In order to demonstrate that social theorists have 
to account separately for the behaviour of persons, there is a need for the 
Justification of the distinctions between CI and non-CI. interactive and 
extended social space and between primary and derived social forces. This 
demonstration is developed in this subsection. 
Changes in extended social space result from the operational Influence of 
those social kinds which cannot conceptualise their interactions with Cis. The 
social forces which bring about such changes must activate the social kind's 
causal and dlspositional properties without any eedlating influence by the 
social kind. A mediating Influence would necessitate the conceptualisation by 
the social kind of the impact of the social force; and this is. ex-hypothesi, 
impossible. 
It is. however. logically possible for a social kind to change from being a 
non-Cl to CI and vice versa and for the properties of social kinds themselves to 
change. An example of such a possible change might be the sudden development of 
the ability by Nicolas Bourbaki to hold conversations as Nicolas Bourbaki 
independently of the individual French mathematicians who have represented 'Le 
Bourbaki'. The precise mechanisms generating these possible changes would be a 
matter for empirical investigation. but they would themselves be brought about 
by the operations of social forces and so occur in either interactive or 
extended social space. 
It may also be argued that the position being adopted here is empty since 
there may, in practice, be no entities which operate In extended social space 
and that derived social forces are never manifest. The notion of a non-Cl 
social kind which activated social forces in extended social space would be one 
which the methodological individualist would attempt to chop out with as sharp 
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an Occam's razor as could be found. 
A contrasting objection might be brought by a theorist who claims that all 
social Institutions can be brought under the scope of the definition of a 
person. Such a theorist might suggest that social institutions are in effect 
themselves Conceptualising Individuals on the grounds that they may form and 
implement policies. 
Common to both these contrasting criticisms, if they are to eliminate the need 
for non-CI social kinds, must be the notion that those social structures, which 
enable interactions between CIs to occur, do not themselves have causal and 
dispositional properties. But this Is a contradiction in terms: one cannot 
enable if one has no dispositional properties. 
A milder form of the second criticism of the conceptions of extended social 
space and derived social forces might be brought by the theorist who only 
personifies social Institutions rather than all social kinds. Such a criticism 
might concede that the social structures enabling Interactions between Cis to 
occur are Indeed non-Cl social kinds while claiming that all other social kinds 
are Cis. This would vitiate the use of the notion of extended social space In 
social analysis and restrict all social theory to interactions between 
individuals 031). 
Two points can be made with respect to restricting all social theory to 
interactions between Cis. Firstly, It Is logically possible for the causal and 
dispositional properties of a non-CI social kind to operate independently of 
those conceptualisations which Identify the social kind as a social kind. There 
Is no conceptual bar to the formation of a definition of a social kind which is 
not a CI and yet has and exercises causal and dispositional properties which are 
distinct from the properties of the Cis who sustain Its operational matrix. 
Contradictions do not follow from the adoption of such definitions. This means 
that the question of whether to restrict all social theory to Interactions 
between Cis is not one which can be settled 8 Priori, it has to be weighed In 
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the light of experience. in the light of the fruitfulness or otherwise of the 
formulated social theories. 
Secondly. the personification of social institutions involving suggestions 
that the Department of Health and Social Security and the United Nations 
Organization are both Cis requires such institutions not only to form concepts 
but also to conceptualise their interactions with 'other' Cls. It may be that 
some Institutions do conceptualise their Interactions with Cis, examples such as 
courts of law might be cited, but most of them do not. Their policy-making 
functions and their interactions with Cis are distinct, though related 
functions. The separation of functions prevents the social institution from 
oonoeptuallsing Its interactions with Cis. As an Individual I cannot be 
considered to be conceptualising my Interactions with a CI If I am obliged to 
wait until a later date, which might be set independently of the occurrence of 
the Interaction, in order to bring the interaction under a concept. If this Is 
the only way In which I can bring the interaction under a concept then my 
interactions are themselves independent of my conceptualisations and as such are 
objectified. Such an objectification is consistent with a concept of a 
conceptualised individual but Inconsistent with that of a oonceptuallaing 
individual. 
The argument In the last two paragraphs has supported the notion that 
non-Cl social kinds exist and interact with each other and with Cis. This 
justifies the formation and use of the concepts of extended social space and 
derived social forces. It Is then up to the social theorist to form hypotheses 
of how objects behave In extended social space and what the factors are which 
determine the use and operation of social forces. The social theorist's concern 
with the formation of laws which govern behaviour is Itself subservient to the 
understanding of the operation of social forces. (*32) 
The purpose of concentrating 80 much on the notion of force, or agency of 
change, is that it is a concept which is central to the understanding of any 
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process; and it is on the operations of processes that cultural systems are 
built. The individual who can substitute for a paradigm individuator can only 
do so if she can understand a process: that is. as long as she both can discover 
how to affect the experiences of others and can conceptualise the process of 
affecting experiences. Indeed, her own conception of herself as a being who 
interacts with others was seen in Chapter 1 to be dependent upon her 
Interpretation of her experiences as an actor or agent. She does not, however, 
need to be able to understand all the workings of the processes by which she 
affects other Individuals (any more than I need to be able to understand all the 
workings of a telephone in order to use one. The only other requirement placed 
on the communicating individual by argument In Chapter 1 was that he is bie to 
conceptualise the existence of an agent of change, with the ability to form 
concepts, which Is distinct from himself. 
The Internal Structure Of A Non-Cl Social Kind 
The fact that the operations of non-CI social kinds are dependent upon the 
conceptualised actions of some Cis, leads to the conclusion that non-CI social 
kinds have operational component parts which are affected by the application of 
social forces. Since the conceptualisations of Cis are never entirely 
externally determined, explanations of the operations of a non-Cl social kind 
must be given in terms of other entities not merely in an enabling capacity but 
in an activating one. 
So when a riot breaks out In a small community such as a prison, it is 
certain that there has been a social force at work bringing about a change from 
a peaceful, If resentful. obedience. What Is also being demonstrated by the 
riot Is that, not only are there Internal social forces operating within the 
social kind in question, but also that the Individual Cis who react to and 
moderate those social forces were being acted upon by social forces prior to the 
riot. 
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In other words. In order for it to be possible for an individual to 
understand how social kinds work he must be able to conceptualise the operations 
of agencies of social change (social forces). And so he must be able to 
conceptualise at least some of the conceptualisations of the Cis who constitute 
the operational matrix of the social kind. This means that the individual must 
not only be able to understand certain concepts but also have some understanding 
of the possible causal Interactions associated with the holding of those 
concepts by the Cis whose behaviour determines the operations of the social 
kind. This means that explanations of the behaviour of a social kind occur In 
the cultural environment generated by the concepts which help determine its 
operational matrix. It does not mean, however. that any Cl which constitutes 
part of the operational component of a non-Cl social kind needs to have any sort 
of concept of her operational function within the non-CI social kind. 
The relationship between an individual and the cultural environment in 
which he gains understanding of the operations of social kinds forms part of 
Stage 2 of the current examination of the relationship between self and society. 
PART 5* THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON 
Introduction 
The second stage of the examination outlined at the end of Part 2 has been 
reached. The first stage prepared the ground in three ways. Firstly, a formal 
definition of a person was offered in Part 3 above. Secondly, justification for 
the uses of the notions of social space and social force was given. Thirdly, it 
was concluded that, while social kinds operate in social environments (defined 
in terms of the exetent of their influence in social space) explanations of the 
behaviour of social kinds are developed in cultural environments (defined in 
terms of the extent of the influence of the use, in social space, of sets of 
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concepts). This last theme will be examined further in stage 2. 
It will be argued that the ability to distinguish a cultural environment 
from a social one is a necessary condition for the possibility of learning 
concepts. 
it will also be argued that. in order 
(i) to sustain the operations of non-Cl and Cl social kinds and 
(ii) to sustain cultural environments (in which it is possible to formulate 
and develop understanding of the operations). 
a Cl must have two capabilities: - 
Firstly, she must be able to activate social forces and conceptualise the 
effects of that activation (Incorporated in the definition of a Cl). Secondly, 
she must also be able to conceptualise the activation (the extra Ingredient 
Incorporated Into the definition of a person). Her fundamental role in 
sustaining cultural environments helps to explain why the concept of a person, 
rather than a Cl, plays such a central role in a cultural system which allows 
for the formulation and development of concepts (*33). 
A corollary of the argument which supports the centrality of the concept of 
a person can be expressed in the following proposition: If an Individual has 
the ability to conceptualise both the process of activation of social forces and 
the effects of the activation then the individual must also have a concept of 
his own selfhood and have a concept of others as being similarly endowed with 
selfhood. 
In essence what is being argued is that if one wishes to make the 
understanding of the operations of social kinds possible one has to sacrifice 
the possibility of establishing an objective concept of the self 034). The 
concept of the self is Irreducible to other concepts in any cultural 
environment. Further, the concept which individuates a specific person is 
similarly irreducible f*p. 96). The Irreducibility rests on the possibility of 
gaining understanding of the operations of social kinds. The understanding of 
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the operations of social kinds is dependent upon, not only the possibility of 
self-conception by persons, but also on the possibility that the Individual can 
operate a second order monitoring facility - both of which were seen in Chapter 
1 to be necessary for the operations of processes involving concept 
cm mun ication. 
Distinguishing Between Social And Cultural Environments 
The distinction between a social and a cultural 
environment Is central to the argument In Part 5. 
The importance of the distinction lies in the use which has to be made of 
It by an individual. It is only in cultural environments that the social kinds 
which facilitate the development of social theories can operate (or indeed in 
which any understanding of social kinds can occur). The understanding of the 
operation of a social kind has to be seen as distinct from the operation of the 
social kind. The understanding is constrained within a cultural environment 
whereas the operation occurs in a social environment. This Is what is meant by 
a social environment - the extent of the influence of the causal and 
dispositional properties of a social kind. 
So if an individual wishes to operate the mechanisms of a social kind while 
being part of the operational matrix of the social kind, then that individual 
must be capable of distinguishing between social and cultural environments. The 
individual must be capable of distinguishing the understanding of the operations 
of the social kinds from the operations themselves. 
This understanding is itself facilitated by the operations of some social 
kinds which are themselves conceptualised in cultural environments. The 
operations of these facilitating social kinds are dependent upon a bootstrapping 
(to borrow a term from computer )argon) process whereby the operators inside a 
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process have to manipulate and come to understand the very process of which 
they form integral parts. The bootstrapping requires the operators to possess a 
second order monitoring facility (*35). 
One should not forget, however, that social theories are not only developed 
In formal settings by social scientists. They are also the sets of ideas, often 
contradictory, which individuals have about the workings and properties of 
social kinds with which they interact. In order to be able to interact with 
these social kinds they must be capable of gaining some understanding of some of 
their operations. The gaining of even this partial understanding of the 
operations of a social kind Is only possible if the Individual who is gaining 
that understanding can both have an awareness of the Impact of the communication 
of the concepts which are appurtenant to the operation of the social kind and 
have an awareness of part of the actual operation of the social kind. In other 
words the learner must have a notion of what a cultural environment is and be 
able to distinguish it from a social environment. This means that the 
Individual can distinguish between the meaning associated with a concept and the 
operations of social structures within which the concept is used. Any blurring 
of the distinction will impede the process of Increasing an Individual's 
understanding of the meaning of a concept. 
Distinguishing A Person From A Conoeptualising Individual 
If it is only the learning process which justifies the specification of a 
cultural environment as a necessary condition enabling a Cl to be 'socialised' 
Into understanding and manipulating social kinds. then it seems reasonable to 
ask why one cannot stick to the definition of a Cl (*p. 56) Instead of accepting 
the need for the more extended definition of a person (D6), (*p. 73). Would not 
Occam's razor chop out definition (D6)? 
The extra ingredient which (Oa) adds to (D2) Is that the person should not 
only be able to activate social forces but also conceptualise the activation. 
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The conceptualisation is only possible If the CI, turned person, has an 
awareness of the cultural environment In which the activation occurs and 
distinguishes It from the actual operation of the social kind - so distinguishes 
the social from the cultural environment. 
The simple Cl might only have the ability to conceptualise the effects of 
the social forces It activates. The C1 could be, in Hume-like fashion, a 
passive reactor to stimuli In combination with an observer of the effects of its 
reactions. Such a being can help to sustain the existence of a social 
environment centered on the operations of a given social kind, but it cannot be 
cogniscent of its sustaining role. Cogniscence of such a role would necessitate 
a CI being able to conceptualise Its potential activation of the social forces 
which were Involved in the operation of the social kind. 
It Is the word 'potential' which Is central to the argument. It precludes 
the possibility that the person-Cl can know that both Its activation of social 
forces and the conceptualisation of the activation must invariably be triggered 
by stimuli which are external to the person. Indeed, if a Cl were to know, or 
think that it knew, that the activation of social forces by the operation of its 
own causal and dispositional properties were always triggered by exogenous 
agencies then it would be 'depersonalised' in the sense used by R. D. Laing 
(*36). Such a Cl would not even be capable of fulfilling the requirements 
placed on individuals by the need to be able to communicate concepts (see 
Chapter 1). 
The Distinction Between A Person's And A Ci's Abilities To Conceptualise 
it is possible to justify the contention that the conceptualising power 
which persons use to sustain social environments, and enables them to be 
cogniscent of that sustaining role, must extend to W /the activities of persons 
which involve conceptualisations. This can be done by noting that one needs to 
allow for the possibilities 
85 
mart 5s The Concept of a Person Chapter 2 
(a) of new individuals joining those who sustain the cultural environment 
and (b) of changes in the meanings of concepts. 
Possibility (b) Involves changes in cultural environments due to changes in the 
effects of the communication of concepts on the Cls whose behaviour sustains the 
social kinds which are operational in the cultural environments. The 
implications flowing from the acceptance of (b) will be analysed extensively in 
Part 6 below. 
It is reasonably obvious that persons should be able to conceptualise their 
powers to activate social forces through communicating concepts if (a) is to be 
possible; but arguments supporting such an obvious contention are not easily 
constructed. The possibility of the acceptance of a new individual Into the 
group which sustains the operations of a social kind involves at least one 
asumption by an analyst who is attempting to understand those operations. This 
assumption is that the existing members of the group (whose behaviour sustains 
the operations of the social kind) recognise that the potential to activate, and 
to conceptualise the activation of, social forces involved in the social kind's 
operations can extend to another individual who can thereby become a member of 
the group. 
The sacrifice of this assumpton carries with It the payment of a price: the 
certainty that the the Individual who attempts to understand the operations of a 
social kind can never become a member of the group which sustains the operations 
of that social kind. Alternatively, the sacrifice prevents an individual who 
forms part of the operational matrix of a social kind from understanding those 
operations. The first element of the price renders unintelligible training 
programmes which induce people into organisations. The alternative renders 
unintelligible all attempts to understand social changes, such attempts Involve 
investigations into changes which occur in the very cultural environment in 
which the Investigations are conceived as being intelligible. 
If an Individual becomes, say, a police officer then the existing police 
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officers and the public (all of whom sustain the causal and dispositional powers 
of the police force and sustain its cultural environment - centering on the 
communication of such concepts as law. arrest, prosecution, crime-prevention 
etc... ) must be capable of being aware of their own functions in sustaining the 
causal and dispositional powers of the police force. This last necessity rests 
on the possibility that the new police officer is able to develop the causal and 
dispositional powers which he needs as a police officer In order that he can 
contribute to the sustaining of the operations of the police force. The 
Intelligibility of the existence of training programmes for new recruits rests 
on the acceptance of the notion that the recruit can conceptualise his potential 
to activate the social forces Involved in the operation of the police force. 
Further the possibility of associating meaning with the notion of a trainee 
police cadet rests on the ability of individuals, with whom such a trainee might 
Interact, being able to conceptualise their own activation of social forces 
which are appurtenent to the operations of the police force. 
The Implications Of A Person's Attempts To Understand The Environment In Which 
He/She Operates 
Neither a social theorist's relationship with a social kind nor the motives 
behind the theorist's drive to understand the operations of the social kind 
necessarily affect the operations of the social kind. This is the case whether 
the theorist's motive is to interact with the social kind (as someone who uses 
the police force to attempt to recover stolen property), or whether it Is to 
help to sustain its operations (as an officer might when attempting to come to 
terms with the police force's hierarchical structure), or whether it is merely 
to increase understanding of its operation (as a sociologist might - in order to 
find corroborative evidence for a theory). 
This means that if an Individual is to be able to understand the operations 
of the social kind In which he operates, then he must be able to distinguish a 
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social environment from a cultural environment: the social environment is the 
one specified by the operations of the social kind, and the cultural environment 
Is the one generated by the use of the concepts whose communication affects the 
operations of the social kind. This ability involves the use, by the person, of 
a second order monitoring device by which the person can be aware of his impact 
on his environment. 
it is also reasonably obvious that a person must possess the capability to 
conceptualise his activation of social forces If changes In the meanings of 
concepts are to be possible. Changes in the meanings of concepts must be 
accompanied by changes in the operations of some or other social kind. This 
will Involve changes in the effects on some Cis of the communication of the 
concepts. Whatever the cause of the changes In these effects, for an individual 
to recognise that this involves a change In the operation of a social kind, and 
so a change in the activation of social forces, he must be capable of 
conceptualising the activation of the social forces. As has already been 
Indicated. the Individual does not have to understand all the mechanisms by 
which social forces operate - dust as she does not need to be able to understand 
all the mechanisms by which natural forces operate in order to row a boat. Her 
understanding in both cases Is sufficient If It Is restricted to understanding 
how to operate the processes which control her interactions with the social and 
natural mechanisms. 
Persons And Second Order Monitoring, A Corollary 
As a corollary to the argument one can support the proposition that the 
agency of the Individual does not fall under any automata theory. Given that an 
Individual who helps to sustain the operations of a social kind Is aware of its 
potential to activate those operations, it is self-contradictory to suggest that 
either "total Internal" or "total external control" (*37) of the agency of the 
Individual can ever be known. 
N 
4*0^rt 5, The Concept of a Person Chapter 2 
This can be seen from the fact that the processes of gaining the knowledge 
themselves involve the operation of social kinds. And the individuals (who 
sustain the cultural environment in which the understanding of the operations of 
the social kinds is developed) must operate on the assumption that they have the 
potential both to activate the operations of these social kinds and to 
conceptualise the activation. So we have the situation that the claim to know 
that X Is true, namely that some automata theory of the self Is true, Involves 
the very same Individuals (who make the claim) simultaneously assuming that X is 
false. 
The Argument In Part 5 Summarised and completed 
So far. in Part 5. justifications for the acceptance of characteristics 
(1), (It) and (iii) In the definition of a person (*p. 73) have been offered. 
These justifications have hinged on the triple possibilities that 
(a) an individual C1 can come to learn or become aware of the properties of 
social kinds, 
(b) the social kinds whose properties can be, even if imperfectly, 
conceptualised can undergo alterations of their properties and that 
these altered states can themselves be conceptualised, and 
(c) the group of individuals who sustain the operations of these social 
kinds and the cultural environments (in which an understanding of the 
operations is developed) can change both in number and in the 
properties which are characteristic of membership of the group. 
The justification for the acceptance of characteristic (iv) (*p. 73) will 
be less direct. In order to Justify the claim that a person must have 
conceptualising abilities and disposltional properties which are engaged by and 
activated by the communication of concepts which specify a cultural environment, 
so 
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the need for internal consistency in the arguments which supported the 
acceptance of (i), (li) and (iil) (*p. 73) will be Invoked. In other words the 
acceptance of (iv) is dependent upon the prior acceptance of the validity of the 
arguments used in justifying the acceptance of (i), (ii) and (iii). This will 
mean that if one accepts (a), (b) and (c) In the previous paragraph then one 
must also accept that persons have characteristics (i) to (Iv). One Is obliged 
further to accept that persons must also be ultimate entities In the cultural 
environment in which (a). (b) and (c) can occur. So that, while there may be 
other sound reasons for accepting that persons have characteristics (i) to (Iv), 
the acceptance of the possibilities (a), (b) and (c) both obliges one to accept, 
and gives one sufficient grounds for accepting, (i) to (iv). 
The internal consistency of the arguments justifying (i) to (Ill) centres 
on the fact that persons, being Cls. are also social kinds. Since they are 
social kinds each one of them will operate in a social environment specified by 
and specifying its possible area of operations. This social environment will be 
such that It is sustained by a group of persons which include the person whose 
social environment is being sustained. 
The exclusion of the person from this group would Involve a 
conceptualisation of a person which did not include characteristic (iii) - that 
a person can activate his own component parts - and would Involve the 
possibility of a notion of a totally objective definition of the self (*38). 
The acceptance of (1). (II) and (Iii) was based on the acceptance of the 
possibility (b) that social kinds' properties can change and that these changes 
can be conceptualised. Since persons are also social kinds it will also be 
possible for an individual person to change in the same manner as any other 
social kind. One Is obliged, in order to retain consistency In the argument, to 
accept the possibility that each person who sustains the social environment in 
which the given changing individual operates can conceptualise the changes in 
the causal and dispositional properties of the changing individual. Since the 
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changing individual is himself a member of the group who sustain the social 
environment in which he operates, he will also be capable of conceptualising the 
changes In his own dispositional properties. 
One can further argue that, since the learning processes undergone by a 
person change that person's causal and dispositional properties qua social kind, 
the appreciation by the person that she has learnt (and with this appreciation 
hangs the intelligibility of teaching) Is only possible If the person has a 
conception of the cultural environment in which understanding of her causal and 
dispositional properties is developed. In other words a person must see herself 
as a social being If she Is to understand that she can learn concepts. Any 
attempt to formulate a totally objective definition of the self, and convince 
some other individual of its acceptability. would therefore be a self-defeating 
task (*39). 
The argument in the last paragraph supports contention (Iv) that a person 
should be such that his conceptualising abilities may be engaged, and that his 
dispositional properties may be activated by, the communication of concepts 
which specify a cultural environment. And further that the person is a party to 
the specification of the social space which comprises the cultural environment. 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs has shown what the conditions 
are for substantiating the claim that a person should have characteristics (1) 
to (Iv) outlined in Part 2. This means that a person can be simultaneously a 
golf club official, a rabbi, a bankrupt and an international athlete. The same 
person may have embedded In her either several Cis, or indeed several persons 
(*40), each operating In her(/his? ) own given social spaces. The actual 
relationship between a person and Its component parts, be they Cis or further 
persons, is a subject for examination by social and medical scientists. 
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PART 6: CHANGES IN THE DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES OF SOCIAL KINDS 
(Including the boundaries within which understanding of persons can be obtained) 
This, the third stage of the argument outlined at the end of Part 2, 
Involves an examination of the three conditions under which changes in the 
causal and dispositional powers of social kinds can occur. The acceptability of 
the second of these conditions has already been established by the argument in 
Part 5 (Stage 2). Indeed, the interdependence of the arguments in Stages 2 and 
3 can be seen from the requirement that one has to look Into the conditions 
which enable changes in the properties of social kinds in general (Stage 3) if 
one Is to understand the conditions which enable changes to occur in particular 
social kinds, namely persons (Stage 2). 
The understanding of the conditions which enable changes to occur In 
persons was not fully reached in Stage 2. This means that the claim, that it is 
only the concept of a person rather than that of a CI which enables one to cope 
with the requirements of explaining "changes which occur in individuals such as 
religious conversions, ageing and the adoption of different roles", has not yet 
been fully justified. Stage 3 will provide this justification. 
The provision of this justification will Involve various processes, each of 
which flows from the analysis of the conditions which must hold in order for any 
social kind to change Its properties. This analysis will begin with an 
examination of the conditions which have to hold if the social space generated 
by the operations of a social kind can change - for the social space generated 
by a social kind can only change if the properties of the social kind change 
041). It will be seen that the fulfilment of these conditions depends upon the 
presence of a minimum of three persons. The necessity for the presence of three 
persons stems from the requirement that concept-development In a cultural 
environment should be possible; and concept-development Is Itself necessitated 
by the possibility of changes occurring in the properties of social kinds. 
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Sustaining A Social Environment Through Changes in The Properties Of Social 
Kinds: 
(l) (The Neoesslty For The Presence of Two Persons) 
In Stage 2, the argument centered on the conditions which have to hold If 
claims that the properties of social kinds can change are to be substantiated. 
These conditions included the necessity that at least one person sustains both 
the social environment in which the social kind operates and the cultural 
environment in which understanding of those operations is obtained and 
developed. 
The argument will now move one step further. This step involves a focus on 
the participants In changes in conceptualisations which lead to alterations in 
the properties of social kinds. The earlier steps involved a focus on a social 
theorist's attempt to understand the processes by which others altered their 
conceptualisations. This further step will begin with an argument which uses. as 
its starting point, the notion that it is possible to develop an understanding 
of changes in the operations of a social kind. If such understanding Is to be 
possible then the cultural and social environments (generated by the operations 
of and an understanding of the social kind) are sustained by more than one 
person. 
There are two requirements underpinning the question of the number of 
persons needed to sustain a social environment. One concerns the need to be 
able to sustain the operations of changing social kinds. The second Involves 
giving support to the Idea that an individual has to be Inducted Into helping to 
sustain a social environment - the individual does not automatically assume such 
sustaining roles. Meeting the terms of the first requirement will lead to a 
demonstration of the need for two Individuals. Meeting the terms of the second 
will lead to the demonstration for the need to have more than two persons who 
sustain the operations of a changing social kind. 
Both requirements rest upon the acceptability of the following condition, 
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When changes occur In the causal and disposition/ powers of a social kind, 
there must be changes in the conceptualisations of some Individuals which 
noraally erbt the functioning of the operations of the social kind ... (NC1) 
Condition (NCI) Is analytically true: the concept of a social kind Includes 
the notion that the social kind's properties are determined by the 
conceptualisations of individuals. An example will Illustrate the analytical 
nature of the relationship. 
If the medieval Inquisition had stopped Instilling fear in people then there 
would have been. accompanying and causing this alteration. changes in the 
conceptualisations of individuals. These change would have been detectable 
either in the acceptance of what might happen as a result of the Inquisition's 
activities or in the reaction to the prospect of what might happen. The changes 
in conceptualisations form necessary conditions for the changes in the causal 
and dispositional powers of the Inquisition both to occur and to be understood 
to occur. However, If no one were to realise that the Inquisition had stopped 
instilling fear then, while (NCI) would still hold. It would lose Its relevance. 
The relevance of (NC1) Is restricted to the constraints its acceptance imposes 
on any social theorist in the development of her theory. 
The existence of an Instantial occurrence of condition (NCI) also enables 
one to claim that the causal and dispositional powers of a social kind have 
altered. The Importance of this claim and Its converse (stated In the previous 
paragraph) lie not In their truth but in their relevance: it is only the 
awareness of the validity of claims made on the basis of accepting (NC1) which 
makes one's consideration of It significant. 
The awareness that changes In the powers of a social kind (and with them 
alterations In the effects of some social forces) have occurred, Involves two 
considerations: firstly, that the Cis who reproduce the behaviour involved In 
the exercise of the powers of the given social kind behave and react 
differently; and secondly, that the persons (who either activate or help sustain 
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the social forces operational in any of the cultural environments within which 
the social kind can be perceived to operate) also begin to behave differently. 
The first of these considerations flows directly from the definition of a 
social kind. As such, It is of little consequence save to reinforce the fact 
that a change in the powers of a social kind is accompanied by a change In the 
meaning of at least one concept (even if this concept Is only the one which Is 
used to Individuate the social kind itself). 
The second consideration emanates from the argument, produced In Part 5, 
that individuals need to have the capability to conceptualise social forces and 
so conceptualise some of the conceptualisations of the Cis whose behaviour 
constituted the operational matrix of a social kind. This argument itself rested 
on the possibility that individuals should be able to learn what the causal and 
dispositional properties of social kinds might be. But in this case, as in the 
first consideration. there has been a change in the meaning of at least one 
concept utilised by the person who is attempting to understand the operations of 
the social kind. Such a change will involve a change In the cultural 
environment In which the understanding of the operations of the social kind is 
developed. 
Since the alteration in meaning of a concept can only occur if the concept 
can be communicated (and only if a process such as that represented by Model(C) 
(*p. 36) is used), the possibility that a social kind can change its causal and 
dispositional powers carries with it the necessity that there are at least two 
persons who sustain the cultural environment In which understanding of the 
operations of the social kind is developed. 
Further, since persons are themselves social kinds who operate In social 
environments which must overlap with the cultural environments in which 
explanations of their behaviour are developed, each person will also have his 
own social environment sustained by at least one other person. Aristotle's 
dictum that a person is a social animal Is analytically, rather than 
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empirically, true. 
One might still argue that it is possible that a social environment 
sustained by only one person might exist, but one does so by paying a price. 
The price Involves sacrificing the possibility that anyone might gain any degree 
of understanding of the one person's causal and dispositional powers which were 
operational in that solipsistic social (sic) environment. This price would have 
to be paid even by the person whose causal and dispositional powers were under 
scrutiny. This conflicts with characteristic (iv). (Da), of persons which 
stated that persons should be capable of conceptualising their own activation of 
social forces. It would denude the Individual's ability to conceptualise her 
own conceptualised interactions with her environment. The logical conclusion of 
paying the price would be the disintegration of all understanding of social 
phenomena and so even of attempting to pay the price Itself: the ultimate in 
self-destructive social practice! 
(11) (The Ne+cesslty 1br the Presence of More Than Two Persons) 
The argument in the previous subsection rested on the supposition that 
changes in the properties of social kinds actually occur. The focus of 
attention will now veer towards a condition which has to be met if such changes 
are to occur. For such changes to occur, it must be possible for individuals 
(who sustain the operations of the changing social kind) to bring these changes 
under a set of concepts. The requirement that individuals should be able to 
conceptuallee the changes in the causal and dispositional properties of social 
kinds takes the argument one step further. This further step leads to the 
substantiation of the claim that social kinds are sustained by more than two 
persons. A social group consisting solely of the self and the other (*42) 
cannot be known to survive changes in its properties; although it is logically 
possible for such changes to occur without being detected. 
The argument in this subsection turns on the need for an individual to 
distinguish two of her functions when she is involved in a concept-developing 
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process such as Model(C). She must be able to distinguish her own participation 
in the concept-developing process from the possibility that any individual may 
participate in the process. The recognition of this possibility carries with it 
the requirement that the Individual simultaneously perceives herself to be 
Involved in a process with another individual while remaining distinct from that 
other individual. 
In short, an individual needs to be able to draw a distinction between her 
participation with another individual in the concept-developing process and her 
Interaction with that other individual. She has to be able to distinguish 
between being part of a process with another Individual and being distinct from 
that other individuals she has to be able to distinguish being with from 
Interacting with the other individual. 
This is the sort of distinction of which many individuals are aware in many 
of their social interactions. It is the sort of distinction which a singer in a 
choir makes when being aware of being part of an ensemble creating music while 
he concentrates on the conductor's Instructions. His relationship with the 
conductor, and Indeed all the other members of the choir, Is simultaneously one 
of involvement and Interaction. He Is aware of both being with and Interacting 
with others. In most of their social interactions, however, Individuals need 
not be consciously aware of their dual role of sustaining a social structure 
while Interacting with other Individuals. But If they cannot perform, and 
conceptualise, the dual role when involved in concept-developing processes, then 
such processes cannot function. The Individuals Involved in concept-developing 
processes must be aware that they are altering the meaning of a concept: the 
necessity Is logical. 
The need to accommodate social structures which permit the development of 
an Individual's notion of self-identity also obliges one to accept that 
individuals should have the ability to distinguish the two roles (*43). The 
absence of an individual's ability to distinguish them would prevent that 
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Individual from developing a notion of self-identity. An individual is required 
to possess such a notion If he is to be able to participate in 
concept-developing processes. These processes involve the Individual taking on 
a role whose existence is determined by the acceptance of the concept-developing 
power of the processes; a role characterised in Chapter i as that of the 
Paradigm individuator (page *28). Without a concept of his own Identity, an 
individual cannot conceptualise himself as a substitute for a Paradigm 
individuator. 
The realisation by an individual of the possibility that she can substitute 
for a generalised participator in a process. provides the second hook on which 
to hang the argument in this section. The realisation involves her In accepting 
the possibility that individuals other than the ones involved in a given 
concept-developing process exist. This means she must have a concept of 
third-party observer status to the process, and realise that she can attain that 
third-party status. Without the existence of such third-party status, the 
notion of a generalised participator in the concept-developing processes would 
disintegrate, and such a disintegration would be accompanied by the 
disintegration of processes which involve the development of understanding of 
social phenomena. The disintegration of the understanding of social phenomena 
is itself accompanied by a disintegration of social phenomena and so of all 
social activity. No such relationship exists between the understanding of and 
the existence of natural, or non-social, activity. 
This, and the previous subsection have lead to the conclusion that knowable 
changes in the properties of social kinds can only occur in cultural 
environments whose social space Is sustained by the eonoeptualisations of more 
than two persons. This means that persons are ineliminabiy social beings. The 
social nature of a person's being Is seen to rest on the person's ability to 
distinguish her own part in the continued operation of a social kind from her 
own conceptualised activity as a causal agents the person has to be able to 
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monitor her own activities. 
The Inelieinability of the Person 
The role played by an Individual's self-monitoring function In the 
development of concepts in general, places constraints on the possible 
conceptualisations of persons by other persons. These constraints Involve the 
ineliminability of the concept of a person from any given explanation of the 
behaviour of any specific person. 
This ineliminability contrasts with the eliminability of virtually any 
concept used in the explanation of natural phenomena. The elimination of a 
concept in natural science Is usually achieved by altering the logical primacy 
of the concepts used in explanatory systems: a concept becomes eliminable 
usually by making some other concept Ineliminable. In the social sciences such 
alterations have at least one significant barrier which they cannot cross$ they 
cannot include the elimination of the person. 
The argument in support of this proposition Is brief. Its acceptability 
rests on the unacceptability of the consequences derived from the acceptance of 
a premise. It will be assumed that an explanation of the behaviour of a person 
is possible In a cultural environment generated by the use of a set of concepts 
which does not include a concept used to individuate the person whose behaviour 
is being explained. 
Let us suppose, contrapositively, that It is possible to explain the 
behaviour of a person using concepts other than the one used to Individuate the 
particular person whose behaviour is being explained. The use of these 
explanatory concepts would generate a cultural environment. Within this 
cultural environment the person would find that his power to activate social 
forces within that cultural environment would be pre-set. The person would not 
be able to alter his capability to conceptualise the activation of social 
forces. In other words, he would not be capable of learning new concepts since 
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such learning would alter his ability to affect social change in the cultural 
environment. 
If the explanation of the person's behaviour is sought by the person 
himself, then a peculiar contradiction develops. The person would have no means 
of self-discovery, no means of knowing that he had learned. The development of 
any form of self-conception would disappear, and disappearance would be 
accompanied by the disappearance of all conceptualised discovery - since all 
conceptualised discovery depends upon the realisation by each individual of his 
own individuality. 
The assumption that objective conceptualisations of persons (associated 
with the elimination of the concept of the self from explanations of the 
behaviour of the self) are possible, has led to an unacceptable conclusion. One 
can conclude that an objective description of a person is only possible if one 
assumes that no social kind, whose properties are sustained and conceptualised 
by the person, can change its properties. Further, in these circumstances the 
person would not be capable of learning or coming to understand that any social 
kinds can change their causal and dispositional properties. 
However, while it Is true that the conoeptualised person Is conceptualised 
in a given cultural environment. It is not the case that that person's own 
conceptualisations are restricted to that same cultural environment. There is 
no restriction which can be placed, a priori, on the cultural environments in 
which a person can operate. Cultural relativism is not obligatory. 
The Possibility That Persons Who Help To Sustain One Cultural Environment Can 
Operate in Another Distinct Cultural Environment 
The acceptance of such a possibility would preclude a vicious relativism, 
which prevented all cross-cultural communication, from establishing Itself In 
any cultural environment in which changes in the dispositional properties of 
social kinds were possible. 
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The argument will, as in the previous sub-section be one from 
contradiction. but it will be presented in a more formal fashion. 
Let us make the contrapositive assumptions (k). (/) and W: 
(k)..... a person P Is one of the persons who help to sustain the cultural 
environment CE1 which Is defined by the processes of communication 
associated with a given set of concepts C1, C2. C3..... C and the 
processes are facilitated by the operations of social kinds SKI, SK2, 
S K3..... S Kn 
(where it Is possible that SKI - SKj for some i<j - which means It is 
possible for a social kind SKI to facilitate the communication of both Cl 
and CO); 
(/)..... the dlspositional properties of a specific social kind SKr 
(O<r<n+1) change creating social kind SKrA thereby changing concept Cr to 
CAA and altering cultural environment CE, to CE1A ; 
(a)..... it is impossible for P to conceptualise her interactions with any 
social kind which faclitates concept communication save with SK1. SK2, 
SK3,..., SKn. 
If (k). (I) and (a) are true then conditions (u) and (v) must also be true, 
where (u) and (v) are, 
(u)..... P would not be able to Interact as a person with SKrA 
(this follows trivially from (a)) 
(v)..... P would cease to sustain CE, as a person and would do so solely as 
a non-person CI 
(this also follows trivially from (. ) - and it means that no person can 
sustain CE, since P Is a generalised person. which In turn means that none 
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of the dispositional properties of SK1, SK2, SK3,..., SK can be known to 
change) 
A contradiction has been obtained since (A postulated a change In SKr 
which in (v) is seen to be unknowable= an unknowable change is not a change. At 
least one of the premisses M. (d and (a) must be false. One can conclude 
that if a person sustains the operations of some social kinds which operate in a 
given cultural environment and the dispositional properties of one of those 
social kinds can change (without debarring the person from gaining understanding 
of the operations of the social kinds which changed the cultural environment) 
then it must be possible for the person to Interact with social kinds which do 
not help to define the cultural environment. 
The proviso which has to be made Is that any 'external' social kinds which 
operate outside the cultural environment with which the person can Interact must 
be capable of interacting with persons In a social space S In which the 
'Internal' social kinds can also operate. S would be a social space In which, 
for example, it might be possible to sustain translatability from one cultural 
environment to another. 
The argument does not substantiate a claim that a person can Interact with 
any social kind. Rather, it establishes that no bounds can be set, on a priori 
grounds, on the potential a person has for interacting with social kinds. This 
means that there are no a priori grounds for claiming that a person who operates 
In a particular cultural environment Is, because of that operation, debarred 
from operating in another cultural environment. Correspondingly, there are no a 
priori grounds for sustaining a claim that definitions of the person must be 
culturally relative since there are no a priori grounds for fixing a definition 
of a person. The properties of a person can, like those of any other person, 
alter -a person's characteristics must, however, not conflict with those 
outlined above In the definition (D6). 
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It is worth emphasising that both the conclusion (that persons must have 
the ability to operate In more than one cultural environment) and the claim 
(that definitions of persons are not culturally relative, or formulated in a 
specific cultural environment) rest on two premisses: first, that individuals 
can alter their understanding of the operations of social kinds; and secondly, 
that it is possible for the causal and dispositional properties of social kinds 
to be known to change. 
A cultural environment in which no alterations in the understanding of the 
operations of social kinds occurred, could be seen as either absolute or 
God-given or natural. Such a cultural environment would preclude the 
possibility of Individuals who operate in It from gaining understanding of its 
operations. An approximation of such a fixed system might be the Hindu Dharma 
with its rigidly structured social institutions and traditional practices. 
These determine the individual's conceptualisations of all social Interactions 
(*44). 
s 
PART Ti AN OUTLINE OF ARGUMENTS IN PARTS 3 TO 6 
Before moving on to the fourth stage of the argument in this chapter. It is 
worth bringing together the strands of the arguments presented In the first 
three stages. It has been argued that the concept of a social force as an agent 
bringing about changes in the behaviour of social kinds Is central to the 
understanding of the operations of social kinds - with respect both to their 
Internal operations and to their Interactions with other social kinds. Further. 
It was argued that only a specific type of Conceptualising Individual could come 
to have some understanding of the social kind's operations. Such a C1 would 
have to be able to conceptualise its power to activate the social forces which 
determined the operations of a social kind (*45); this CI could not be a non- 
103 
00art 7o An Outline of Arguments in Parts 3 to 6 
person Cl. 
Chapter 2 
The discussion in Parts 3 to 6 also points towards an analysis of social 
change as neither holistic nor individualistic. The pointers indicate that 
society should be conceived as something which can be detected in a collection 
of cultural environments which comprise perhaps one single large cultural 
environment. In particular, the argument in Part 6 demonstrated that if one is 
to view such an embracing cultural environment as closed or bounded, then one 
would sacrifice the possibility of gaining understanding of the operations of 
the social kinds which are functional in the cultural environment - providing 
one still retained the requirement that there was a need to account for changes 
in the properties of social kinds. 
In the fourth stage these Ideas are explored further. The exploration will 
Involve an examination of the notion of society. It will be found that society 
Is not an entity with causal powers and dispositional tendencies, but rather a 
collection of various entities which have causal power; the effects of the 
exercise of the causal power being detectable In a cultural environment. The 
purpose of undertaking the further examination Is to deepen the understanding of 
the person/society relationship and so enrich the understanding of the basis on 
which the identity of the individual Is built. 
w* 
PART 8: TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOCIETY 
I ntrod uotlon 
This part of the chapter will begin with a brief outline of some of the 
problems faced by those who attempt to offer explanations of dynamics of the 
society/person relationship. It will be intimated that many of the difficulties 
can be traced to a conception of society as an entity with dispositional 
tendencies and causal properties. This Intimation will lead to the 
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Identification of an analysis of the society/person relationship which exhibits 
fewer flaws than many an alternative. This is the analysis offered by Roy 
Bhaskar (*46). Bhaskar builds a model of the relationship with which he 
attempts to capture Its essential features. It will be seen that the 
assimilation of the principles encapsulated in the Bhaskarlan model still leave 
one with the problem of adequately accounting for changes in the properties of 
those social kinds which facilitate the development of explanations of changes 
in social kinds. 
In dealing with this residual Bhaskarian problem. a similar model to his 
will be built. Like Bhaskar's model, Its purpose will be to elucidate aspects 
of the relationship rather than explain the specific nature of a given 
society/person relationship. There Is no Intention that the remodelled 
structure should be reified. This alternative model will have the advantage of 
facilitating an adequate conception of the processes by which new individuals 
can be assimilated Into a given cultural environment; a process which Is 
problematic in the unreformed Bhaskarlan model. 
The problems faced by many theorists who attempt to offer explanations of 
the society/person relationship flow from the existence of the tension between 
two aspects of an Individual's participation in social interactions. These two 
aspects reflect the individual's dual role in social Interactionst the role 
associated with the sustaining of the social structure within which the 
Interaction is occurring, and the role of a separate conscious individual who Is 
participating in the Interaction. These two roles are associated with the two 
forms of relationship between Individuals which were examined in Part 8; namely 
the ones concerned with being with Others as contrasted with Interacting with 
other& The tension between the two roles is not only the source of the 
problems found In analysing the society/person relationship, it also, 
paradoxically, provides the means by which an adequate understanding of the 
problem can be reached. 
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The Person And Society. Some possibilities 
The relationship beween a person and society is neither "egocentric and 
contractual" nor "soclocentric and organic" (*47). The former would base itself 
on the complete autonomy of the Individual and the latter on the primacy of 
power of the social group. The relationship is rather one In which a person, as 
a social kind. defines himself through the conceptualisations of his activation 
of social forces and is defined by others by means of concepts which attempt to 
encapsulate the person's power to activate such social forces. 
It was established In Part 6 that the operation of a social force cannot be 
assigned to a solipsistic individual without facing unacceptable consequences. 
Changes In social space cannot be brought about without the occurrence of 
changes in the conceptualisations of at least three Individuals. One can 
conclude that an analysis of the society/person relationship involving the 
autonomy of the Individual and her subsequent contractual arrangements with 
other individuals becomes inadequate. Social contract theories have no basis on 
which to builds the operation of a social force destroys the concept of the 
pre-contractual individual. The exercise of an individual's powers, qua social 
kind, is In all circumstances enabled by the existence of other social kinds 
which operate in an extended social space. In other words the conceptualised 
actions of individuals can only occur in social space within the ambit of the 
operations of at least one non-Cl social kind. 
Similarly, the operation of a social force cannot be ascribed to a social 
kind without simultaneously ascribing at least part of that operation to a 
person. It was seen in Part 6 that certain penalties would have to be paid If 
Individuals involved in the operations of social kinds could not simultaneously 
be consciously aware of their own causal efficacy within those operations. The 
existence of an instantial occurrence of an entirely sociocentric social force 
would necessitate the renunciation of the possibility of explaining changes in 
the powers of social kinds. 
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Further, the individualistic and sooiooentric explanations of the 
operations of social kinds cannot be merged. Any attempt, such as that by Peter 
Berger (*48), to combine the two positions merely ends up by combining their 
faults - as is pointed out by Roy Bhaskar (*49). 
Bhaskar's own solution, In which he constructs a transformational model of 
the society/person relationship (*50), also faces some problems. These result 
from his acceptance of one of the premisses which creates some of the problems 
which he criticises in others. This premise Involves the assumption that 
society itself, rather than only social structures, has causal and dispositional 
properties. 
The acceptance of this premise creates strains In the Bhaskarlan analysis. 
Stress lines develop between, on the one hand, his attempt to ascribe to society 
powers of socialisation over individuals. and on the other, his classification 
of society as an "ensemble of structure, practices and conventions which 
Individuals reproduce or transform but which would not exist unless they (the 
individuals) did so" (see note (*50)). The source of the stress Is the 
underanalysed dual role of a person outlined in the Introduction to Part 8 
above. The dual role was concerned with a person's conceptualisation of himself 
as an Individual social agent and as a sustainer/transformer of the powers and 
operations of the social kind. 
The source of this strain cannot be eliminated. Persons must be able to 
gain some understanding of the operations of the social structures In which they 
operate; otherwise no social structure would survive the death of those who 
sustained its operations. The attempt to meet the requirement that individuals 
can gain some understanding of the operations of social structures will be seen 
to generate a need to modify the Bhaskarian analysis. In order to develop this 
modified analysis it will be helpful if Bhaskar's own analysis were outlined. 
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Enablement/constraint II 
Social structure 
Chapter 2 
Reproduction /transformation 
I 
II 
Individual 
Bhaskar's diagram 2.6 
There is little which is controversial in the relationship described in 
this diagram. Human agency Is Indeed constrained and enabled by the operations 
of social structures; perhaps Bhaskar might have added that the human agency had 
to be of the type which could, in principle, be eonoeptualleed by the agent. 
These enabling and constraining structures exist only in virtue of Interpreted 
human agency which Itself can only function through the operations of social 
structures. This point lies at the core of the analysis in Chapter 1 above; 
although there the conceptualised and conceptualising nature of the begetter of 
the agency were emphasised. 
The relationship described in Bhaskar's diagram 2.5 does, however, suffer 
from one inadequacy and a flaw. The Inadequacy consists of the omission of a 
reference to natural structures which also have enabling effects on human 
agency. Bhaskar rectifies this in a more sophisticated model In which he uses a 
"social cube" (*52) in which both natural and social constraints on human agency 
are Included. (The existence of the natural constraints on human agency were 
also Identified in Chapter 1, Part 2, above and the extent of their influence on 
the powers of persons will be Investigated in Chapter 3 below. ) The flaw to be 
found in the model described by diagram 2.5 Is the one identified above 
involving the assumption that society Itself, rather than merely the structures 
which comprise society, has causal and dispositional properties. The removal of 
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the flaw will be carried out below In the next sub-section, when a re-formed 
TMSA will be developed. 
Bhaskar goes on to give an Indication of his conception of the 
reproduction/ transformation process. The details of the mechanisms he 
describes are not relevant to the argument in this essay. What Is of concern 
here is the use which Bhaskar makes of it. He uses it to move from a 
fundamentally passive mode of human participation in the 
reproduction /transformation of social structures to an emancipatory active mode. 
His TMSA encapsulates the passive mode by following through a cycle from 
reproduction/transformation through production and back to 
reproduction/transformation. The main argument being offered in this Part of 
this essay is that the move from the passive to the emancipatory active mode 
necessitates a conception of society which is different from the Bhaskarlan 
conception. 
The following diagram is a modified reproduction of Bhaskar's own which 
describes the cycle from reproduction/transformation through production and back 
to reproduction /transformations 
*Reprodgctfon/b! n~foa /on 
1. Unintended oonseq 
2 Unacknowledged condition s_ 
*Conditions* 
8i 
3. Unoonsolous sotiva 
* Prod uot" 
4. Teolt skills 
'Reproduottlon/trinafforret/on" 
1II1 
etc.. 
1. Unintended oonsequenoee 
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Knowledge in the human sciences. Bhaskar claims, promises an emancipatory 
effect. Bhaskar would naturally agree that the human sciences need to be 
located In a TMSA if such a model Is to be of use to us in the emancipatory 
process. He would agree that 'Bootstrapping' processes exist which facilitate 
learners in the task of pulling themselves out of their own conditioning, and 
this necessitates the inclusion of the emancipatory process Itself in the 
mechanism of the system which the emancipation enables one to supercede. The 
emancipatory process itself has to be located in the structure from which the 
emancipation emancipates us. 
While Bhaskar's analysis Involves the assumption that the emancipatory 
process Is located within a TMSA, he does not seem to have analysed all the 
implications of the acceptance of his own TMSA. In particular he has omitted 
the analysis of the effect of the subjectivity of the self on the nature of the 
social environments which facilitate the learning processes needed for the 
occurrence of emancipation. It has been argued above that the facilitation of 
learn ingprocesses necessitates the development of a distinction between cultural 
and social environments. 
A Re-formed Transformational Model Of Social Action 
A re-formed TMSA which Incorporates the insights of the person/social 
structure relationship established In this essay, enables one to locate the 
emancipatory human sciences within the transformational model of society. The 
acceptance of this re-formed model will Involve one in facing fewer difficulties 
than are faced when one accepts the Bhaskarlan TMSA. As Bhaskar has constructed 
the model there seems to be no room to expand the boundaries of society itself. 
since he has restricted the social area within which society is detected to a 
social rather than to a cultural environment. It has been argued above that the 
facilitation of learning processes necessitates the development of a distinction 
between cultural and social environments. 
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A re-formed model which gives insights Into the person/society relationship 
should incorporate the points established in Chapter 1 and the earlier Parts of 
this chapter. It will not be difficult to incorporate these points as the 
concept of the society/person relationship which has underpinned the arguments 
in this essay has been a transformational one with many affinities with the 
Bhaskarian one. Like Bhaskar's model, the re-formed model serves heuristic 
purposes: it is not intended to replicate all possible social relations. The 
re-formed model is, like Bhaskar's, portrayed in diagrammatic form. The 
two-dimensional nature of the medium in which the diagram is presented prevents 
one from accurately reflecting the relationships between persons and natural 
kinds. Due account is taken of this deficiency when the detailed implications 
of the acceptance of the model are examined below. 
Social kinds (A) 
Enablement/constraint/ 
II 
Reproduction /transformation/ 
lII 
soclalisation2 
socialisationi 
I 
Human agency (B) 
(social) 
Perceived Interactions-------t-+------------------- 
j--Percelved 
Interactions 
II II 
L Human agency (C) 
(natural) 
Enablement/constraint I(ý Transformation 
II 
Natural kinds (t) 
Figure 6 
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Within the category of social kinds no distinction has been made between 
persons and non-person social kinds. The distinction is, however. central to 
the argument which supports the acceptability of the model if the model is to be 
seen as reflecting the nature of the person/society relationship. This omission 
is remedied by offering the following 'detail' of the relationship between (A) 
and (B). 
The particular process outlined in the detail is socialisation. 
Socialisation is chosen firstly because it is a process without which all other 
social processes become asocial, and so would be reduced to natural processes. 
The second reason for choosing it is that the argument, developed in Chapter 4 
below, shows that there are penalties to be paid by anyone attempting to claim 
that a social interaction can occur without some aspect of the interaction 
involving a process of socialisation. The third reason for using socialisation 
as an illustration of the relationship between social kinds and persons is that 
it shows clearly the kinetic and reciprocal nature of the interactions between 
persons and non-person social kinds. 
Detail of (A) & (B) in the context of socialisation processes: non-Person to 
Person 
(A) Social kinds = (non-person: NP,, NP2,.... NP. ) & (Persons: P,. P2...., P) 
Enablement/constraint Transformation 
(socialisation, ) (socialisation2) 
(B) Human agency (A,. A2..... An) 
Figure 6 
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(B) Human agency is triggered, enabled and constrained by the behaviour of 
persons and non-person social kinds. 
Person Pk has agency Ak. 
Social kind NP1, operating through A,. A2,..., effects the socialisation of P2. 
This illustrates the dependence of the operations of social kinds upon the 
human agency. Part of the operations of most social kinds will involve the 
socialisation of individuals but this has to be achieved by the operations of 
human agency so that socialisation processes become operations of social kinds 
on other social kinds through the use of human agency. 
There are two aspects to the socialisation process. A non-person social 
kind such as a toddlers' play group may operate both by enabling a 'new' mum to 
chat about child care and by placing expectations on her (socialisation, ). The 
process then results in the new mum changing her behaviour patterns 
(socialisation2). But when the person in charge of the toddlers uses peer group 
pressure to effect an acceptance by a child of certain norms of behaviour, the 
socialsiation process is a little more complex. This more complex process is 
illustrated by Figure 7. 
Detail of (A) & (B) In the context of soclallsat/on processes: Person to Person 
(A) Social kinds = (non-person: NP1 , NP2,.... NPA) 
Pn) 
(B) Human agency 
E nablement/constraint 
& (Persons: P, , 
P.,..., PA) 
Reproduction & Transformation 
(socialisation, ) (socialisation2) 
(A1, A2,..., An) 
Figure 7 
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(B) - Human agency is triggered, enabled and constrained by the behaviour of 
persons and non-person social kinds. 
Person Pk has agency Ar. 
A person P affects the operation of NP, In order to achieve the socialisation 
of person P2. 
These 'details' are simplistic in that they seem to ignore the possibility 
of either multiple processes occurring simultaneously or of a single process 
involving the operations of several social kinds. The simplification results 
from the constraints of the two-dimensional medium being used to Illustrate the 
model. 
The interpretation given in this model of the two stages of the 
socialisation process is similar to the Interpretation given to any other social 
process. It is a causal process which alters the behaviour of a social kind. 
As such it can be carried out by any social kind. even by a person; but since it 
necessarily operates through Interactions between Individuals it must be carried 
out through the operation of at least one non-person social kind. This point 
was established by the argument in Chapter 1. This means that social processes 
must involve exchange interactions between conceptualising individuals and 
non-conceptualising social kinds. The process can either be consciously 
activated, as in the case of brainwashing. Alternatively, it could operate 
tacitly through the existing powers of non-person social kinds, as In the case 
of what Is known as 'institutional' racism. 
Interpretation Of The Re-Formed TUBA 
The dual role of persons as social kinds and as interactive agents with 
other persons is exemplified in the model. It Is at level (A) that persons 
exist as social kinds and as components of other social kinds. The sense a 
person has of being with other persons as component parts of social kinds Is a 
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sense the person has of her existence at level (A), amongst other social kinds. 
The sense a person has that he is interacting with other persons finds its 
expression at level (B). 
The only evidence a person has to validate the senses of being with and 
Interacting with others Is derived from the person's perceived interactions with 
others. These perceived interactions are, as was established In Chapter 1, 
enabled and constrained by the operations of both natural and social kinds. 
This means that the relationships between perceived interactions and the 
properties of natural and social kinds must lie at the centre of any analysis of 
the perceived properties of natural and social kinds. It should be noted that 
the analysis of perceived interactions has formed the pivot around which all the 
arguments in this essay have been developed. 
it was also established in Chapter 1 that the distinction between a natural 
and a social kind Is Itself a product of conceptualisations. The distinction 
was encapsulated by the Identification of the distinction between objects of 
Type-1 and of Type-2. Type-2 objects were prototypes of Conceptualising 
Individuals while Type-1 objects were prototypes of natural kinds. However 
Type-2 objects are Type-1 objects with extended powers. In other words persons, 
forming a subcategory of Cis, are also objects with the powers of natural kinds. 
This means that the modified TMSA would have to loop back onto itself In 
order to show that there Is an overlap between objects in (A) and In (D) (Figure 
5). Further modifications to the model would have to be made in order to 
Incorporate this feature. But this can be said of any representative model. if 
the representation were to capture exactly the essence of the thing it 
represented then it would be that thing. 
As well as focussing on the dual role of persons, the modified TMSA also 
highlights the need to distinguish between natural and social kinds. The 
distinction underscores all the conceptualisations through which social kinds 
operate. it must also be Inter-related to the concept of the self. In order to 
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fill what seems to be a gap In analysis, the relationship between natural and 
social kind concepts will be examined in Chapter 3. 
It is in recognising and distinguishing the dual role of individuals - 
associated with being with and Interacting with others - within the 
reproduction/ transformation of social structures, that the re-formed TMSA links 
Bhaskar's work with that carried out in this essay. The dual role was seen to 
Involve the individual in the use of two types of second order monitoring 
devices. The individual has to be able to monitor his own conscious 
Interactions with other Individuals and Interpret them as having some meaning. 
The Individual also has to be able to monitor her own function as an agent who 
reproduces and transforms the social structures within which she Is operating. 
These were seen as conditions which had to hold if any learning, not just 
emancipatory learning, had to occur. It was acknowledged that the second order 
self-monitoring may be erroneous, the individual may be unaware of some aspects 
of his social activity. But It is logically impossible to sustain the 
transformation of the properties of a social structure while all individuals are 
unaware of all aspects of their activities in reproducing the social structures. 
There are two differences between the Bhaskarian perspective and the one 
being proposed in this essay. The first is found in the ontological status 
given to persons. The second Iles in the emphasis placed on the analysis of the 
enabling and constraining properties of natural kinds on human agency. Bhaskar 
does not give, as far as one can tell, individuals the status of social 
structures. This leads him to underemphasise the degree of Influence which 
individuals have over all social kinds. In doing this he underemphasises their 
Influence over themselves. 
This is a pity as a TMSA can form a more direct route, than the one he 
choses, towards the emancipatory process Identified in his work. He does 
Indicate that natural kinds have constraining and enabling effects on human 
agency. He does not, however, examine in the sort of detail found In this essay 
117 
mart 8r Towards a Definition of Society Chapter 2 
the distinctions between natural and social kinds with respect to their 
differing influences on human agency and on the concept of Personal Identity; 
neither does he examine the enabling and constraining effects of natural kinds 
on the possible conceptualisations of what it Is to be a person - these are 
examined in Chapter 3 below. 
Society As An Ensemble Of Social Kinds, Practices And Conventions 
The problems outlined in the last two subsections, together with the 
solutions may be summarised in the following questions and answers, - What is the 
relationship between society and persons? And what conceptualisations of 
society and persons could both sustain and determine such a relationship? It 
will be remembered that the problems stem from the dual role of individuals 
involved In social interactions: the role associated with sustaining the 
operations of the social kinds which facilitate the Interactions and the role of 
interlocutor In the interaction. 
The answers to these questions have drawn on Bhaskar's answers= pace the 
reservations expressed above. The strengths of the Bhaskarlan explanatory model 
have been exploited and a re-formed model has been built. One of the strengths 
lies in Bhaskar's stated concept of what society is: 
Soolety - Is an ensemble of embedded structures, practices and conventions, 
to which have been added firstt/y 
but society is not Itself a structure. 
and a6aond/y 
Persons - are social structures which are constituents of the ensemble. 
if society is to be viewed as "an ensemble of structures, practices and 
conventions which individuals reproduce and transform" then it is not society 
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per se which is transformed but rather the structures, practices and 
conventions. The reproduction and/or transformation of society Is only a 
derivative of the reproduction and/or transformation of its component parts. 
If the ensemble has dispositlonal properties qua ensemble, then it will 
satisfy the definitional requirements of a social kind and have an associated 
social environment. As was argued in Part 6 above, there must be a social space 
beyond such a social environment if one is to allow for the possibility that 
persons can gain some understanding of the social kinds within whose social 
environment the persons find themselves. If the ensemble which constitutes 
society is seen as possessing socialising properties then that ensemble becomes 
a social kind with an associated social space. If one allows for the 
possibility that persons can learn something of the operations of the ensemble's 
dispositional properties, then the ensemble must be a proper subset of some 
greater ensemble. The Bhaskarian model has one structure too many. 
And yet collections of social kinds do exist and we have concepts of the 
totality of the Influence of the social kinds. In order to retain the concept 
of society as something which is not a structure with causal and dispositional 
properties, one has to restrict the ascription of processes such as 
socialisation to the operations of social kinds. Socialisation Is now seen as a 
process whereby the disposltional properties of persons (expressed in their 
abilities to activate the operations of social kinds) are being altered by the 
very operations of the social kinds. Socialisation Is a process effected by 
social kinds rather than by society. 
The processes undergone by a schoolchild in learning facts and skills, 
Including social skills, alter the dispositional properties of virtually all 
children who go to school. They learn how to activate social forces and they 
are conditioned Into activating some social forces rather than others In given 
situations - socialisation processes are at work. Naturally, there may be other 
socialising effects on the children being brought about by the operations of 
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other social kinds. But to suggest that there Is one all-embracing social kind 
which incorporates all social kinds is mistaken. 
Two By-products Of Accepting The Person/Soolsty Analysis In The TMSA 
An interesting by-product of accepting one aspect of the above analysis (of 
the enabiement and development of a person's powers to activate the operations 
of social kinds) is that the person, being a social kind, is capable of having a 
socialising effect on herself (*53) - providing she operates through some other 
social kind. She will, through the exercise of her own powers qua social kind, 
tend to reinforce her own dispositional tendencies. It may even be that the 
conservation of the person's sense of self-Identity through his constant 
reinforcement of his dispositional tendencies, by their continued use, is an 
essential feature of the operation of any social structure - whether or not the 
social stucture is itself a person. Such a question involves implications which 
provide an interesting area for further investigation. 
A second by-product flows from the use of the re-formed TMSA. The model 
has implicitly pointed towards the Importance of the enabling and constraining 
features of social and natural kinds. Since persons are social kinds which also 
possess some of the powers which natural kinds are perceived to possess, persons 
are also capable of enabling and constraining both social and natural processes. 
Indeed, it is this capability which allows persons access to the processes 
which affect the agencies of both social and natural kinds. Without being aware 
that they have the ability to constrain and enable both social and natural 
processes, persons could not conoeptuallse themselves as either social or 
natural agents: they would, in such circumstances, be Incapable of participating 
In concept-com mun loation. 
The analysis of the Implications of the use of the enabling and 
constraining capabilities of persons has formed the basis of the bulk of 
Bhaskar's work. In this respect the work In this essay does not differ from 
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B hask ar's. 
" w 
PART 91 CONCLUSION 
The main argument of this chapter has centered on the contention that any 
understanding of social interactions Is possible only if one assumes three 
things: firstly, that social kinds exist; secondly, that the relationships 
between social kinds are not entirely specified by the interactions between 
social kinds, they are also affected by the sense of being a social kind which 
each 'person' possesses; and thirdly, that the 'persons' who gain the 
understanding of social interactions are themselves those social kinds whose 
conceptualised behaviour sustains, reproduces and can transform the properties 
of all social kinds. 
The argument pivots on the possibility that understanding of social 
Interactions can develop within cultural environments in which the social 
Interactions occur. While this is the pivot. the foundation upon which the 
argument rests is different. The foundation consists of the acceptance of the 
possibility that persons can have an understanding of, and Influence over, the 
operations of social kinds. The pivot and foundation necessitate a conception 
of an Individual not only as conceptualised by others but also as 
conceptualising both others and his own activities In social interactions. 
There are two major consequences of such a conception. Firstly, since all 
communicable experiences and conceptualisations take place as a result of the 
agency of natural and social kinds, the understanding of the stratification of 
both social and natural kinds must be gained Indirectly through attempts to 
control and influence the enabling and constraining characteristics of the 
social and natural kinds. Secondly, the Individual cannot isolate herself from 
either social or natural kinds - thereby making it Impossible for her to 
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Interact with a material object and conceptualise the interaction without 
turning the material object into a social object. 
This means that the distinction between a social and a natural kind Is a 
conceptual one which rests on the practices of, and relationships between, the 
Individuals of the particular cultural environment in which the distinction Is 
conceptualised. But because the totality of an individual's conceptualised 
behaviour cannot be restricted to any cultural environment, the distinction is 
always corrigible. The penalty paid for restricting an Individual's 
conceptuallsed behaviour was seen, In Part 6, to involve the impossibility that 
that individual can come to understand the operations of a changed social kind. 
in our particular cultural environment the natural/social kind distinction 
rests on the intelligibility of the practices of groups of Individuals. The 
intelligibility itself makes sense only if it Is assumed (I) that all social 
kinds are reproduced and sustained in being by the actions of human agents and 
(il) that natural kinds are reproduced and sustained in being by factors which 
are independent of those actions (*52). 
A minor consequence of the conception of an Individual as both 
conceptualised and conceptualising Is that an objective definition of the self 
would negate the possibility of the self being able to learn how social kinds 
operate - see previous paragraph but one. Specifically the self cannot be 
Identified with a material object for, if it were, It could not conceptualise a 
distinction between objects whose existence and operations were dependent upon 
its own conceptualisations and those which were independent of them. This does 
not mean that the individual self cannot be a material object, but rather that 
it can never be known by the Individual that he is a material object. 
Conceptualisations carry with them the requirement that their own operations are 
not totally determined by the contexts or environments in which they are formed 
or developed. 
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PART 10, FOOTNOTE 
CritIoIs  Of The Arguments Presented In The Chapter 
Chapter 2 
It might be argued that the main points being made in this chapter rest on 
the acceptance of the definitions (D1) to (D8) which have variously been 
submitted for consideration. It could be thought that this leaves the arguments 
bereft of an anchor. They might be thought to be circular, to be dependent 
solely upon the consistency of the points made with the conceptualisation of the 
definitions (D1) to (De). 
The avoidance of circularity is achieved by considering the grounds for the 
acceptance of the definitions. These are accepted In order to render certain 
aspects of conoeptualised experience intelligible, for without accepting them 
one is left with no intelligible account of the processes by which an individual 
can gain understanding of her social Interactions. And this understanding is 
needed for the individual to be able to participate in the process (C) outlined, 
In Chapter 1 (op. 36), whereby concepts are formed and developed. The ability 
to participate in such a process was seen to be a necessary condition for the 
ability of an individual to develop concepts and so to conceptualise not only 
its social interactions but also to formulate any concepts at all. 
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THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT. SOCIAL 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE Sr=LP 
PART 1e INTRODUCTION 
The principal aim of this chapter is to enhance our understanding of the 
relationship between an individual and his environment. 
In Chapter 1 the foundations of the investigation leading to the 
development of such an understanding were laid. These were based on the 
requirement that cognitive interactions between individuals should be 
Intelligible. 
In Chapter 2 one aspect of the relationship was Investigated. This 
concerned the relationship between individuals and those objects whose 
operational Influences are, at least In part, determined by the 
conoeptuaiisations of the Individuals. These objects were oharacterised as 
'social kinds'. 
Social kinds were characterised as objects which operate In an environment 
itself characterised as 'social space'. A distinction was drawn between two 
types of sub-spaces 'social environments' and 'cultural environments'. The 
former were defined as the areas in social space consisting of the extent of the 
Influence of the operations of a specified set of social kinds. The latter were 
defined as the areas in social space consisting of the extent of the Influence 
of operations involving the oonceptuallsations of a specified set of concepts. 
The analysis of the enabling and constraining properties of social kinds 
Indicated that these operate In sacºa/ envlronsenta but are utilised by 
Individuals (in their cognitive Interactions) In cultural env/ronirenta. 
The enabling and constraining properties of social kinds v/s-a-v/s the 
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behaviour of persons, themselves also seen as social kinds, were Investigated in 
Chapter 2. The possible exercise of these properties, through the operation of 
social forces, was seen to Impose restrictions on the possible 
conceptualisations of what it is to be a person In any given cultural 
environment. These restrictions were seen to flow from the need that 
individuals should be able simultaneously to operate social forces and to 
conceptualise those operations. The conscious operation by an individual of a 
social force was seen to necessitate her having a sense of 'being with' other 
Individuals in sustaining social structures. The conoeptualisation of the 
operation was seen to Involve her in being capable of substituting for a 
'paradigm Individuator' and so also have a sense of 'interacting with' other 
Individuals. 
In Chapter 3 the focus of concern will shift to the enabling and 
constraining effects which the operations of natural forces have on the possible 
behaviour of persons. Since these effects must be conceptualised. If they are 
to be analysed, there develops a need to formulate a clear distinction between 
social and natural effects. But not only must the distinction be formulated, 
the grounds for claiming where the distinction Iles have to be ascertained and 
validated. 
The delineation, and justification of the delineation, of the distinction 
between natural and social kinds furnishes us with the main tasks to be carried 
out In this chapter. Apart from Its Importance to social and natural 
scientists, the delineation has a significant bearing on questions of Personal 
Identity, and so has an Impact on the construction of theories of Personal 
Identity. The specific concept of Personal Identity developed In a particular 
cultural environment may affect the delineation between natural and social 
kinds. Conversely. and simultaneously. a particular delineation may constrain 
the development of the concept of Personal Identity In a given cultural 
environment. 
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The tasks of delineation will begin with an examination of the basis of 
claims regarding the nature and structure of the natural environment. 
Particular attention will be paid to the Kantlan claim that the material 
environment is permanent In substance but variable in given experiences of it. 
it will be argued that, while Kant's claim Is substantially correct, some of the 
details of his claims are not acceptable. Further, and somewhat paradoxically, 
it will be seen that Kant's argument can be applied to social space. A similar 
claim regarding the permanence of part of social space can be validated, one 
specific social environment is permanent in substance but variable in any given 
experience of It. 
It will further be argued that, while the demarcation between social and 
material worlds cannot be rigidly set, there are objects which must be material, 
some which must be social and some whose status is contingent upon various 
cultural factors. 
The Development Of The Arguments Summarised: 
The Cr/t/ques Of (I) Kant And (II) Poinc ro 
In Part 2 of the chapter an investigation into the basis of claims about 
the ontological status of the objects which operate In physical or 'natural' 
space will be carried out. A link between the arguments concerning natural and 
social spaces will be forged. The investigation will draw on a restricted 
selection of some arguments developed by Kant (*1) and Poincare (*2). Both 
these philosophers make claims about the nature of natural space which they 
justify by citing the sacrifices which have to be made if the claims are denied. 
(1) The Critique Of Kant 
In Kant's case the, claim is that the content of natural space is permanent 
white its form may change. He points out that the sacrifice which has to be 
made if his claim Is rejected is a denial of the possibility of the application 
of a single systea of time 
by an individual to her experiences. The main 
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penalty incurred by one who attempts to operate in a non-singular system of time 
Is the sacrifice of the possibility of distinguishing experiences from 
illusions. An adjunct to this sacrifice would be the impossibility of the 
formation of the concept of selfhood by the individual. Such an impossibility 
would prevent the individual from both substituting for a 'paradigm 
Individuator' (Chapter 1, page 26) and involving himself in the 
meaning-affirming and concept-developing processes (C) (Chapter 1 *page 36). If 
this were to happen to all individuals, the cultural system in which they 
operated would collapse. 
These arguments are closely tied to the distinctions made in Chapter 2 
between two types of relationships those in which individuals see themselves as 
Ming with others while together they sustain social structures, and those in 
which Individuals interact with each other. Both 'being with' and 'Interacting 
with' others involve the assumption that one is operating in a single system of 
time. This assumption is accompanied by another, viz the permanent nature of 
the social environment generated by the operations of concept-developing and 
meaning-aff irming social kinds. 'Interacting' with others Involves the 
acceptance of either one of two possibilities: that changes may occur In either 
the behaviour or the causal properties of a social kind= or that the social 
environment generated by the social kind may cease to exist. It will be seen 
that the acceptance of these possibilities provides one with a criterion for 
distinguishing natural structures from social ones. 
(ii) The Critique Of Poincard 
The uses to which Poincarb's argument will be put are different. They are 
concerned more with the nature of conscious experience than with the nature of 
communicable conceptualisations. The purpose of undertaking a critique of some 
of the Ideas developed by Poincare is to prepare the ground for the analysis of 
conscious experience to be carried out in Chapter 4. In Chapter 3 the 
relationship between the conscious individual and the content of conscious 
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experience is examined; in Chapter 4 the relationship between the conscious 
individual and the projection of that content to other conscious Individuals Is 
examined. 
Some of Poincarh's claims help one to focus on the nature of the Impact 
which an individual has on her conscious experiences. In one of these he claims 
that the existence of solid objects in natural space (although he does not use 
this phrase) is a precondition of the possibility of development both of spatial 
concepts In general and of any given geometry. The geometry is seen to be 
applicable to the relationships between material objects. He combines this with 
a corollary: Individuals must be able to interfere with the movements of the 
'solid objects' if they are to be able to develop and apply the spatial 
concepts. 
Within this analysis he points out that there is a difference between what 
he calls 'representative space' and conceptualised space. The former consists 
of the conglomerate of non-homogeneous signals received by the various senses. 
The latter consists of the ordered, homogeneous, three-dimensional space which 
Individuals conceptualise as representing the natural environment in which they 
operate. It Poincare is right then the conclusions he draws will have an Impact 
on the conception an individual has of herself as an agent who is able to alter 
the sensations, and so the conceptualisations. of others. 
The differences as well as the similarities between Poinoar6's starting 
point and the one used here will be highlighted. The differences will be seen 
to revolve around the purposes behind the two enquiries. Poincar6's enquiry 
attempts to discover the means by which a concept of space might be developed 
and applied, and then to discover the epistemological consequences of the 
processes of development and application. The enquiry In this essay directs its 
attention both to the possible reasons for developing and applying concepts of 
space and to the consequences of making the reasons intelligible (*3). 
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The Aims Of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 
It has already been stated that the principal concern of this chapter is to 
use the conclusions drawn from the discussion outlined above In order to help 
determine the demarcation between natural and social spaces. It Is within the 
bounds set by such a demarcation that any adequate understanding of the nature 
of Personal Identity has to develop. It will be established that the 
demarcation Is not completely arbitrary since the price which is paid by any 
claim of its arbitrariness Is the tacit acceptance of untenable notions both of 
selfhood and of social structures within and through which Individuals Interact. 
Similarly, it will be argued that the demarcation between natural and social 
spaces Is not entirely a matter of convention. * 
The subsidiary concern of the chapter is to show that, given the 
demarcation between the social and material worlds, there is a connectedness 
between them. It will be seen that this connectedness stems from the fact that 
both are conoeptualised by Individuals whose conceptions are temporal and who 
need to distinguish Illusory from non-illusory experiences. 
In pursuing the goals set by the main and subsidiary concerns, the argument 
will, inter alle, give further support to the claim made in Chapters 1 and 2 
that individuals must have second order monitoring devices if they are to give 
meaning to their own sensations. 
*sssssssssssssssssssssssssss: ssssssss: sssasssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss* 
fNOTE : An argument which specifies the need for a demarcation between social and 
material Interactions does not per se tell one anything either about the 
specific locus of the demarcation or about the precise form of those 
Interactions, it merely tells us that the demarcation exists ("4). But in so 
Indicating it also indicates that certain conceptions of Personal Identity, 
specifically those advocating the possibility of objective definitions of 
persons, are untenable. 
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PART 2: A CRITIQUE AND DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S THEORY OF OUTER SENSE 
The Permanence Of Material Or Natural Space 
An outline of the Kantlan argument will begin the analysis of the qualities 
which are exhibited by objects in natural space. It will also Indicate how one 
can determine areas of certainty and doubt when one atempts to understand the 
properties of objects. The argument will also pinpoint the basis of both the 
certainty and the doubt. 
In both the Refutation of Idealism and the First Analogy of Experience 
(*5), Kant argues that conscious experience gives sufficient grounds for 
establishing the claim that objects exist in space beyond the direct awareness 
of the phenomena found in conscious experience. Kant does not use the same 
terminology. He focusses rather on the temporality of experience and does not 
explain too clearly what he means by "objects which exist outside me". 
While this lack of clarity may obscure the strength of Kant's argument, it 
does not weaken it; neither does it reduce its importance. One of the strengths 
of the Kantlan argument lies in the characterisation of the self which is 
presupposed by the existence of a subject of experiences which occur in a single 
sys" Of w im 
if one reinterprets Kant's words as meaning that conscious experience 
enables one to establish the existence of objects in space beyond the Influence 
of the Interpretation of the experience then one Is more likely both to make 
sense of his claim and to accept it. Conscious experience involves changes in 
state, and all changes involve the passage of time. The notion that either 
these changes in state, or the states themselves, have influence on each other 
is a prerequisite of the intelligibility of the conscious experience itself (the 
possibility that every component part of an experience might only be 
contingently connected to every other component part runs counter to the very 
notion of consciousness 06)). In these circumstances it can be seen that It is 
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intelligible for a conscious being to ask whether there is anything which exists 
beyond the Influence of those processes which constitute his own experiences. 
He can intelligibly ask whether anything exists beyond the phenomena of which he 
Is directly aware. 
Kant gives an unequivocally positive response to such a question. The 
basis of his answer is to be found in the concept of time which such a being 
must possess. even if the possession is tacit. More precisely his answer 
centres on the concept of the history of the objects which are oonceptuallsed in 
conscious experience. He argues that conceptualising the history of an object 
involves one In conceptualising its changes of state. This latter process of 
conceptualisation he sees as only being possible against a background which is 
unchanging. But the central point of the argument is, as W. H. Walsh has put it. 
that it establishes "what must be true of the experienced world If we are to 
opake objective temporal Judgements within a single systee of VAM" (*7) 
(Walsh's emphasis) 
This central point hangs on the ability to distinguish the experience of an 
objective order from an Illusion. The need for such a distinction stems from 
the requirement that one can oonceptuallse the history of objects. Illusion 
takes place entirely within the bounds of Influence of the interpretations of 
experience and. as such, is a product of the operations of objects situated in 
social space. Experiences which consisted of nothing but illusions, which an 
occurred entirely within the scope of the influence of the Interpretations of 
the experiences, would not permit judgements in a single time system to be made. 
Each experience would have its own history, and this history would be separate 
from all other histories. Such a scenario would prevent the use of a concept 
from repeatedly performing Its functions either as enoapsulator of the 
understanding of a similar (or the same) event or as the referent of a similar 
(or the same) object. Indeed, the notion of similarity could not be 
incorporated into judgements at all. 
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If. therefore, we are to accept the possibility of the continuity of 
experiences then we must also accept that there must be an objective order - 
experiences of which are separable from illusions. Along with Kant we are bound 
to accept that the objective order, which is involved in facilitating 
judgements, can sustain change but neither annihilation nor creation; it is a 
permanent entity in which every existing thing both developed from something 
before it, and it will develop into something in the future. Phenomena which 
Involve the experiences of annihilation and/or creation do not belong to an 
objective order. They are experiences whose mode of operation is subjectively 
determined, which belong to those modal aspects of experience which are 
determined by the operation of a faculty such as the imagination. 
This exegesis of Kant's work owes much to W. H Walsh's observation. quoted 
above, that the condition on which Kant focusses is that individuals should be 
able to make temporal Judgments in a single system of time. The exegesis 
begins to bring out the implicit social basis of the Kantian argument. It will 
be argued below (in the remainder of Part 2) that the possibility that social 
interactions should occur,, generates the requirement that individuals must 
distinguish experiences of an objective order from illusions; a requirement 
which Kant conceived as being derived solely from an Individual's Isolated 
conscious experience of the material world. The additional social requirement 
enables one to extend the Kantian argument beyond the merely quantitative and 
into the normative areas of human activities. * 
Sone Criticises Of Kant's Arguments 
Not all commentators accept the full force of Kant's arguments on these 
matters. Notably Jonathan Bennett (*8) argues that Kant's distinction between a 
priori concepts and a priori Intuitions should really be translated Into talk of 
descriptive expressions and proper names respectively. He goes on to argue that 
all the conceptual baggage carried by proper names prevents them from doing the 
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work Kant allocates to a priori Intuitions. He seems to interpret the Kantian 
notion of an a priori intuition as a notion of something which encapsulates an 
experience rather than of something which encapsulates a possible appreciation 
of the basis of an experience. Bennett glides Into a translation, from a priori 
Intuition to proper name, by pointing out that proper names and Kantlan a priori 
Intuitions have one thing in common: namely that they both pick out 
singularities (*9). He uses this argument specifically against Kant's analysis 
of space rather than against Kant's analysis of time. It Is not difficult to 
see that Bennett here commits the fallacy of the assertion of the consequent. 
Bennett also cites Anthony Quinton's example which prima facie refutes the 
same Kantlan arguments. Quinton's example is of an Individual who has dreams 
which seem to operate in a different spatial context to the waking experiences 
of the same Individual. Both Bennett and Quinton. however, accept arguments 
supporting the notion that time is singular, and yet fail to appreciate the 
Integrated nature of the Kantian argument. Yet this integration lies at the 
heart of Kant's argument establishing the permanence of the material world and 
with it a single system of space. It is only in the context of an a priori 
Intuition of a single system of time that Kant feels able to propound an 
argument supporting the notion of an a priori intuition of a singular material 
space. 
"NOTE : The distinction between objective and subjective orders is analytic, in 
the Kentian sense. The concepts 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' Incorporate 
the notion that they are distinguished by the possibility that one and not the 
other constitutes the modes of operation In which the behaviour of objects can 
be affected by the conceptualisations of individuals. it is only with hindsight 
that one can tell that experiences have been illusory, and the criteria for 
making such judgements are based on the possibility that changes in 
understanding of one's environment can occur (see *p. 143 f. below). 
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Kant's Argument Extended: An Outline 
Chapter 3 
Kant points out that the existence of an Intuition of a singular material 
space depends upon the possibility of a unified history of the individual's 
experiences (of that which is independent of the individual's Imagination). A 
unified history of experiences is, as Kant correctly Indicates, a precondition 
of the stretching over time of any experience - since atemporal experiences are 
not experiences. 
The force of the Kantlan argument stems from its lack of reliance on the 
content of conscious experience. Kant focusses instead on the operations 
Involved in conceptualised experience. These operations are only possible if 
the events to which they refer occur in a single system of time and In an 
environment which is dimensional - but, contrary to Kant's argument, it Is not 
necessarily three-dimensional (see Part 3 below). The perception of the 
dimensionality of the environment is necessarily linked both to the temporal 
nature of the experiences and to the temporal nature of the occurrences related 
to those experiences. The impossibility of conceptualising a dimensional 
environment without doing so in a single system of time is virtually 
self-evident: dimensionality is only conceptualised through conceptualising 
change, and changes are analytically (in the Kantlan sense) temporal. 
The Kantlan enterprise can be extended to Incorporate analyses of some 
other aspects of conscious experience. The requirements generated by the need 
to meet the condition that experiences occur in a single system of time also 
applies to cognitive interactions between individuals. The operations Involved 
In the interactions require the existence of a permanent social space. This 
requirement needs to be met irrespective of the cognitive content of the 
experiences of the Individuals Involved in the Interactions or of the causal 
Impact of the on any given Individual of such Interactions. The requirement is 
the same as the one which stems from the need for experiences of individuals In 
the objective natural order to occur In a single system of time 
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The requirement in the two cases is identical: there is a requirement in 
both oases that the history of objects be conceptualised. In neither case does 
the conceptualised history have to be accurate; the arguments are independent of 
the content of conscious experience. In both cases one can draw the Kantian 
conclusion that the space which contains the objects (whose history is 
conceptualised) is permanent. The social space which sustains the social 
objects whose history is conceptualised, is the social environment generated by 
the operations of those social kinds which facilitate concept communication. 
This notion will be developed and validated below In the next three sub- 
sections. It will be seen that just as material space is permanent so this 
social environment is permanent. In neither case is it being claimed that the 
space Is bounded nor that its limits could be known. Indeed, the possibility 
that such spaces could expand is embedded in the conceptions individuals have of 
them= for without such a possibility the possibility of the expansion of our 
understanding would be bounded. Such a limit on knowledge could never be known 
to have been reached (see above - Chapter 2 Part 6). 
The singularity of the social space referred to here is distinct from the 
singularity of material space as envisaged by Kant. Kant's singularity seemed 
to apply to the entirety or totality of physical space - perhaps consisting of 
the union of all spaclally contiguous physical environments. The singular 
social space referred to above, and validated below, is rather the Intersection 
of all social environments - that Is, the social environment generated by the 
operations of the social kinds which facilitate concept communication. 
Kant's Argument Extended 
The rather Kantlan argument which Is being put together In this essay began 
In Chapter 1. The extra ingredient added there to the Kantian analysis was the 
Introduction of a social dimension, and with it Individuals as social beings. 
The possibility of the occurrence of Intelligible cognitive Interactions between 
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Individuals was seen to generate the need for the existence of the social 
dimension. It is by examining the criteria which have to be met in order to 
sustain the modes of operation of objects found in the social dimension that the 
argument will now proceed. 
Kant's argument, which establishes the independence from any given 
experience of the material or natural world, rests upon the assumption that 
experiences occur in a single system of time. Similarly, in establishing the 
independence from any given experience of a particular set of social structures, 
the argument here depends upon the acceptance of a similar assumption of a 
single system of time. 
The acceptance of a single system of time by the participants in the 
processes of concept communication is a precondition of the Intelligibility of 
that process to the participants. Each participant has to assume that at least 
some of the elements involved in the communicative process operate Independently 
of his interpretation of the process. This Independence is inconsistent with 
the notion that experiences occur in a non-singular, non-permanent social 
environment. 
The justification supporting the claim of inconsistency Is closely similar 
to Kant's. Yet there is more to the argument here than one finds In Kant. The 
extra Ingredient stems from the analysis of cognitive Interactions as well as 
cognitive experiences. Each participant In such interactions must be in a 
position to be able to specify at least one of the objects which do. and some 
which do not, operate independently of his interpretative faculties. The 
absence of the possibility that one could exercise such an ability would render 
cognitive interactions between individuals unintelligible. 
The price cited by Kant for the refection of his conclusions is the 
disintegration of the coherent temporal experience. The price cited here for 
rejecting the conclusion, that a singular social environment exists, Is the 
disintegration of cognitive Interactions between Individuals. It can be seen 
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that the two arguments are closely connected. 
Chapter 3 
The connection does not stem from the similar format of the two arguments. 
it stems Instead from a symbiotic relationship which exists between the 
experiences of individuals of the operations of natural kinds and the 
experiences of Individuals of cognitive interactions with other individuals. 
Cognitive Interactions form the basis for developing cognitive experiences of 
the operations of natural kinds: and cognitive interactions Involve the 
manipulation of the operations of both natural and social kinds. 
A participant in both types of cognitive interaction must assume that the 
properties of both natural and social kinds manifest themselves in a single 
system of time. The justification of the validity of this claim will be 
expounded in the next sub-section. It will be seen that the integrated nature 
of experience prevents individuals from making sharp distinctions between all 
natural and all social kinds; but that they must make such sharp distinctions 
between all natural and aCoe social kinds. The circumstances in which such 
distinctions have to be sharply made are those in which a cultural environment's 
corpus of knowledge is manipulated with the expectation of changing it. The 
price paid for the negation of the possibility of sustaining such a sharp 
distinction is the negation of the possibility of having cognitive interactions 
which lead to alterations in knowledge: in other words the price paid is the 
negation of the possibility that social structures which facilitate the 
expansion of knowledge could be developed. 
The need to make distinctions between some social and all natural kinds, 
married to the impossibility of drawing a sharp distinction between all social 
and natural kinds, leads to the generation of some paradoxes. it will be seen 
that these paradoxes centre on the simultaneously subjective and objective 
nature of an individual's cognitive interactions with other Individuals. In 
Chapter 4 It will be seen that the existence of the paradoxes forms a necessary 
condition for the intelligibility of any communicable cognitive experience: 
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persons are essentially paradoxical beings. This essence springs from the 
nature of the cognitive Interactions. Specifically it springs from the nature 
of those cognitive interactions, within which the concept of what a person is 
may be permitted to develop. 
Itpliatlons Of The Extended Kantlan Argument: 
(I) Subjectivity And Objectivity 
In extending the scope of Kant's argument beyond the realm of material 
interactions, one is able to avoid Kant's anthropocentric naturalism -a more 
detailed discussion of which is carried out in Part 3 below. There is a further 
benefit In taking Kant's enterprise further than he did; this involves 
overcoming one of the limitations which flows from the adoption of the Kantian 
anthropocentric perspective. The limitations prevent the formation of a 
workable distinction between the subjective and objective aspects of the modes 
of operation of individuals. In focussing exclusively on the operations of the 
perception of the material world, Kant was unlikely to come up with such a 
workable distinction. 
The reasons behind this are reasonably straightforward. The experience by 
an individual of cognitive interactions between individuals. together with the 
appreciation of the possibility of further similar experiences, leads that 
Individual to be able to distinguish her own subjective from her own objective 
modes of operation. Further, the assumption that she can make such distinctions 
forms the basis on which other Individuals can determine the intelligibility of 
interacting on a cognitive level with her. It I cannot distinguish any of my 
own experiential modes as being subjective, then I cannot Intelligibly 
participate in cognitive interactions with others. For similar reasons I must 
also assume that those with whom I am interacting can distinguish some of their 
own modes of opertion as being subjective (this point will be developed further 
In Chapter 4). But the subjective modes of operation of others are not 
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subjective for me, and yet I have to distinguish them both from my own 
subjective modes of operation and from the modes of operation of objects to 
which I do not ascribe any subjective capabilities. 
There are, then, three modes of operation for all Individuals: the 
subjective mode, the Inter-subjective or social mode, and the non-subjective or 
natural mode. Each mode involves the Individual in some interactions with some 
objects): the individual can interact reflexively with himself In utilising a 
self-monitoring mechanism, he can interact with social kinds (including other 
persons) utilising the mechanisms of social kinds, and he can Interact with 
natural kinds utilising the mechanisms of natural kinds. 
There are two possible consequences of denying that the distinctions a 
person makes between these modes of operation is significant. Both 
possibilities involve the payment of the same price. Either the person can only 
account for the operations of individuals in a world which is entirely material 
and objective, or she is restricted to operating in social structures where 
genuine novelty is impossible, where the development of knowledge cannot occur. 
Either alternative obliges one to collapse the conceptual operations of 
Individuals into a single objective world. Distinctions within this single 
objective world between explanations of Illusory and non-Illusory processes 
could not be sustained: indeed the very notion of an explanation would Itself 
become unintelligible. 
The first step extending the Kantian argument Into the domain of social 
interactions has been taken. The price to be paid for rejecting the possibility 
of sustaining a significant distinction between social and material domains has 
been set. However, the consequences which flow from this extension need to be 
fully explored before tackling any weaknesses which exist In Kant's arguments. 
These weaknesses will be identified In Part 3 below, where Kant's 
anthropocentric naturalism will be rejected. 
The importance of rejecting his anthropocentric naturalism lies in the need 
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to establish the independence of conceptual processes from the content of 
consciousness. The Independence will be seen to hold when the content of 
consciousness refers to processes which are deemed to be unaffected by conscious 
processes - that is to material processes. it will then be possible to extend 
the argument so that it becomes applicable when the content of consciousness 
refers to processes which are deemed to be affected by conscious processes - 
that Is to social processes. 
The rejection of Kant's anthropocentric* naturalism rests on a prior 
acceptance of the existence of, and the distinction between, those social and 
material spaces which are linked to each other through their operation In a 
single system of time. That such a distinction must be made has already been 
established. The limitations which need to be Imposed on the areas in which the 
distinction can be made will be investigated in the next sub-section. 
(1/) The Slrultanenus /nterdependenoe and Independence of Social and Material 
8paoM 
Kant claims that an individual can have no coherent experiences as an 
Individual without assuming that there is a permanent, singular world which is 
Independent of the individual's interpretations of his sense experiences and 
against which he can contrast changing experiences. This claim is encapsulated 
by claim (Matt): 
The permanence and singular nature of the material environment 
take as their temporal and conceptual reference points the cognitive 
experience of an Individual. ... (Matt) 
The extension of the Kantian claim being proposed and substantiated here is 
founded on the intelligibility of any concept communication which facilitates 
the development of an individual's understanding of her environment. Using 
Thomas Kuhn's terminology (*10) what is being claimed Is that the 
140 
hrt 1r Introduction Chapter 3 
characteristics of those social structures where 'normal science' is practiced 
are such as to facilitate the development of 'revolutionary science' thereby 
possibly annihilating some of the social structures. This means that part of 
the social structure within which 'normal science' Is practiced must be 
non-permanent and possibly non-singular. 
it is possible now to summarise the essence of the claim being 
substantiated In Part 2 as follows. The same Individual cannot experience the 
communication of concepts without also Implicitly assuming two things: first, 
that communication processes occur In a non-permanent, non-singular cultural 
environment which is generated Independently of any given process of 
communication; and secondly, that these same processes of communication occur in 
a permanent, singular social environment which is situated in the non-permanent 
cultural environment. This claim Is encapsulated by one similar to (Matt) vine 
The permanence and singular nature of this social environment 
take as their temporal and conceptual reference points the cognitive 
Interactions between Individuals. ... (8001) 
Having just indicated that social and material environments are 
Independent, it will now be argued that, in certain specific circumstances. 
there must exist a strict delineation between these two environments. The 
specific circumstances will be seen to be the same as those to which reference 
is made in Chapter 2, Part 6, when arguing that society cannot operate in a 
closed social environment. These circumstances were seen there to centre on the 
possibility that knowledge and/or understanding of the operations of objects In 
social environments might change. As with previous arguments used In this essay 
the price to be paid for not accepting the argument can be citedi in this case 
the refusal to accept that there is a strict delineation (which is built upon 
the existence of individuals whose subjective activity sustains the existence of 
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the social environments) Involves the restriction of causes of changes in the 
corpus of knowledge (which generates a cultural environment) to non-conscious 
mechanisms. Such a restriction would negate the Intelligibility of the 
development of social structures whose purpose it is to change the current 
corpus of knowledge. The argument is, as before, Kantlan in nature. 
It has already been established that Kant's independent. permanent world of 
material objects and the social environment generated by the operations of 
social kinds which facilitate concept communication, must operate In a single 
system of time. The reason they must do so is that the operations of objects in 
both environments are constrained by the need to facilitate cognitive 
Interactions between Individuals. This means that the operations of objects in 
the social and material worlds must, when conceptualised and consciously 
manipulated by Individuals, be Interdependent. 
it is, however, only when conscious attempts are made to expand the 
understanding of the operations of objects In either environment that the 
interdependence becomes Important. If the only purpose underlying the 
participation by individuals in cognitive interactions with other Individuals 
were merely to transfer the given corpus of understanding from Individual to 
individual, then there would be no need to be aware of the distinction between 
social and natural structures. In these circumstances any change In the corpus 
of knowledge would not be seen as different in category from the detected 
changes in the properties of a natural kind. Such a scenario would be found in 
a cultural environment where there were no operational social kinds whose 
function it was to facilitate the alteration of the corpus of knowledge. 
In such a cultural environment, any changes in the corpus of knowledge 
would have to be conceptualised as epiphenomena of nature. Indeed, in such 
cultural environments there would be no need to distinguish between social and 
natural processes. The Importance of this consideration for the purposes of the 
argument here is that without such a distinction the question of the identity of 
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the Individual is no more or less problematic than the Identity of a natural 
kind. The set of properties which an individual might possess is specified at 
any point In time within the corpus of knowledge. Further, no Individual could, 
by consciously using her causal powers to affect and effect changes in her 
social/natural environments, alter the set characteristics which might be 
possessed by any individual - she would have no power to contribute towards the 
redefinition of a person and no power to contribute to the definition of herself 
as an individual. 
Where there is no possibility of a conscious. intentional alteration of the 
corpus of knowledge, both social and material environments will be seen as 
permanent. One can provide an argument supporting the acceptability of this 
claim by examining the relationship between the expansion of knowledge and the 
possible development of the notion of Personal Identity. The possibility of 
conscious. Intentional alterations to the corpus of knowledge is closely 
interlinked with the necessity that individuals can contribute towards the 
redefinition of the person. Any alteration in the corpus of knowledge will 
alter the effect, in social space, of the use of certain concepts. This will 
alter the causal powers of the Individuals who use the concepts and so alter the 
social environments specified by the possible operations of the Individuals. 
This means that the conscious alteration of the corpus of knowledge by any 
Individual will have the effect of redefining at least those individuals who 
accept the alterations which she has instigated. So where there Is no 
possibility of conscious, Intentional alterations In the corpus of knowledge, 
there is also no possibility of changes in the definition of a person - and 
vice- versa. 
Natural And Social Kinds And The Modal Aspects Of Cognitive Experience 
The symbiotic relationship between the concept of Personal Identity and the 
possible expansion of knowledge has been established. If the Individual has the 
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power to alter the concepts whose use is invoked in any process which 
individuates him then the cultural environment in which he operates must contain 
mechanisms which facilitate the conscious alteration of the corpus of knowledge. 
Conversely, the possibility that the corpus of knowledge can be altered can 
only be sustained if individuals have the power to redefine themselves. 
The point at which an individual begins to contribute to the redefinition 
of a person Is reached when criteria of intelligibility are brought Into play. 
This can be seen to be the case when one considers the functions. In cognitive 
Interactions, of criteria of intelligibility and of the uses of self-monitoring 
devices possessed by persons. Without the use of criteria of intelligibility, 
the monitoring by an individual of her own experiences itself becomes 
unintelligible; and this lack of Intelligibility is accompanied by the lack of 
intelligibility of all concept communication. Without the use of the 
self-monitoring device the individual cannot substitute for a 'paradigm 
individuator' and so cannot contribute towards the formation of any concept, let 
alone concepts of Personal Identity. 
The converse of the claim made in the last paragraph has already been 
established. The point at which a cultural environment comes to contain social 
kinds which facilitate the alteration of the corpus of knowledge is reached when 
Individuals have the power to alter the concept of a person. This power may be 
exercised only through the alteration of the corpus of knowledge. The actual 
exercise of the power does not have to occur in order for the corpus of 
knowledge to change. It is sufficient that the possibility of Its exercise 
exists for this possibility, along with a change in the corpus of knowledge, is 
accompanied by conceptualised changes In the concepts of the Identity of some 
individuals. Neither does the exercise of the power Itself have to be 
conceptualised, it can be exercised by an Individual without his being aware of 
the exercise. 
The reliance of this argument on the modal aspects of experience is 
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central. Modal aspects concern themselves with possible and necessary outcomes 
of conceptualised behaviour. As such they are concerned with the possible 
disappearance and/or annihilation of objects whose behaviour is being monitored. 
Without the possibility of the disappearance and/or annihilation of some 
objects, questions of possibility and necessity would be unintelligible. Since 
the annihilation of objects was established by Kant to be impossible in the 
world of material objects. Its possibility must be restricted to the world of 
social objects. In other words the concept of a social object contains the 
notion that it is possible that the object may be annihilated. By contrast the 
concept of a material object excludes the notion that the object may be 
annihilated. 
This means that the delineation of the boundary between social and material 
environments Is closely related to the possession of self-monitoring mechanisms 
by conscious individuals. It Is only through the use of self-monitoring 
mechanisms that modal aspects of experience are Intelligible. So the possession 
of self-monitoring mechanisms by Individuals provides one with both necessary 
and sufficient reasons for the establishment of a delineating boundary between 
material and social environments. 
There Is one exception. The self-monitoring aspects and intelligibility of 
experience involving cognitive interactions negate the possibility of the 
annihilation of one social kind: the social kind which facilitates cognitive 
interations between individuals in cultural environments in which changes in the 
corpus of knowledge can be effected. In these cultural environments the 
mechanisms used to communicate concepts cannot be annihilated. In order to 
annihilate such a mechanism one would have to destroy all memories of its 
operations. In which case it would not be known that it had ever been in 
operation. This means that the annihilation of a social kind which facilitates 
concept communication cannot ever be known to have occurred. 
Further. if a mechanism which, up to a particular point In time had not 
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been In use, were to come into use, then it has to be assumed that the mechanism 
was always available for use. The ontological distinction drawn between such 
mechanisms and other social kinds stems from the fact that the former's 
operations are content-free - their operations do not depend upon the conceptual 
content of any particular cognitive Interaction. By contrast the operations of 
all other social kinds are dependent upon the cognitive content of the social 
interactions which sustain their operations. Indeed. It is this cognitive 
content which gives these other social kinds their modus operand! - if one were 
to alter the cognitive content one could easily alter the social kind Itself. 
In the next sub-section the arguments which have been developed in Part 2 
will be summarised. These have been concerned with the relationships between 
concepts of Personal Identity and the delineation of the boundary between 
material and social environments. The construction of the summary will lead to 
the identification of one remaining area of Investigations the interactions 
between Individuals and their material environments. The need for such an 
investigation is derived from the apparent persuasiveness of Kant's arguments. 
It was argued above that problems arise if one accepts Kant's phenomenology, 
which is simultaneously naturalistic and anthropocentric. As such Its 
acceptance may lead to the eventual fusion of social and material environments; 
leaving one with the task of having to meet the payment, identified above, of 
the price of the fusion. The refutation of Kant's anthropocentric naturalism is 
completed In Part 3 below. 
Impfloatlons Of The Extended Kantlan Argu. ent ! /UI A Summary 
Kant's argument identifies a source of our understanding of the permanent 
nature of the material environment. Inter alle. it also implicitly Identifies 
the source of our understanding of the nature of non-material environments. The 
source of this understanding has been explicitly identified In the last 
sub-section by employing an extended version of the Kantlan argument. it was 
146 
Pat lo Introduction Chapter 3 
Identified as being the structure of the social kinds which facilitate those 
forms of concept communication which can lead to alterations in the corpus of 
knowledge encapsulated by a given cultural environment. 
The examination has so far focussed on the Importance of two pairs of 
related notions: permanence and non-permanence on one hand; objectivity and 
subjectivity on the other. Kant could not move beyond claiming that one can 
establish the permanence and euclidean structure of the material environment; he 
could not justify any claims about the operations of objects in that 
environment. Similarly, he could not move beyond claiming that there were both 
subjective and objective aspects of experience; he could not justify any claims 
about the nature of the referents of objective experience. 
The argument in the previous sub-sections has permitted some of the moves 
which were out of reach for someone following a strictly Kantian line. These 
moves were seen to be based on the conditions which have to hold if social 
interactions which facilitate intentional changes in the corpus of knowledge are 
to be possible. The moves were seen, at root, to rely on the subjective nature 
of modal aspects of experience. These modal aspects were seen to underpin the 
possibility that knowledge could expand. They were also seen to form the basis 
of the justification for the delineation between social and natural kinds. 
The argument was not, however, watertight. There remains a possibility 
that modal aspects of experience are not subjective. Indeed Kant saw these as 
objectively determined and forming the basis of synthetic a priori knowledge of 
the structure of the material environment. This possibility will now be 
rejected with the aid of an examination of Poincari's arguments refuting the 
details of the Kantian claim that the material environment Is three-dimensional 
and euclidean. 
This examination will Involve a two-pronged analysis of some of Poincare's 
arguments. already alluded to above. The first analysis will highlight the fact 
that certain of his arguments rely on the Interdependence of the material and 
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the social worlds for their acceptability. The reliance is not explicitly 
acknowledged by Poincarh. The second analysis will involve an examination of 
the content of one of Poincarh's arguments (*11). This argument gives an a 
priori justification of general claims about the nature of space - these give 
one access to some Kantian synthetic a priori concepts (but not those of an 
applied 3-D geometry which Kant himself suggested) as contrasted with the a 
prior/ intuition of space itself. This examination will lead to the 
Identification of the subjective element present In experiences where a priori 
Intu/tftne of either natural or social space are operational. 
ww 
PART 3e THE IMPACT OF POINCARE ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SELF. 
Two aspects of Poincare's arguments are of significance to the formulation 
of a concept of Personal Identity. The first is the tacit assumption in the 
arguments that the individual has to do conceptual work on his sensual 
information in order to formulate spatial concepts. Since the formation of such 
concepts is not an epiphenomenon of nature, it will be argued that the 
subjectivity of the individual cannot be eliminated from the concept of a person 
without paying a price. The second significant aspect of Poincare's arguments 
is the explicit reference made to the need for individuals to be active, 
self-evaluatory causal agents In the environment if they are to conceptualise 
that environment as dimensional. As In the case of the first aspect, the 
argument directs one's attention to the subjectivity of a person. 
Both these aspects of Poincare's arguments lie at the heart of the argument 
being developed in this essay. The first merely reiterates and modifies a 
similar position adopted by Kant. The second takes the Kantlan position and 
extends it. The argument in this essay proposes a further extension to 
Poinoarb's which permits a separate analysis of the social dimension of 
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perceived phenomena. This separate analysis may provide one with the basis from 
which it may be possible to discover a firmer basis for human value systems than 
those which have been proposed hitherto. 
The Significance Of Poincarb's Theories of Space, Displacement, Solidity And 
Acton 
The significance of those of Poincarä's theories which will be examined 
below are to be found In three areas. Firstly, he refutes the central arguments 
Kant used to support his claim that the knowledge that Eualideen geometry can be 
applied to our spatial environment is synthetic a priori knowledge. The 
refutation does not, however, invalidate the Kantlan enterprise itself; on the 
contrary, Poincare's own argument constitutes a variant of Kant's. 
The claims he makes are such that Kant would classify as supporting the 
notion of synthetic a priori knowledge. In this case the knowledge concerns the 
structure of our natural environment. Poincare claims that an individual's 
perceptions of the number of possible dimensions of 'motor space' is limited by 
the number of muscles the Individual has 012). He also claims that space must 
contain solid objects. The importance of this argument is not that It negates 
the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge - for clearly it does not. it 
Is rather that it refutes an argument of Kant's which claims that the 
environment is simultaneously naturalistic and anthropocentric. 
The simultaneity of anthropocentricity and naturalism is built In by Kant 
when he makes the nature of the environment dependent upon the mechanisms of 
sense perception and Independent of any Interpretative process undertaken by 
'sense perceivers'. If accepted, Kant's anthropocentric naturalism would give 
one access to certain knowledge that both we, as Individuals, and the 
environment we perceive are the way we pecelve ourselves and them to be. It 
would also provide us with the possibility of developing a sound justification 
for claiming that the conceptualisation of the individual could be reduced to 
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the conoeptuaiisations of objects which did not themselves have the power to 
conceptualise. 
The examination of Poincare's arguments Is not as out of place as might 
appear in an Investigation into the basis on which theories of Personal Identity 
are built. Poincare's arguments allow one to refute the intelligibility of 
determining objective conceptualisations of the processes of conoeptualising the 
natural environment. If the conceptualisations of such processes do not permit 
one Intelligibly to eliminate the Individual, then the possibility of forming 
concepts of persons entirely in terms of non-person concepts disintegrates. 
Seedndly, Poincare shows, in true Kantlan fashion, that the development and 
application of geometrical concepts to space are only possible If (i) space 
contains 'solid' objects; (ii) individuals are able to activate some of those 
solids In order to alter either their (the solids') states or their relative 
positions (commonly we describe this by saying that they can move objects by 
moving their muscles); and (iii) Individuals are able to monitor both these 
activations and the changes of state and/or relative position. (Poincare does 
not discuss the significance of the Individual's ability to monitor the 
activation of changes; such a discussion would not have contributed to the 
central concern of his argument. ) 
The importance of Poincarb's argument, as seen from the perspective adopted 
in this essay, is that it provides a social scientist with a starting point for 
establishing the demarcation between social and material environments. The 
individual cannot operate in an environment in which she cannot develop and 
apply spatial concepts. No possible changes in the perceptions, or 
interpretations of perceptions, of individuals can remove the need for solid 
objects and their spatial relations. The social scientist may, In these 
circumstances, justifiably begin by specifying as material (and so non-social) 
those environments in which the changes of position and/or shape of objects are 
detected. 
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Thirdly. Poincare demonstrates that any processes of interpretation of (Ii) 
and (iii) above are only contingently related to the activations and monitoring 
procedures referred to in (ti) and Oil). He demonstrates conclusively that it 
is possible to represent the sense data one is receiving as originating from a 
fairly wide variety of types of spatial environment. While the arguments he 
uses to achieve this are similar to the one referred to In the previous two 
paragraphs, they focus on different ends. For Polncarb the focus was the 
discovery of the basis of knowledge of the application of mathematical concept. 
In this essay. the focus shifts to the importance of the subjectivity of the 
individual. and with it the consequent doubt that an objective conceptualisation 
of the self is possible. 
Dsbunking Kant's Anthropooentrlc Naturalism 
The Kantlan theory of synthetic a priori knowledge of the Euclidean nature 
of spatial relationships is both anthropocentric and naturalistic. In order to 
achieve his goals, Kant needs to show that the aeahan/sas of sense perceptions 
are such that the application of a geometry to space restricts that geometry to 
being Euclidean. This means that individuals cannot but eonoeptualise the 
environment as Euclidean, so the process of conceptualisation becomes an 
epiphenomenon of nature. It will not do for him to throw the necessity back 
onto the understanding for, in such a case, either the knowledge would be 
analytic rather than synthetic or the mode of operation of the understanding 
would itself be mechanistic. 
Poincare shows. In arguments reminiscent of Berkeley 013). that the 
mechanisms of sense perception tend to push the Individual away from. rather 
than towards, the application of strictly Euclidean geometrical concepts to 
space. In these arguments he points out that, not only do Individuals normally 
experience 'visual' and 'tactile' space, but they also experience 'motor' space. 
it is worthwhile briefly to examine the relationships between these three 
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spaces. 
The three spaces are distinguished from each other by the sense organs 
which provide the signals which the individual assimilates Into her experience 
of her spatial environment. 'Visual' space has its origins in the 
two-dimensional (as Poincarh conceives them to be - see note(*15)) signals 
received by the eye. 'Tactile' space has its origins In the signals received by 
the sense of touch. 'Motor' space is derived from the experiences of movements 
of the muscles. Poincare argues that the three spaces are assimilated into a 
single 'representative space' by a series of processes which Include 
experimentation and the association of ideas. An evaluation of his description 
of the assimilation is not necessary for the purposes of this chapter. 
He goes on to indicate that. in developing and applying the notions of 
Euclidean geometry to space. Individuals will develop and then use an 
Isomorphism between 'representative' and Euclidean spaces. The Isomorphism has 
some undertones of Kantlan rationalism: - 
"Thus we do not represent to ourselves external bodies In geometrical space, but 
we reason about these bodies as If they were situated in geometrical space. 
When it Is said, on the other hand, that we "localise" such an object in such a 
point of space, what does It mean? It simply means that we represent to 
ourselves the moveaenta that Bust take place to reach that object And it does 
not mean that to represent to ourselves these movements they must be projected 
Into space, and the concept of space must therefore pre-exist. When I say that 
we represent to ourselves these movements, I only mean that we represent to 
ourselves the muscular sensations which accompany them, and which have no 
geometrical character, and which therefore in no way Imply the pre-existence of 
the concept of space. " (Poincar6's emphasis) (*14) 
Whether or not this rationalist analysis is rigorously correct is not 
significant for our purposes. What Is Important Is the observation that 
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'representative space' is not Euclidean. Not every dimension in representative 
space is equivalent to every other one. According to Poincard, the two 
dimensions of visual space are augmented to three by the assimilation of 
Information from motor space; muscular movements are needed If one is to extend 
beyond the flatness of visual space (*15). Further, not every point In 
representative space is equivalent to every others naturally, a neighbourhood of 
a point may alter in representative space if one moves ones visual perspective, 
but this does not alter the nature of the neighbourhood of the point in 
Euclidean space. Poincare here demonstrates conclusively that the mechanisms of 
sense perception do not force an individual to apply a Euclidean concept to his 
spatial environment; the Individual has to work against his sense information in 
order to apply Euclidean concepts to space. 
This means that, in contradistinction to Kant, one can argue that Euclidean 
space is not forced on us. If we use Euclidean concepts It is because we have 
Interpreted sense inputs as derived from a Euclidean environment. 
A possibility that the application of Euclidean concepts to space may still 
be forced on us remains. It is still possible that our Interpretative faculties 
are such that we can do nothing with representative space other than interpret 
it as having Euclidean origins. Poincar6 shows this not to be the case. Very 
simply he demonstrates that representative space could be Interpreted as 
originating from a non-Euclidean space if different signals were to be received 
fon the very Bane sense reoeptea as we use at present (*16). 
This, in conjunction with the previous argument, means that the application 
of Euclidean concepts to space must be contingent upon the nature of the 
environment and cannot be known a priori. Indeed, the argument demonstrates 
that the application of any specific type of dimensional spatial concept cannot 
be known a priori. All that one can know a priori is that space Is dimensional. 
The fact that it is known as being of a specific type of dimensionality 
consequently means that some conceptual work on raw sense data has to be carried 
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out by Individuals when they conceptualise the environment as dimensional. 
Poincare demonstrates that this conceptual work necessitates the use, by the 
individual. of a process by which she monitors her Interactions with objects in 
the environment. The interpretation of the material environment as Euclidean 
(or as any other spce) requires the use of a second order monitoring device by 
the Interpreter. 
The Significance or the Debunking a? Kant's Anthropocentric Naturalism 
For the purposes of this essay the significance of the debunking of Kant's 
theory of synthetic a priori knowledge of the application of Euclidean concepts 
to space lies In the Implications It has on the nature of the Individual who 
applies spatial concepts. 
In contrast with the Kant/an exposition, one can use Poinoar6's 
results to argue that the link between on the one hand, the prooeaaea 
by which information about the world is gathered and on the other, the 
interpretation by the individual of the nature of that world, must be 
seen as a link whose parameters cannot be determined In advance of the 
operation of the interpretative faculties of individuals. 
The core of the debunking process Is found in Poincarb's examination of the 
means by which concepts of space - visual, tactile and motor - can be 
assimilated into a notion of repreaentat/ye space. This means that there Is a 
conceptual leap undertaken by the Individual in translating the information from 
the senses Into a notion of natural space. The assimilation of sensory 
information is not an automatic process. 
Poincar6 argues convincingly that there are conditions which have to be 
satisfied if the process of assimilaton of sensory information is to be 
facilitated. These conditions turn out ! /rst/y to be ones which the physical 
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environment. in which individuals operate, has to meet, it must contain solid 
objects. 
SSoVnd/y, there are conditions which the Individual himself has to satisfy: he 
(I) must be a consciously motor-active individual, 
(ii) must have the ability to displace and deform objects, and 
(lit) must have an ability to assimilate and Interpret sets of experiences 
which is independent of the means by which any of those of his 
sensations (which help to formulate the experiences) are triggered? 
It is important to note that it is the Independence of the ability to 
assimilate and Interpret Information from the weans by which the Information Is 
transmitted which enables Individuals to intuit separate social and natural 
epaoes. The means by which Information is transmitted generates a set of 
phenomena which can be non-subjectively described; they can be adequately 
described without making any references to the individuals involved In the 
transmission of information. The abilities of cognitive individuals to 
assimilate and interpret the same information cannot be similarly 
non-subjectively redescribed. 
The last sub-condition (Iii) Is the one which forms the cornerstone of the 
debunking process. It also combines with (1) and (1i) and the condition which 
space has to satisfy, to give one a firm foundation on which to support the 
proposition that one can establish a demarcation between the social and material 
worlds; a demarcation which still permits them to interact. In the hands of 
either idealists/rationalists such as Kant or Idealists/ materialists such as 
Hume, the demarcation becomes a fusion. The former reduce all known operations 
(whether or not these are affected by conceptualisations) to the operations of 
the Individual's rational and imaginative faculties while the latter seem 
willing to reduce them to the operations of matter. 
wwý* 
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PART 4z SOCIAL AND NATURAL KINDS DIFFERENTIATED 
In Part 4 the areas in which the boundaries between natural and social 
kinds is sharply delineated will be identified. The Identification of these 
areas will, Inter alle, identify the areas in which the delineation is either a 
matter of convention or is blurred. The examination of the delineation of the 
boundary will follow on from a resume and a bringing together of the arguments 
developed In the earlier Parts of this chapter. 
The arguments in Parts 2 and 3 above lead naturally to the acceptance of 
the claims (A), (b), (c), (d) and (e) listed below. The acceptance of the 
claims helps one determine the possible boundaries between natural and social 
kinds: 
(a) any object which Is own as either facilitating or constraining the process 
of concept communication but whose operations are seen as being Independent of 
conceptualisations, must both be viewed as a natural kind and be differentiated 
from social kinds; 
(b) any object which is seen as being Independent of the factors which 
facilitate and/or constrain the process of concept communication, and whose 
operations are seen as occurring independently of the conceptualisations of 
Individuals, may be dwsed either a natural or a social kind; 
(a) the structure of cultural environment cannot be sustained without the 
operations of some objects which are deemed to be natural kinds of the type 
falling under the scope of (a) - this means that It must be poas/b/e to make 
some distinctions between natural and social kinds (this claim was substantiated 
in Chapter 1); 
(d) if an individual can operate in more than one distinct cultural environment 
then there must be at least one natural kind of the type referred to In (c) 
which facilitates concept communication In all those distinct environments - 
this means that a rigid cultural relativism. In which it is impossible for 
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cross-cultural communication to occur. Is untenable; links must exist between 
all cultural environments. 
( if an Individual can operate in more than one distinct cultural environment 
then there must be a social kind facilitating concept communication which 
operates in those several cultural environments. * 
ExaarPI a of (a) and (b) 
objects which fall under the ambit of (a) would include any object which 
enables one 
(I) to use one's touch, eyes, nose or eardrums to sense signals, 
(II) to transmit signals which are perceivable through the use of the visual, 
tactile, olfactory or auditory senses. 
Examples of these objects would include: vocal cords, microphones, air 
particles, hearing aids (from ear trumpets to electronic ones), perfumes, 
hands... It is also not necessary that there exist any Individuals who can 
articulate an explanation of how such objects facilitate concept communication; 
it is only necessary that the objects are perceived as facilitators. 
Objects which fall under the ambit of (b) would Include objects whose 
operations are seen as neutral with regard to the prooeaa of concept 
communication. These might be objects whose modus operand/ could in actuality be 
either dependent or Independent of the oonoeptualisations of Individuals, but 
fNOTE v It is possible that one might be obliged to categorlse an object referred 
to In (b) as a natural kind on grounds which are different from those outlined 
in (a). There may be valid grounds which are different from the facilitation of 
concept communication and yet which may permit one to substantiate claims that a 
given set of objects comprises of natural kinds. Among alternative grounds 
which have been cited are the possibility of sense-perception (Kant) and the 
intelligibility of certain scientific practices (Bhaskar) ("17). 
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they will not be conceived to be dependent. 
This point is Itself Independent of whether It Is possible to draw a 
distinction between what Is conceptualised and what occurs Independently of 
oonoeptuallsations. This means that If Individuals' conceptions change, then 
the ontological status of some objects could change from social to natural kinds 
and possibly also vice versa. 
Examples of these might Include: 
(i) the Hindu Karma (*18) -a set of structures seen as specifying the status of 
Individuals based on the individuals' past behaviour (including that of previous 
lives) and determining the fortune or III-fortune which Individuals encounter. 
The operations of the Karma are regarded as neutral with respect to the process 
of concept communication per se as well as being independent of the 
conceptualisations of Individuals. A Hindu would probably regard It as being an 
example of a natural kind with statements about its operations being viewed as 
referring to natural facts. A non-Hindu might, by contrast, view the Karma as a 
social structure dependent upon the conceptualisations of the individuals 
through whom it is seen partly to operate. 
(II) a 'black hole' -a postulated block of mass whose molecules are conceived 
as being so densely packed that Its gravitational attractive forces are 
calculated as being sufficient to pull everything including electromagnetic 
radiation back into itself, so that not even energy escapes Its gravity. it 
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a black hole is an imaginary entity 
and, as such, is a social kind. Most modern physicists would probably regard it 
as a natural kind - although some physicists apparently ('H) exist who are happy 
to regard all elementary particles as conceptual entities. 
Claims (d) and (e) 
The cross-Cultural nature of so re natural and =No social kinds 
The argument supporting claim (d) will be set out In a fairly systematic, 
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mathematical style. It rests on the conditions which need to be met If one Is 
to make judgements about the occurrences in one cultural environment while one 
is operating in another. This argument will be extended, without loss of 
generality, to apply to the particular social kind whose operations facilitate 
concept communication. 
Claim (d) follows directly from the acceptance of a minor amendment to 
claim (a). One needs to couple claim (a) with the requirement that an 
individual, say 11, retains her identity as the same individual when operating 
in different cultural environments. The retention of the Identity in two 
distinct cultural environments, say CE1 and CE2, carries with it the requirement 
that the individual it can be identified as the same individual in both 
environments. The fulfilment of this requirement carries with it a further 
requirement: this being that there must be at least two other individuals, say 
I and 13, who can also operate in both environments (*19). This means that 
there must be a cultural environment, say CE2A, which intersects both CEi and 
CE2. 
This third environment will be the one generated by the use of the concept 
which Identifies 1i as 1, in the differing social spaces. Cultural environment 
CE2A will encompass the operation of at least one communication facilitating 
natural kind. say NKu, such as those referred to in (c) Since NK, facilitates 
concept communication in CE2A it must also do so In both CE, and CE2. 
By similar reasoning a natural kind NK2 will facilitate concept 
communication In CE2 and CE3 and natural kind NK, will do so in cultural 
environments CEj and CEki. So If an individual Ii can operate In CEI. 
CE2,.... and CEA then there exist natural kinds NKR. NK2,..., and NKw-, which 
facilitate I, 's concept communication In the cultural environments. 
But the argument goes further: for, If one can claim that Ii retains her 
Identity In all the cultural environments then one has to assume that there is a 
cultural environment CE within which one Identifies Ii as operating in all these 
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other environments. Since, ex-hypothesi, the environment CE is the cultural 
environment which is partly specified by the concept which identifies I as the 
same 11. it will consist (in part) of the Intersection of all the environments 
such as CES. This means that within the social space specified by CE there will 
operate a set of natural kinds which facilitate concept communication In all the 
cultural environments CE,, CE2..., and CEn. 
In essence this claim rests on the notion that an individual can only make 
sense of claims about more than one cultural environment by placing herself in a 
further cultural environment. This futher cultural environment is the one which 
encompasses both the environment concerning which the individual is making the 
claim and the environment in which she is operating. 
Only the negation of the poea/bllty of making sense of claims about more 
than one cultural environment would allow one to refuse to accept the argument 
being developed here. The ability an individual has to move from operating in a 
given cultural environment such as CES, to operating in such an encompassing 
environment, such as CE, Is the same one as that which enables her to operate 
the second order monitoring mechanism referred to In Chapter 1. She has to be 
aware of her own participation in the operations of the cultural environment 
from which she starts in order to appreciate the she can operate In the 
'extended' cultural environment. 
The arument can be amended so as to apply to social kinds. It can be 
repeated with the substitution of a particular social kind, say SK1, which 
facilitates concept communication in cultural environment CE1. Every step of 
the argument remains valid. The argument cannot, however, be extended to apply 
to any social kind which affects and is affected by the behaviour of 1i; such an 
extension would break down at the stage when it is asserted that: "This means 
that there must be a cultural environment, say CE2A, which intersects both CEI 
and CE2. " 
it is only the 'permanent' nature of the material environment which permits 
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one to claim the extension of the influence of operation of a natural kind 
across the boundaries between distinct cultural environments. The source of the 
permanence was seen earlier to be the requirement that it is possible to have 
non-illusory experiences in a single system of time. Similarly, the 'permanent' 
nature of the particular social environment which facilitates concept 
communication enables one to claim the extension of the Influence of that 
particular social kind across the boundaries between cultural environments. it 
should be noted that both arguments have as a premise the continued retention of 
the identity of an individual through that Individual's operations in the 
diverse cultural environments - and these operations must Involve some concept 
communication (*20). 
The argument which has just been developed determines limitations which 
have to be placed on any claims to cultural relativism. Relativistic claims may 
consist perhaps of the notion that it is only by operating within a given 
cultural environment that one can come to understand the operations of the 
social kinds In that environment. However, such claims have to take into 
account the implications of the retention of the Identity of the Individual who 
is attempting to understand the operations of the social kinds In various 
cultural environments. 
if it is deemed impossible for an Individual to retain her Identity across 
the boundaries of different cultural environments then the relativist claim 
degenerates Into a dogmatic assertion with no known method of refutation. By 
contrast, the argument being put forward here, while also being of an a priori 
nature, states the penalties which have to be paid for denying the conclusions 
drawn. The main penalty would be the negation of the possibility that the 
corpus of knowledge could expand. 
The development of justification of the claim that this penalty has to be 
paid is reasonably straightforward: an expansion of the corpus of knowledge 
would necessitate the possibility that an individual could come to know that he 
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osn operate in a cultural environment in which he previously had not been 
operating - which means that he must be aware that he is retaining his identity 
in both the original and the changed cultural environments. 
The Delineation Of The Boundaries Betwesen Natural And Social Kinds 
The examples and discussion in Part 4 have indicated that there are areas 
where the boundaries between natural and social kinds are distinct and others 
where they are blurred. There Is only one area where the boundary Is sharp. 
This is the cultural environment in which the cognitive behaviour of individuals 
would be unintelligible without the assumption that the operations of some 
particular objects were independent of conceptualisations - the area In which 
these objects operate must be deemed to be permanent and such that It contains 
natural kinds. But even here, as Is seen in the case of the Hindu Karma, there 
is the possibility that the boundaries might blur - if the perceived ontological 
status of a natural kind were to alter. 
PART 5, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
summary 
The force motivating the development of the arguments in this chapter has 
been the drive to determine the areas where it Is possible and where it is 
necessary to distinguish between social and natural structures. An Increased 
understanding of the relationship between on the one hand any such possibilities 
and, on the other hand the concept of what constitutes Personal Identity, 
provided an underlying motivating force. 
The arguments have been modelled on the structure of the Kantian 
transcendental arguments as developed in his Transcendental Aesthetic and his 
Refutation of Idealism (*21). While the Kantian enterprise Itself was seen to 
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be sound, some of the details of Kant's own exposition were found to be flawed. 
Further, Kant's exposition is Inadequate to the task of accounting for our 
understanding of what he calls 'things in themselves', things which appertain to 
the world he characterises as 'noumenal'. 
The inadequacy of Kant's exposition was seen to stem from his omission of 
any analysis of cognitive interactions between individuals. Kant restricts 
himself to an analysis of the interactions between an individual and his natural 
environment. The extension of the Kantian enterprise which was developed In 
part 2 fills the lacuna left by Kant. The extension was seen to involve a 
Kantian argument which examined the conditions which had to hold if cognitive 
interactions between individuals were to sustain changes on the corpus of 
knowledge in a given cultural environment. 
These conditions were met only if two categories of object operated in the 
given cultural environment: the first is the social environment which 
facilitates concept communication which enjoys similar 'permanent' status to the 
material environment in which the individuals operated; and the second is the 
social environment which is 'non-permanent' - that is, such that It could be 
annihilated and/or may have been created without being transformed from some 
other object. The permanent environments were conceived as operating 
Independently of conceptualisations. As such they were seen to operate In an 
objectively defined environment. The non-permanent environments were seen as 
those generated by the operations of those social kinds whose behaviour could 
not be adequately conceptualised if it was assumed that the behaviour occurred 
entirely In objectively defined environments. 
The notions of permanence and objectivity were seen to be closely related. 
The possibility of distinguishing them from the notions of non-permanence and 
subjectivity was seen to rest on the ineliminabllity of the self from 
descriptions of the operations of social kinds. In other words holistic 
explanations of the behaviour of social kinds have to pay a price: they negate 
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the possibility that individuals can become aware of changes In the corpus of 
knowledge which specifies the cultural environment in which they operate. 
The flawed nature of one of the details of the Kantlan argument was exposed 
in Part 3 where Poincar6's insights are invoked to demonstrate that Kant's 
anthropocentric naturalism Is untenable: there must exist both subjective and 
objective domains in human cognitive experience - even it the experience 
involves only interactions with material objects In a material environment. 
Poincare's argument shows that there is always a gap between the 
'representative environment' and the 'represented environment' (these are not 
terms used by Poincare). Since the link between the former (oonoeptuallsed) 
environment and the latter (existent) environment involves the activity of the 
Individual, there must be interpretative work done by the individual when she 
conceptuailses her interactions with her material environment. The 
self-monitored subjectivity of the individual Is ineliminable even in the 
analysis of the individual's experience of her material environment. 
Two points should be noted about the use made of Poinoarb's arguments. 
Firstly, he was not concerned with the relationships between individuals and 
their social environments. Further, his concern with the relationship between 
the individual and his material environment was driven by a desire to discover 
the basis for the acceptability of the application of geometrical concepts. 
Secondly, Poincarb's own arguments rest on a tacit assumption which is 
explicitly stated in this essay. This is the assumption that it is possible to 
alter the given corpus of knowledge in a given cultural environment. The very 
notion that what he characterises as 'representative space' exists and is not 
necessarily the same as material space Involves an assumption that it is 
possible to change 'representative space' - that is, it is possible to change 
some aspect of the corpus of knowledge. It Is the acceptance of this asumptlon 
which underpins all the arguments developed In this essay. 
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Conclusion 
Chapter 3 
The arguments in Chapters 2 and 3 have all supported the contention that 
the self is ineliminable from any concept of Personal Identity. This 
ineliminabiiity stems from two sources each of which Is dependent upon the 
possibility that changes in knowledge can consciously be effected. One source 
is found in the structure of social kinds which sustain cognitive Interactions 
between Individuals and the other is found in the form of the cognitive 
Interactions themselves. Each of these places a requirement on the nature of 
the individual and his cognitive conscious experiences. 
In Chapter 4 some of the implications of the conclusions reached In 
Chapters 1 to 3 will be explored. This will be achieved by examining the nature 
of conscious experience. The reason why conscious experience is examined is 
that it lies at the heart of the operations of social kinds and so of the 
concept of Personal Identity. It will be found that the Intelligibility of 
processes involving cognitive interactions between Individuals gives one a basis 
for making some universal claims about the nature of persons and. Inter a//a. 
about the nature of some human values. 
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CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE 
"Consciousness means many things, often simultaneously, often contradictory. 
Thus It may mean a state different from being asleep or In a coma;... 
Consciousness may have a Freudian meaning,... Finally there is a Marxist use 
of consciousness. The difference between these uses of the term Is that whilst 
most of the earlier ones are essentially static definitions of consciousness as 
a 'state' of being, in the Marxist sense consciousness is a dynamic force which 
emerges In the interaction between the Individual and his or her environment" 
Steven pose The Conscious Brain p. 33 
PART 1" INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will be concerned with the construction of the final stage 
of the development of the foundation for a theory of personal Identity; the 
development will be completed In Chapter 5 along with an evaluation of some 
theories of Personal Identity. This final stage will consist of an analysis of 
conscious experience. More specifically it will consist of an analysis of a 
particular aspect of experiences the emotional aspect (see Addendum 1 *p. 203) 
The importance of the analysis lies not so much In either the conclusions drawn 
or its contents it lies rather In the power of the form of analysis used. It 
will be argued that a similar type of analysis can be used to extend one's 
understanding of other non-cognitive aspects of experience; and through that 
extension, to Increase one's understanding of the nature of the self. 
The particular function of the emotions in sustaining the self's concept 
of her own identity will be highlighted. Further, and reinforcing arguments in 
earlier chapters, it will been seen that the self's concept of her own Identity 
performs a central role in the development and acceptance of any notion of 
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personal Identity. 
Chapter 4 
Some of the consequences which flow from the arguments set out in the 
previous chapters will be explored. The focus of attention will, as already 
indicated, be the emotional content of experience. This focus is not chosen 
with the intention of either expounding or developing any theory of the emotions 
or of the nature of emotional behaviour. Its aim is rather to offer insights 
into the ways in which the methods of analysis used in this essay, enable one to 
increase one's understanding of the normative and/or affective domains of human 
activities. More precisely, the aim is to increase the understanding of the 
relationship between 
(a) the normative and/or affective aspects and 
(b) the cognitive aspects of human conscious behaviour. 
These insights will enable one to develop techniques for assessing the 
acceptability of personal Identity theories. 
A central feature of the method of analysis is the use which is made of 
empirical findings. It will be seen that the acceptability of the premisses 
used and the conclusions drawn is not directly dependent upon evidence drawn 
from experienced phenomena. The conclusions cannot be refuted by citing 
empirical evidence. This does not mean that the arguments are independent of 
any empirical findings - nor could they be, for their subject matter is itself 
conscious experience. They are anchored in experience though their reliance is 
on possible Interpr t Uons of experience. The claims in this chapter rest on 
the Incoherence of interpretations of conscious experience which would flow from 
the denial of the claims. It is being suggested that the grounds for rejecting 
a given explanation of the behaviour of a specific social kind may be more 
subtle than mere Inconsistency between the actual and expected outcomes of the 
behaviour of the social kind. 
In this chapter the basis for explanations of the behaviour of a 
particular social kind, a 'person'. Is sought. The method of analysis outlined 
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here, rather than a social scientific investigation of the properties of 
persons. can yield results which enable one to reject some received explanations 
- see Addendum 2 *p. 204. 
The choice of the emotional content of experience as a focus was, 
however, not arbitrary. There are two factors which make It more apt than, say, 
the aesthetic component or the moral aspects of conscious experience. Firstly, 
it will be seen that, along with the cognitive content, the emotional content 
forms an essential component part of conscious experience. The justification 
for this is based on the essentially evaluative nature of cognitive experiences. 
it is not easy to see how the same can be said of a moral component or even an 
aesthetic component of experience - pace any arguments which might establish 
that every social interaction must have a moral aspect or that every conscious 
action by an individual must have an aesthetic aspect. Indeed, It Is suggested 
here that the extension of the argument sustaining the notion that emotion is an 
essential component of experience might provide the basis for suggesting tha 
experience is also essentially moral. 
The second factor is related to the first. Given that conscious 
experience Is essentially emotional, the analysis of it is more likely - than 
the analysis of something which Is not essentially part of experience - to be a 
prime mover in the generation of further understanding of the human condition. 
At least the analysis Is more likely to more productive than an analysis of some 
other aspect of experience whose status Is dependent upon the prior existence of 
an emotional/ evaluative aspect. 
The starting point will be the acceptance of the arguments developed in 
the previous chapters. These Indicated that 'social kinds' in general and 
'persons' (*1) in particular should be seen as entities with powers to bring 
about detectable changes. The failure to view them as such entities was seen to 
carry with it certain unacceptable consequences (*2). It was also Indicated 
that the fundamental distinction to be drawn between a 'person' and a non-person 
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social kind is that the former. but not the latter has the ability both to 
monitor the operations of his own powers and to alter those powers (*3). With 
this starting point the core of the argument In this chapter can be summarised 
as follows: 
Each individual possesses a mechanism by use of which she Is able to Initiate 
and sustain conscious interactions with her social and natural environments. An 
impulsive force which drives her to use this mechanism Is needed if she is to be 
capable of sustaining a sense of her own identity. In this context the use of 
the self-monitoring device can properly be said to Involve the emotions. The 
existence, nature and operation of the mechanism can be used to support the 
claim that all cognitive experiences have both emotional and normative aspects. 
One can conclude directly that there is always a residual aspect of an 
Individual's Interactions with others which is subjective and unanaiysable. 
The existence and necessity of the operation of the self-monitoring 
mechanism in communicable experience was established in earlier chapters. There 
it was seen that conscious, communicable experience has to have cognitive 
content. The possession of a monitoring mechanism within conscious experience 
which Interprets the experience was Itself seen as a necessary condition for the 
experience to have cognitive content. 
The process of developing the argument will draw upon arguments from 
various sources but it will be concerned principally with the work of two 
writers: R. Q. Collingwood and Sir John Eccles (*4). Collingwood's own concern 
was with both the emotional and the aesthetic content of experience, while 
Eccles' main concern Is the operation of the brain. For both writers the unity 
of conscious experience is of prime concern. 
Collingwood's work will be used as a springboard from which to develop 
the analysis. The limitations of Collingwood's theory will be seen to stem from 
his acceptance of the Humean story of the atomistic event in conscious 
experience - the sense datum - as the fundamental unit which he sees as forming 
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the basic building block from which conscious experience is constructed. 
Eccles. by contrast finds himself unable to accept the atomistic story. 
not on any abstract philosophical grounds, but because It would run counter to 
the evidence gathered from research Into the information processing operations 
carried out by the brain. This does not mean that Eccles rejects any claim for 
the existence of an atomistio sensory impulse, but rather that he places it in a 
subordinate role In the process of the construction and maintenance of conscious 
experience. According to Eccles, a sensory input, which might be considered by 
us to be a sense datum devoid of cognitive interpretation given by the 
Individual, is absorbed by an already formed cognitive 'picture' and processed 
to fit into, and amend, such a picture. 
In this chapter the terms 'sense datum' and 'almple /alprOMIOn' will be 
used to refer to sensory impulses which have been interpreted using cognitive 
faculties by some conceptualising individual. The sensory Impulse consists of 
the result of the operations of a natural kind even if that operation is 
triggered by the operation of a social kind. A sense datum consists of the 
results of the operations of a specific social kind, viz. a 'person'. This 
occurs when the person interprets some sensory impulses. So the sense datum is 
seen, ab initio . as a social product. It can, In principal, be oonoeptualised 
and the conceptualisation can be communicated. 
Eccles' exposition of conscious experience Is the one which has 
underpinned the arguments set out In the previous chapters. It will be 
contended that the acceptance of the exposition is also necessary if one is to 
sustain the notion that emotional experience is possible. Further, lt will be 
argued that. once one has accepted the possibility of the occurrence of 
emotional experience In an individual, one has to accept that every experience 
of that Individual has emotional content. This means that, not only are the 
experiences of individuals of necessity cognitive, they are also of necessity 
emotional. This necessity enables one to see more deeply Into the concept of 
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the self which each individual carries into any form of conscious experience. 
It is this concept which has to carry the weight of being able to sustain the 
causal powers of persons in particular and of social kinds in general. And it 
is the principal aim of this chapter, and the essay as a whole, to throw light 
on the nature of the interdependence of this concept of self and the social 
structures in and through which the self operates. 
Summary Of The Argument In Chapter 4 
In outline the discussion in this chapter will take the following forms 
the analysis will begin. in Part 2, by debunking the theory of the sense datum. 
It will be argued, utilising conclusions reached In earlier chapters, that the 
Isolated sense datum is a mythical object which cannot serve as the fundamental 
building block from which conscious experience can be built. The purpose is to 
establish that the relationships between components of experience and the 
objects to which they refer cannot all be external. This conclusion Is similar 
to the one reached In Chapter 3 where it was established that the Individual 
must make a unique contribution to his experiences of the material world. 
The focus in Part 3 will be on the distinction between the content of 
consciousness, as something which is capable of being observed, and the 
modifications which the processes involved in consciousness make to that 
observable content. Part 3 supplies the substance of the philosophical argument 
of the chapter. Some of the factors which can help to bring about the 
modifications of experience will be highlighted. These factors will be seen to 
Include the emotional aspects experienced as well as the cognitive ones. it 
will be argued that the application of value terms to the cognitive aspects of 
experience is a necessary condition for the possibility of the development of 
those cognitive aspects. It will also be argued that the application of value 
terms supplies the basis by which to justify claims about the existence of a 
degree of subjectivity in the interactions between persons. 
171 
dir! fr Introduction Chapter 4 
In Part 4 there will be an examination of the modification of conscious 
experience brought about by the emotions. This will consist of a description 
and evaluation of general theories of the emotions and of Collingwood's 
particular theory of the 'emotional charge' on experience. 
Part 5 will consist of a development and a modification of Collingwood's 
theory. This modification will be supported by arguments which themselves rest 
on a specific need. The need, stemming from an individual's ability to have 
communicable cognitive experiences, consists of the facilitation of two taskse 
the first is the continuation by the individual to sustain her own sense of 
identity throughout her experiences. The continuation and outcome of the 
experiences will remain, to her, uncertain: should the outcome and the 
continuation of an experience bath be free from uncertainty then the lndlvdualls 
need to sustain her sense of Identity vanishes. The combination of the need to 
sustain a sense of Identity and the uncertainty of outcome of experience, 
highlights the importance of the notion of expectation in experience. 
The second task which needs to be facilitated, Is the assessment and/or 
interpretation by the Individual of any aspect of his experiences. It will be 
argued that any assessment and/or Interpretation of an experience necessitates 
an evaluation of the degree to which an expectation has been fulfilled. The 
process of evaluation, in the context of the need the Individual has to sustain 
his concept of self-identity, must be an emotional one. 
In Part 6 the various strands of the arguments put forward in Parts 2 to 
5 will be brought together, outlining the Impact these will have on a theory of 
Personal Identity. The theory itself will be synthesised In the next chapter 
together with a critique of other theories. 
"* 
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PART 2s THE SENSE DATUM THEORY DEBUNKED 
The debunking of the theory of the sense datum will achieve two purposes. 
Firstly, It will identify some of the problems faced by an atomistic or Humean 
(*5) analysis of the origins and development of our understanding of our 
material environment. of our social environment and of ourselves. These 
problems pivot around the atomist's attempt to show that knowledge Is built by a 
process of connecting Ideas all of which start out as isolated from each other. 
It has already been seen below (Chapters 1,2 & 3) that unrelated Ideas 
cannot coexist readily with the possibility that knowledge can develop. It will 
be seen below that atomism Is restricted to unconnected sensory Impulses; It 
does not have application In the world of interpreted experience. 
There is a distinction between that part of the content of conscious 
experience which involves relations with material entities and that part which 
centres on the modifications of experience brought about by the cognitive, 
emotional and aesthetic aspects of an individual's make-up. It Is only when 
examining the relationship between conscious experience and those material 
objects whose behaviour can impinge upon experience, that it makes sense to talk 
about atomistic events In experience. But as soon as one talks about 
underatanding any aspect of one's experience, the atomism of any component part 
of experience becomes untenable. The untenability does not stem from Internal 
Inconsistencies. Rather, it accompanies the requirement that conscious 
experience can be part of developments which Involve changes In - usually seen 
as reflecting growth of - understanding. 
There is a second, and for the purposes of this essay, more Important 
reason for diminishing the influence of the notion of the sense datum. it is to 
provide a more solid basis than the atomist's one for developing a coherent 
theory of the nature of conscious experience. Lying at the heart of the 
non-atomistic theory is the distinction drawn between a sense datum and a 
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sensory impulse. The debunking process is designed to achieve a double result: 
the establishment of the Impossibility of an atomistic sense datum In experience 
and the relegation of the scope of atomism to examinations of sensory impulses. 
The Hunan Simple Impression 
The Isolated sense datum which somehow impinges Itself either on the mind 
of, or Into, the consciousness of an Individual was seen by Hume as the starting 
point of philosophical Investigation (*6). He was not, however, so naive as to 
suggest that there was no input from the individual in the formulation of 
conscious experience. The individual has, according to Hume, the ability to 
reason, to discern difference and similarity and the ability to associate Ideas. 
And yet Hume considers that the initial material from which all experience is 
constructed is the 'simple impression'. 
The problem with starting with a 'simple impression' and attempting to 
build 'complex impressions' from them Is Identified in Chapter 1 above. In 
order to recognise a simple Impression as the same one which was perceived on a 
previous occasion, one does not merely need to be able to discern similarity and 
sameness, one has to be able to follow a process of Identification. As was seen 
In each of the previous chapters, the ramifications of the requirement that one 
should be able to follow such a process (which Is recognisably one which 
involves identification) are extensive. Not least of the ramifications Is the 
necessity to accept the existence of social structures which both facilitate and 
constrain the process of Identification. 
This does not mean that the simple impression or pure sense datum does 
not exist. it is theoretically possible for sense data to exist in 
consciousness. Indeed, If conscious experience consists of discrete rather than 
continuous episodes, then the simple Impression must exist. 
The problem for an individual, however, is not the establishment of the 
theoretical possibility of the atomistio interpreted experience. The problem is 
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rather being able to experience the theoretically constructed atomistic 
experience. While it is theoretically possible that experiences consist of 
discrete rather than continuous episodes, they cannot be experienced as such. 
But as well as the practical impossibility of being consciously aware of breaks 
In oonsoiausness, there are some unacceptable consequences which follow from the 
acceptance (even if only theoretical) of atomism in experience. The proponent 
of the theory that consciousness consists of collections of discrete sense data 
would be faced with the problem of establishing cognitive relationships between 
sense data - while retaining their separation from each other. The cognitive 
relationships would have to be externally imposed on the sense data in order to 
preserve their discrete natures. 
It seems then, that in circumstances where experience is considered to 
consist of discrete sense data, the possible Interpretations of experience by an 
individual would be bounded by externally Imposed cognitive relationships. The 
ability to expand understanding beyond the constraints Imposed by the social 
kinds which determine cognitive relationships between discrete experiences, 
would be denied to any given individual. In these circumstances no Individual 
could consciously contribute to formation of new Interpretations of experience. 
Knowledge would be bound within the walls of the existing cultural environment, 
and there would not even be the means for an Individual from one cultural 
environment to Interact with an Individual fro m another cultural environment. 
Such cross-cultural interactions would Involve both the individuals in attempts 
to escape from the prisons of their respective cultural environments. 
This claim consists of a special instance of the general argument put 
forward in Chapter 2, Part 5. There it was argued that in no single cultural 
environment was it possible to conceptualise all the possible operations of a 
person. The penalty, to be borne by the assertion that such a conceptualisation 
is possible, was seen to be the negation of the possibility of the existence of 
a learning process. A previously unrelated sense datum (to the atomist 
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Indistinguishable in current experience from the sensory impulse) would, when 
interpreted by an individual, provide an individual with the occurrence of an 
expansion of perceived understanding beyond its current state. So the Humean 
theory cannot sustain the possibility of a learning process which extends 
knowledge beyond its current state. yet the theory Involves the assumption that 
such a process is operational! 
(see Addendum 3 *p. 205 for an argument supporting the notion that conscious 
experience does not consist of atomistic events. ) 
PART 3a MODIFICATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE 
In Part 3 the focus of the argument will be on the distinction between 
the observable contents of conscious experience and the modifications of 
experience. The distinction is the one which might be considered to hold 
between, on one hand either 
(a) the retinal images caused when an employee reads a dismissal notice, 
er (b) the neurone movements occurring In the brain while the employee is 
reading the notice, 
and, on the other hand 
either (c) the conceptualisation of the message contained In the notice, 
or (d) the fear associated with the expected outcome of the result of the 
implementation of the redundancy notice, 
or (e) the feeling of nausea which always accompanies looking at the 
particular notice board on account of the dirty conditions under 
which it is maintained, 
er (f) the appreciation that one is continually driving oneself to cope with 
the various instructions sent by management as well as having to cope 
with the physical requirements Imposed on one by the operation of the 
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machinery in the factory. 
The purpose of focussing on this distinction is twofold. Firstly, it 
provides one with strong arguments with which to oppose those who claim that it 
is possible to formulate objective definitions of persons. Secondly, it enables 
one to pinpoint those aspects of consciousness which are needed in order for an 
Individual to sustain a sense of his own identity. 
The discussion will begin by indicating how a Humean or atomistic account 
of experience is inadequate. It will be argued that the atomistio account of 
experience does not allow one to sustain a workable distinction between the 
normative and cognitive aspects of conscious experience. In consequence the 
atomist relegates explanations of all aspects of experience to the type of 
explanation which is appropriate in accounting for occurrences such as (a) and 
(b). At least, even if the atomist does not overtly do this, all atomistic 
explanations of occurrences of type (c) - (g) can be reduced, without remainder, 
to explanations of occurrences such as (a) and (b). This leads to the breakdown 
of the distinction between a natural and a social kind; a distinction which was 
identified and Justified in Chapters 1,2 &3 on the basis of the penalty to be 
paid if the distinction was Inadequately made. 
The Identification of The Inadequacy Of Atoelstio Accounts Of Conscious 
Experience 
An appreciation of the inadequacy of the atomistic account of conscious 
experience enables one to focus on those aspects of consciousness which lead one 
to develop a more coherent theory of the individual. The atomist's analysis 
would have us believe that all aspects of experience concern themselves with 
phenomena. Such a belief would lead to the conclusion that all modificatons of 
experience are themselves phenomenal and so are brought about by factors which 
are observable. If all the causal factors were observable then all alterations 
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of experience would be exogenous to the experience - pace any feed-back 
mechanism in the experience which might trigger the operation of an observable 
cause. 
This would mean that all relationships between different aspects of an 
individual's experience would be external relations (see Part 4 and Addenda - 
below). In particular, experiences of emotions (which are seen by the atomist 
as alterations from one conscious state to another) are brought about by some 
sensory stimuli which are in category Indistinguishable from other sensory 
stimuli. Emotional aspects of experience are, In the atomist's story, phenomena 
of a different type from those of visual experience, but they are still seen as 
observable phenomena. Consistency would seem to require an atomist like Hume to 
argue that the aesthetic, as well as the emotional aspects of experience also 
consist of observable phenomena; but this will not be discussed here. 
The atomist's view does not seem to allow for an important distinction to 
be drawn between the various aspects of conscious experience such as those 
Identified In Chapter 1. It is a view which seems to suggest that all 
alterations in the content of consciousness must be empirically based; they must 
be, in principle, observable. This view Is one which has been consistently 
opposed throughout this essay. Indeed, the argument developed In Chapter 3 
Indicates that part of the content of conscious experience which is directly 
affected by sensory Inputs cannot Itself be completely determined by sensory 
Inputs. There must be something Intrinsic to the experience which can affect 
the nature of its content. The justification of the claim asserting the 
existence of this intrinsic power will be based on the intelligibility of the 
'Bedford question' specified below (*p. 179). Bedford's own analysis will be 
augmented by the extension of the scope of his question. It is the extension of 
the : Dope of the Bedford question which sustains the main ar gucent being 
developed In this chapter. 
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The Power To Alltot One's Own Conscious SUMS And The Bedford Question 
it Is the Intrinsic power to affect their own conscious state (and with 
this to affect its own powers to interact with Its environment) which 
distinguishes individuals capable of cognitive consciousness from natural kinds. 
The distinction lies not in the inability of all natural kinds to Induce 
changes in their own structures and/or properties - for some natural kinds do 
seem to have such abilities - discussed in Chapter 2. The distinction lies 
rather in the power conscious beings have to alter understanding - and with it, 
to alter the very fabric of conscious experience itself. It gives Individuals 
capable of cognitive consciousness a characteristic denied to natural kinds 
(*see Chapter 3. Part 4). The characteristic is not present in conscious 
beings, such as domestic pets, which are incapable of communicating 
conceptualised aspects of their conscious states. 
This is the characteristic which prompted GE Moore (*7) to identify the 
"naturalistic fallacy". He criticises the theory that that 'good' can be 
equated with pleasure or any other naturally occurring phenomenon. His analysis 
has its roots in the distinction between natural phenomena (such as the movement 
of electromagnetic radiation which causes one to experience colours) and the 
content of consciousness when an Individual refers to colours (*8). Similarly, 
the question Errol Bedford (*9) puts to the behaviourist (who equates emotions 
with associated behaviour patterns) rests on the same distinction. 
sedfbrd asks whether given emotional behaviour Is appropriate or reasonable. 
The intelligibility of this as a question which does not have an 
automatic answer shows, as Bedford argues, that there Is always a distinction 
between observable phenomena and emotional states. The latter, but not the 
former. can be intelligibly described as appropriate or reasonable. 
Bedford's question is reminiscent of one asked by Thomas Reid. Reid 
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points out (*10) that moral approbation cannot be feeling alone since one can 
disagree with the former and "give no offence to a reasonable man", yet one 
cannot agree or disagree with feelings. 
The Extension And The Scope Of The Bedford Question 
Bedford's analysis has wider applications than the rejection of 
behaviourist accounts of the emotions. It does more than focus on the 
distinction between observable and non-observable aspects of consciousness. 
Appropriateness is an attribute which can only be applied to behaviour if there 
Is a subjective element to the behaviour. Further, appropriateness is an 
attribute which is applied of necessity to the behaviour of other persons by any 
Individual who is communicating with other persons. It follows immediately that 
the involvement in concept communication carries with it the assumption that 
there is an unanalysable subjective element in the behaviour of the participants 
in the process of concept communication (*11). Non-subjective responses cannot 
intelligibly be described as (in)appropriate or (un)reasonable. 
it is worth noting that the existence of a subjective element in the 
behaviour of persons involved in concept communication Is an assumption based on 
the Intelligibility of an Intel pretglion of the nature of the process of concept 
communication. A claim about ontological status is being based upon 
epistemological considerations. This means that the ontological claim holds only 
as long as the epistemological considerations hold. But conversely the denial 
of the ontological claim (that an unanalysable subjective element operates in 
all persons) carries with it a denial of the epistemological considerations 
(that the behaviour of persons can be interpreted as (In)appropriate). 
There is a deeper consequence to the extension of the Bedford question. 
Reasonableness and appropriateness carry with them associations of Interactions 
and of activity: they cannot be ascribed to the static aspects of objects such 
as to the beauty of a painting. It is this aspect of the extension of the 
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Bedford question which added a further dimension to the arguments In this 
chapter. 
The central claim in this chapter does not merely Involve the assertion 
that there is an unanalysabie subjective element In the conscious state of a 
person. It Is rather that this subjective element is neither blind nor chaotic, 
that it provides a driving force for the behaviour of the Individual and that It 
provides the basis for the individual's sense of self-identity. The argument 
augments and extends the scope of Bedford's analysis. Bedford's analysis seems 
to leave the Individual's subjectivity trapped In the world of consciousness. 
The Humean atomist might still hold on to the possibility of an objective 
analysis of all behaviour and omit the unobservable world of conceptualisations 
from all analyses of persons - since this unobservable world need not have any 
Impact on the observable behaviour of any natural or social kind. In other 
words the distinction drawn between the cognitive and normative aspects of 
experience, while supported by argument, is only of use if it extends from the 
world of consciousness to the world of observable praxis. 
The Power To Cope With One's Own Environment (BedfW d Queatlon (I)) 
The augmentation of Bedford's argument Involves the extension of the 
ascription of features such as appropriateness to conscious Interactions between 
a person and her environment. If a theory of Personal Identity Is to say more 
than a Humean one which restricts all claims to the realm of the observable, 
then the theory has to extend subjectivity to the realm of the Individual's 
interactions with her environment. 
The discussion In Chapter 1 provides one with the basis of the extension 
of the Bedford analysis. There it was argued that, In order for an individual 
to be able to Interact with others in processes where concepts were being 
communicated, he has to conform to the standards of a "good-enough 
Individuator". The individual has to be able to slot Into a role of a 
communicator in which he has to be both a good-enough Identifier of the other 
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individuals with whom he is communicating and a good-enough user of concepts. 
The process by which an Individual can slot into the role of a "good-enough 
individuator" provides one with the two platforms on which to build the 
extension of Bedford's analysis. 
These two platforms consist of, 
(I) the uncertainty of the individual's performance as a good-enough 
Individuator, and 
(/I) the assumption made by individuals that others with whom they might be 
communicating are driven to attempting to cope with the uncertainties 
surrounding their Interactions with their social and natural 
environments. 
As was Indicated in Chapter 1, the uncertain progress and outcome of any 
occurrence of concept communication stems from the requirement that such 
occurrences need to facilitate learning processes. The second platform Is built 
on the first. The intelligibility of one's participation In an Interaction 
Involving concept communication can only be sustained If one assumes that the 
Individuals with whom one is communicating are somehow driven to continue to 
participate In the Interaction. 
The Drive (Bedford Question ! N)) 
In view of the inherent uncertainty of the progress and outcome of such 
Interactions, one's continued participation In the Interaction makes sense only 
if one assumes that the others Involved were themselves attempting to make sense 
of the Interaction. In other words one has to assume that others are driving 
themselves to cope with their social and natural environments. The dropping of 
this assumption would prevent one from making sense of one's own participation 
in concept communication. 
Bedford's question can now be asked of an individual's conceptualised 
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interactions with other individuals. Are an individual's Interactions 
(In)appropriate. (un)reasonable or even (un)prop/t/ous? The application of 
these characterisations to conceptualised Interactions is similar to their 
application In the case of conscious states. The intelligibility of the 
application leads one to conclude that conceptualised Interactions must be 
driven, In part, by non-objective elements. For if they were driven by 
objective elements then asking whether they were either (in)appropriate, 
(un)reasonable or (un)propitious would Itself be a question which did not have 
an automatic answer. 
One is also led to conclude that there Is a subjective force which drives 
each individual to cope with his or her environment. And finally one can 
conclude, on the basis of an individual's participation in concept 
communication, that the subjective force does not operate in a random fashion. 
The random operation of the force driving an Individual to cope with her or his 
environment, would run counter to the expectations of the participants In the 
process of concept communication, and so render unintelligible their 
participation In it (*12). 
The two factors, (i) and (ii) (*p. 182 above) will be referred to again 
In Part 5 below where the need for, and the means by which, an individual can 
sustain a sense of his own identity is examined. 
The Power (Bedford Question (Il)) 
The Importance of the power a Person has over the content of her 
conscious states lies in the emphasis which Is placed by the Bedford question on 
the individual's ability to cope with (rather than automatically respond to) her 
environment. Automatic responses cannot be intelligibly described as 
(un)reasonable. 
The power over the content of conscious states stems from an Interpreting 
function of individuals: that they are attempting to oope with their 
environments. This is the same requirement, in a different guise, as the one 
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which underpinned the arguments In earlier chapters, epeciaily in Chapter 3. 
That earlier requirement was that the Individual should have, at his disposal. 
the means by which he can learn. 
It is worth dwelling on the points raised in these last two sub-sections. 
This will be done by putting them in a situation in which it is possible to 
draw a contrast between a person's subjective, self-altering, driving force 
(with which he attempts to cope with his environment) and the self-altering, 
self-regulating mechanisms which drive natural kinds. 
The Contrast Between Self-regulating Natural Kinds And Persons 
There are two features of persons and natural kinds which make the 
contrast significant. The belief that the two features are present Is 
justified, not by observation, but by the price paid in rendering acceptable the 
processes undertaken to investigate the properties of persons and natural kinds. 
One feature of natural kinds, not assumed to be a feature of persons, consists 
of the existence of a stable driving force which provides a key to the behaviour 
patterns of the natural kind. The properties of this stable driving force, once 
determined, should enable one to specify the natural kind's behaviour In any 
given 'closed' (*13) environment. 
Protoplasm may move spontaneously and might alter its structure by 
absorbing other matter. But those investigating its behaviour assume it does 
so because it is being driven by something with stable properties. At root the 
Investigators are attempting to determine the structure of the stable driving 
force. 
The price to be paid. by the sacrifice of the assumption that there is 
such an underlying something with stable properties, Is the sacrifice of the 
intelligibility of methods of investigating the behaviour of natural kinds 
(*14). These methods do not Include any concept communication with the natural 
kind. Neither could they, for concept communication would turn the natural kind 
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Into a Conceptualising Individual (Ch. 2 *p. 57). And concept communication 
carries with it the permanent possibility of a different outcome from any 
previously attempted similar communication. 
This permanent possibility for a different outcome stems from a specific 
aspect of concept communication. This is the interpretation and constant 
re-interpretation of sensory stimuli by the participants in the processes of 
concept communication. It was argued In Chapter 1, Part 4, that this is the 
feature of concept communication which is needed If It is to be capable of 
performing the functions required of it. The permanent possibility for a 
different outcome (from the one which occurs on any given occasion) must be 
dropped when one accepts a theory which assumes that objective definitions of 
the thing being investigated are possible. At minimum the acceptance of a 
theory of the 'objective' person will restrict one to operating within a bounded 
and fixed cultural environment. 
The analysis of the first feature distinguishing natural kinds from 
persons has already included some aspects of the second feature. This second 
feature has already been discussed above. It is the appreclat/on that one is 
oontlnually driving oneself to ooipe With one's environment It makes the 
distinction, outlined at the beginning of Part 3 above, which Is more than dust 
a nominal one. The argument demonstrating why it is more than a nominal 
distinction has already been rehearsed above, but it is worthy of a summary. 
There Is an assumption when attempting to understand persons that, when they are 
conscious, they are driving themselves to cope with their environment. Without 
this assumption, any attempt to communicate with other Individuals would become 
unintelligible. if there were no such assumption, no-one attempting to 
understand the behaviour of individuals would think it neoessery , rather than 
Just expedient, to communicate with the individuals. 
By contrast there Is no such assumption In the case of natural kinds 
where it is not thought either necessary or expedient to communicate with them 
185 
tart S. Modifications and Qualifications of Conscious Experience Chapter 4 
In order to gain understanding of their properties. The distinction between the 
physical aspects of experience and the cognitive. emotional and aesthetic 
aspects would be vacuous if it were applied to natural kinds. 
The individual's Power To Afloat Conscious Interactions With His Environment is 
Not Necessarily Consciously Exercised 
The Importance of the conscious being's power to alter both the content 
of her own conscious states and the course of her Interactions with her 
environment needs to be recognised. It provides one with a criterion for 
distinguishing potentially adequate from inherently Inadequate theories of 
Personal Identity. This recognition does not, however, oblige one to adhere to 
the proposition that the power to alter one's own conscious states and one's 
conscious Interactions with one's environment must itself be exercised 
consciously. 
There are at least two types of manifestation of an individual's power to 
affect his own conscious states. One involves the alteration of what is the 
focus of attention; it often operates at a conscious level. This may be 
achieved In various ways: by the use of the Imagination to focus attention on, 
say, this morning's breakfast; or by altering sensory Inputs by, say, the 
movements of one's body. The second type of manifestation operates less often 
at a conscious level: its operations are usually thought of as occurring at a 
sub-conscious level. It involves the association of meaning, emotion and 
aesthetic sense with the symbolic forms held in consciousness. 
The first of these two types of manifestation is associated with changes 
in the aspects of experience exemplified by (a) and (b) (*p. 176) above. The 
second is associated with changes exemplified by (c) - (f), also In (*p. 176). 
The atom ist tends to conflate these two forms of alteration of the content of 
consciousness. The conflation allows for the possibility of a completely 
objective analysis of consciousness; but it does so at a price. The price was 
ISO 
f 3i Modifications and Qualifications of Conscious Experience Chapter 4 
seen in earlier chapters to be the sacrifice of the development of new meanings. 
The argument in this chapter goes one step further and substantiates the claim 
that the price is even higher: lt alas Includes the sacrifice of the 
Individual's sense of self-Identity. 
Alterations In Conscious States May Have Many Causes 
Part 4 will consist of an examination of a category of theories about 
emotional conscious states. It will be argued that the subjectivity identified 
in part 3 Is compatible with the development of some understanding of the nature 
of conscious states. Before proceeding to this one needs to emphasise that the 
Individual's power to alter his own consciousness is not the only possible 
source of such alterations. 
What Is being claimed here as esssential is that a person has an unanalysable 
capability to alter her own conscious states and her conscious interactions with 
her natural and social environments. It Is also being claimed that this 
capability needs to be recognised In the formulation of any theory of Personal 
Identity if the application of the theory Is not restricted to a single cultural 
environment. 
The conscious exercise of the Individual's ability to affect changes in 
his own conscious states may not even be an essential factor in the occurrence 
of such changes. It remains possible that alterations in conscious states may 
be brought about entirely by other causes. It Is perfectly possible for sensory 
impulses to bring about changes In consciousness. It is also possible for such 
an externally induced change to be Induced with no conscious contribution from 
the conscious being whose conscious state is being altered. Further, there are 
good reasons to suppose that it is possible to explain fully (or at least as 
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fully as can be achieved by explanations of natural phenomena) the changes 
brought about by these other non-conscious causes of changes in consciousness. 
However, these externally Induced changes can modify aspects of consciousness 
such as (c), (d) and (e) (*p. 176) only if a contribution Is made by an 
unobservable, unanalysable, subjective component of a person. 
w AWN 
PART 4s THE EMOTIONS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE 
Part 4 will consist of a brief overview of some theories of the emotions. 
The final theory on which It will focus will be RG Collingwood's. His theory 
will be seen to be the one which, more closely than any other, is consistent 
with an adequate account of persons. It does Justice to the requirements set by 
the Bedford question. It also goes a long way towards dovetailing with the 
requirements (outlined In Chapter 1) set by the need to sustain concept 
communication. These requirements were seen to necessitate the operations of 
social structures. which were defined in Chapter 2 and characterised as 'social 
kinds'. 
Behaviourist. Feeling. Psycho-Analytic And Cognitive Theories 
Traditional theories of the emotions can be placed In four broad 
categories: behaviourist, feeling, psycho-analytic and cognitive (*15). The 
categories are not mutually exclusive: It is possible for a theory to comprise 
of a mixture of, say, a behaviourist and Psycho-analytic theory. The discussion 
in this sub-section will be concerned with psycho-analytic and cognitive 
theories. The Inadequacies of the behaviourist theories were Identified in Part 
3 with reference to the Bedford question. Thomas Reid's similar question points 
out the inadequacies of the feeling theory on similar grounds: both behaviour 
and feelings are In some sense primary existences and as such cannot properly be 
in 
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qualified by normative judgements. 
psycho-Analytic Theories 
Chapter 4 
The proponents of psycho-analytic theories attempt - presumably not 
conaaiously! - to avoid this difficulty by placing the origins of the emotions 
in the unconscious. Clearly, if occurrences in the unconscious are viewed as 
physical occurrences then the psycho-analytic theory becomes a behaviourist 
theory by another name. Psycho-analytic theorists tend to recoil from 
propounding entirely material explanations of conscious phenomena. Such 
theorists view emotional states as abnormal states. 
The emotional state is viewed as an abnormal conscious state. 
Consciousness is seen as a stream which, when disrupted, produces emotions 
(*16). The emotional state, being caused by a mechanism over which an 
Individual has influence, can thus be described as appropriate. The possibility 
of access to the mechanism so as to alter the possible future emotional states 
makes the ascription of normative terms to emotional states Intelligible. The 
intelligibility of psycho-analytic practice is built on the possibility that the 
Individual has access to the mechanisms which influence her own emotional 
states= so it is not surprising to find that psycho-analytic theories Involve 
postulates of the existence of the mechanisms. 
There is something appealing about the psycho-analytic theory. It 
accommodates the possibility that there Is a subjective element in experience; 
Indeed. It embraces such a possiblity. it Is also appealing to the builder of 
theories of human behaviour. It makes it possible for virtually any explanation 
of human behaviour to work: all one needs to do is to postulate a mechanism In. 
the unconscious which generates emotions which cause the behaviour In question. 
But it leaves one dissatisfied. It Involves an assumption, bordering on an 
axiom, that it is possible to have an emotion-free experience. The emotion-free 
experience is seen as the 'normal' one; and the notion of a 'normal' emotion is 
virtually excluded mb inM& It will be seen that the possibllties of 
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emotion-free experiences and of developing objective definitions of persons are 
closely Interlinked. It will also be argued that the ascription of the term 
'normal' to conscious states as a criterion to determining whether they are 
emotional is misguided. 
Cognlttve Theories 
The cognitive theories of the emotions tend to emphasise the necessity of 
a cognitive element in emotional experience. This is a view which can 
accommodate the Bedford question. It also makes the study of the emotions 
possible if normative predicates are to be applied to them. The Individual's 
own perception of her own emotions becomes a required consideration of any 
theory. Indeed, as RW Hepburn points out, one's understanding of one's emotions 
is needed if one is to be able to educate them: 
"Tolstoy, one can say, Is emotionally educative, In that the reader Is much less 
likely to disavow the complexities of his own emotions and Insincerely suppress 
them: ... " (*17) 
It will be argued here that a mixture of a psycho-analytic and a 
cognitive theory of the emotions can do justice to at least one aspect of one's 
understanding of persons. It allows one to encompass the possibility that a 
person is able to Interact with others while Identifying herself as separate 
from others. This dual ability is needed If concept communication and all the 
social kinds which sustain It are to operate In a way in which It Is possible to 
gain understanding of their operations. The mixture of the cognitive and 
psycho-analytic theories can be found In Collingwood's analysis of the emotions. 
it is with an examination of his theory that a theory consistent with the 
arguments in Chapters 1 to 3 will be developed. 
Coliingwood's Theory Of The Eeotlons 
Coiling wood's theory of the emotions probably has more features in common 
with a combined psycho-analytic and cognitive theory than that of any other 
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philosopher. He builds this combination on a theory of the nature of the self. 
He sees the self as having (a) a superstructure related to his thinking nature, 
which consists of his conscious level of experience, and (b) a psychic level of 
experience, related to his sensuous and emotional nature. (Collingwood's use of 
the term 'psychic' is technical and he emphasises that he does not intend it to 
Infer any aspect of what are termed para-normal phenomena. ) Level (b) Is seen 
as a basic level at which emotions unfettered by a thinking consciousness 
operate. Emotions operate at this level but only "those which are the emotional 
charges on sensa. " (*18). These emotions are Incapable of expression In 
language yet, when operating at level (b), they operate on a level which has 
,N the character of 
" foundation Upon which the rational part of our nature is 
ballt' (emphasis added). 
So Collingwood's perspective involves a claim that the exercise and 
development of an individual's reason (and through that her understanding) is 
constructed upon a structure which forms the basis of emotional experience. The 
rational and emotional are Inseparable. 
According to Collingwood, level (a) - the superstructure - brings with it 
a different order of emotions, the emotions of consciousness. Level (b) 
provides the Individual with the raw material of experience. When the 
Individual brings thought to bear upon this raw material he operates at level 
(a) and provides form to the material. As Collingwood put Its 
"Thus our experience of the world In space and time, ..., which means not the 
world external to ourselves (for we ourselves are part of it ... ) but the world 
of things external to one another, ..., Is an experience partly sensuous 
(strictly, sensuous-emotional) and partly Intellectuals sense being concerned 
with the colours we see, the sounds we hear, and so forth; and thought, with the 
relations between these things. " (*19) 
It is at this point that we begin to see the atomistic basis of 
Collingwood's theory. He categorises as sensuous-emotional the part of 
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experience which is to be found at a deeper level than the Intellectual part. 
In this deeper level he finds the colours we see, the sounds we hear, etc... 
which he describes as sensa (*20). At the deeper level, in contrast with the 
Humean theory, we do not find that an emotion is one among many possible primary 
components of experience. If, in Collingwood's theory, emotion were a primary 
component of experience, the theory would fail to cross the Bedford hurdle. We 
find rather that in the theory all" emotions are categorised as charges on 
experience; they somehow modify the basic components of experience and give them 
some sort of charge. 
This means that Collingwood has to have two types of emotions one 
associated with the conscious level of experience and one associated with the 
psychic level. The former he categorises as "emotions of consciousness". and 
the latter as "psychical emotions". He distinguishes the two types of emotion 
through their expression. 
"Physical expression Is the only expression of which psychical emotions are 
capable...; but psychical emotions are not the only ones that can be physically 
expressed. These 'emotions of consciousness', unlike purely psychical emotions, 
admit of expression in language... " (*21) 
The physical expressions of emotions at level (b) are bodily reactions 
such as the tensing of muscles when angry, the tingling of skin areas when 
excited etc... It seems that these physical expressions are Indicators which 
enable an observer to claim that the feeling and Its associated emotional charge 
exist in the Individual. As soon as the individual brings the feeling Into his 
consciousness, or absorbs it at a conscious level, he moves from level (b) to 
level (a) and the emotion develops into an emotion of consciousness. 
Collingwood encapsulates the contrast between the two types of emotion In the 
statements "Now, a psychical emotion Is the emotional charge not on a sensum 
but on a mode of consciousness" (*22). 
There are, here, two separate notions associated with the two types of 
102 
la-! 4s The EeoHons and Conscious Experience Chapter 4 
emotion. The concern with them in this essay pivots on the move from an emotion 
which is purely sensuous to one which Is capable of being expressed in language. 
Making this move enables one to do two things. Firstly, It enables one to give 
further support to the claim that persons have a sense of their own Identity 
which is unanalysable. Secondly It enables one to substantiate the claim that 
experience without an emotional component prevents an individual from having a 
sense of her own identity; and so prevents the development of social 
interaction. 
The fact that emotions of consciousness admit to expression in language 
constitutes the first of the two notions; the second, that psychical emotions 
are charges on a mode of consciousness. 
There is a relationship between these two notions - even though It Is not 
explicitly stated by Collingwood. Collingwood defined the conscious level as 
that part of experience of which thought is possible; an emotional charge 
operating at this level must, by definition, be capable of expression In 
language - pace any argument which claims to establish that it Is possible to 
think without being able to express the thought In language. Collingwood's 
emotion of consciousness is not only brought Into consciousness but It is 
capable of being thought about. When a psychical emotion is brought Into 
consciousness. it becomes an emotional charge on a mode of consciousness which 
is capable of expression in language - It becomes an emotion of consciousness. 
This emotional charge on a mode of consciousness is not available to those 
animals which are unable to formulate concepts: such sentient beings would only 
be capable of psychical emotions. 
As will be seen below this restriction prevents an animal from 
formulating a concept of Its own identity. This prevents it from becoming a 
'person'. 
It is likely that Collingwood would accept that the relationship between 
psychical emotions and emotions of consciousness is analytic; but it is not 
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something which concerned him. His main concern was with the development of a 
theory of aesthetics. His concerns with the nature of the individual and with 
the nature of the individual's experience were necessary for the proper 
development of his theory. These are also central to the concerns of this 
essay. The three notions of (i) an emotion of consciousness, (11) a psychic 
emotion, and (111) the expression In language of an emotion of consciousness, 
will form the hooks on which the argument presented in this chapter will hang. 
This argument, whose main purpose is to contribute to the development of 
a theory of Personal Identity, is parasitic upon the acceptance of a particular 
description of experience. The description Is taken directly from Collingwood. 
it Incorporates his analysis which sees experience as constructed on two levels: 
one psychic and one conscious -a distinction which has Its roots In Freud. The 
needs of the theory of personal identity are not dependent upon a detailed 
acceptance of Collingwood's description of the two levels; they are met equally 
by an acceptance that there are at least two levels of experience - one 
conscious and one non-conscious. A justification of the existence of these two 
levels is needed if a theory based on their existence is to be rigorously 
supported. 
(In order to preserve the flow of the argument the justification is relegated to 
Addendum 4 of this chapter (*p. 207). It will be seen there that the 
justification of the existence of more than one level of experience Is itself 
dependent upon the presence of expectation in experience. ) 
* 
PART 5s COLLINANOOD'S THEORY EXTENDED 
For in every action what Is primarily Intended by the doer whether he acts as a 
result of natural necessity or out of free will, Is the disclosure of his own 
image. Hence lt comes about that every doer, in so far as he does, takes 
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delight In doing; since everything that is desires its own being, and since in 
motion the being of the doer Is somehow Intensified, delight necessarily 
follows... Thus nothing acts unless by acting It makes patent Its latent self.,, 
(*23) 
In this brief section the discussion will commute between two notions: 
the first consists of the requirement that conscious, cognitive experience is of 
necessity ambiguous to the experiencing Individual; and the second consists of 
the requirement that an individual has a sense of her own identity. Both 
requirements were seen in earlier chapters to stem from the operational needs of 
those social structures which are able to sustain the intelligibility of both 
concept communication and learning processes. The warrant which will be Invoked 
In order to commute between the two notions is the Individual's expectation of 
the progress and outcome of any given cognitive experience. The question of 
ambiguity in experience will be approached by examining possible ambiguity-free 
experiences. 
Asbipulty In Experience 
The possibility of the elimination of ambiguity In experience Is central 
to the conceptualisation of experience as constituted of atomistic sensa. The 
experience of a sensum needs to be free from ambiguity: this Is a patch of blue, 
or this is the sound of an E sharp. There is no room for ambiguity in the 
perceiver's understanding that a patch of blue or an E sharp Is being 
experienced: it either is or is not a patch of blue or an E sharp. Indeed, the 
very concept of an atomistic experience is analytically (In the Kantlan sense) 
linked to the notion of exactness. 
Hume's arguments reveal that the reverse relationship also holds, freedom 
from ambiguity in experience is only possible when the experience consists of 
atomistic sense. The attempt to move from the realm of the atomistic sense 
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datum into the realms of chronological and complex experiences (constructed out 
of sense data), obliges one to confront a Humean argument; and point out the 
paradox embedded In It. Hume argues that the construction of Ideas out of 
Impressions necessarily allows doubt to enter Into the understanding of the 
perception. What he omits to discuss is the atomistic sense datum on which the 
construction is based. The sense datum admits of no ambiguity and so of no 
doubt; it is based on the enticing possibility that one can be certain of at 
least some perceptions. 
While the possibility of certainty is seductive - it has Its modern roots 
in Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas" (*24) - Its achievement would only be, 
at best, instantaneous. As soon as experience becomes temporal and part of the 
mechanics of a learning process, It becomes necessarily ambiguous. The 
ambiguity Is a feature on which the Intelligibility of the search for knowledge 
rests. The need to communicate, which is subordinate to the Individual's drive 
to increase her understanding of her environment, is also Intelligible only on 
the assumption that her present understanding possesses some element of 
ambiguity. 
Ambiguity And Expeotitlon 
The ambiguity of experience means that the chronological progress of 
experience is constantly accompanied by expectations of the nature of that 
progress. These expectations must be either fulfilled or frustrated= so the 
fulfilment or frustration of the expectation accompanies all temporal 
experience. It is either the fulfilment or the frustration which produces a 
eodifloe!! on of experience which can properly be described as eaottlonel. 
Since all cognitive experience contains an element of ambiguity, all 
such experience must be accompanied by expectations and so must be emotional. 
These emotions can be described as relief or even elation, when the expectation 
is fulfilled, and shock or disappointment when it is not. In the quotation 
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cited at the beginning of Part 5, Dante Is focussing on the elation associated 
with the fulfilment of expectation and the sharpened sense of self which 
accompanies such fulfilment. 
It should be noted that both ends of the commuter fine (referred to above 
p. 190) are governed by the drive the individual has to Increase his 
understanding of his environment. The existence of a force driving the 
individual to Increase his understanding of his environment, has underpinned the 
substantiation of the claim that experience Is necessarily ambiguous. The 
operation of such a driving force is a precondition of the possibility of the 
operation of the processes which govern concept communication. Without an 
assumption of its operation, concept communication would become unintelligible 
to the participants in communication processes. 
The fact that you continue to talk to me Is only intellIgible to both of 
us on the assumption that we are both continually driving ouselves to make sense 
of the signals which we are receiving. We each assume that our experiences are 
riddled with ambiguity; we also assume that the other is subject to some sort of 
endogenous drive which pushes the other towards keeping the conversation going. 
Each one of the mechanisms which Initiate, as well as sustain, concept 
communication can only operate If the Individuals Involved are driven (or drive 
themselves) to make sense of their environments. An individual's need to 
understand her own environment also Indicates that the possession of a sense of 
her own Identity Is not fixed. Just as there Is ambiguity in experience so 
there must be ambiguity In the Individual's concept of self which forms the 
basis of the experience. 
The Sense Of Self 
The extension of Collingwood's theory being proposed here turns on the 
requirement that the Individual has a sense of his own Identity. To the extent 
that a heightened, or diminished, sense of self can be expressed in language, 
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the emotion which accompanies it will be an emotion of consciousness. 
An employee who is paid by her employer by banker's order will expect to 
be able to cash cheques at her bank. The continuing ability to do so. together 
with, say, a conversation with a bank manager to arrange a loan, will heighten 
the individual's sense of seif. It will sharpen her sense of being an employee 
related to an employer who pays her regularly. Her sense of self Is one which 
carries with it the belief that she has, and can exercise, certain powers in the 
context of specific cultural environments. 
Similarly. the refusal of the bank to honour a cheque may lead the 
Individual to develop a weakened sense of self. The belief in the powers she 
has will have been found to have been Incorrect. She may even begin to question 
her status as an employee or perhaps the status of her employer; In either case 
her sense of self will be diminished. 
Such an emotion of consciousness will reinforce, or weaken, the 
Individual's sense of self within the cultural environment In which the 
Individual Is already operating. By doing so It will strengthen, or weaken, the 
operational mechanisms of those social kinds whose scopes of operation (*25) 
define the cultural environment. 
There is a possiblity that an enhanced or diminished sense of self may 
not be capable of being expressed In language. This inability may stem from two 
sources: an Inadequacy by the Individual In the understanding of his own powers 
and status within a given cultural environment; and a limitation of the concepts 
which are used in a given cultural environment to account for the powers of the 
social kinds which operate within the cultural environment. In either case It 
is not possible for an Individual to express a fufllled expectation in ianguage3 
he may either be unaware of the expectations which are Inherent In his 
experiences or he might not have the conceptual ability to express them in 
language. The Inability might stem either from his limited conceptual framework 
or from an Inadequately developed set of concepts which form the basis for the 
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definition of the cultural environment in which he is operating. 
Should an enhanced or diminished sense of self be Incapable of being 
expressed in language, then the emotion associated with the enhancement or 
diminution will be a psychic emotion (as described by Coliingwood). The 
consideration of psychic emotions is relevant to at least two areas of the human 
sciences: psycho-analysis and sociology. Many of the processes which 
psycho-analysts attempt to trigger involve the change of a psychic emotion Into 
an emotion of consciousness. One method psycho-analysts use to deal with the 
sorts of problems which confront a patient is to help him turn psychic emotions 
into emotions of consciousness so that the patient can alter his sense of self. 
The alteration should, ideally, lead to fewer occurrences of unfulfilled 
expectations and so fewer occurrences of the diminution of the Individual's 
sense of self. The psycho-analyst's treatment is not always successful. 
Sometimes this is because of the difficulties Involved in turning psychic 
emotions into emotions of consciousness. The inability to turn a set of psychic 
emotions into emotions of consciousness might stem from the Inadequacy of the 
conceptual system in which attempts are made to express the emotions In 
language. In this case a change in the cultural environment in which an 
individual operates is needed; concepts need to develop which will enable 
emotions to be expressed In language. The understanding of these developments 
lies in the province of the sociologist. 
The changes which occurred in cultural environments as a result of the 
work of social scientists such as von Hartmann, Freud and Jung enabled the 
development of social kinds which facilitated the turning of some psychic 
emotions Into emotions of consciousness. The fact that this facilitation 
occurred does not mean that expressions in language of the emotions of 
consciousness are exact. Indeed, the argument in this Chapter indicates that 
they cannot be exacts ambiguity is present even In the means of determining that 
ambiguity is present. 
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The Noreactlve Aspects Of Experience And The Repercussions On The Nature Of 
Roolal Kinds 
The ambiguity of experience has led to the identification of the parts 
played by expectation and the fulfilment or frustration of the expectation. The 
link between expectation and the fulfilment of the expectation Is made by an 
evaluation. This involves two processes. Firstly, each experience is pregnant 
with expectation of the nature and progress of the experience. Secondly, every 
Individual Is constantly evaluating the progress of his experience In the light 
of the expectation. 
it is this evaluation which produces the confirmation or refutation of 
the expectation. The evaluation is the process which governs the Individual's 
enhanced or diminished sense of self. So It is an evaluation which is dependent 
upon the individual's existing concept of selfhood -a concept which carries 
with it all the beliefs the individual has regarding her powers viz a viz both 
social and natural kinds - and contributes to the maintenance or alteration of 
the concept of selfhood and Its accompanying set of values. This means that the 
cognitive and normative aspects of experience are inextricably Interlinkede the 
fact-value dichotomy cannot be applied in any given cognitive experience without 
rendering unintelligible some aspect of the experience. 
The second consequence which flows from the analysis of ambiguity in 
experience Is to be found In the nature of social kinds. The analysis leads one 
to conclude that the properties of social kinds must partly be in a state of 
flux. It must not be forgotten. however, that the properties of social kinds 
are of necessity partly stable. Persons could not interact with them on a 
conscious basis unless they possessed some degree of stability; this claim 
underpins the argument in Chapter 2. This degree of stability Is, however. 
limited. It is affected by the ambiguous nature of the concepts of selfhood 
possessed by each individual whose behaviour sustains the operations of the 
social kind. The enhancement (or the diminution) of an individual's sense of 
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self and the accompanying alteration of her concept of selfhood, will have an 
effect on her contribution to the maintenance of the powers of a social kind, 
and thereby affect the properties of the social kind. 
Since a person is a social kind, the partial instability of his powers, 
qua social kind. has two sources. The first Is the ambiguity of his own 
experience and the accompanying partly unstable concept of selfhood. The second 
consists of the partial Instability of other Individuals' concepts of their own 
selfhoods. Both sources lead to the Instability of the person's powers as 
exercised through the behaviour of those social kinds whose operations are 
sustained by him and other individuals. 
The Need For Evidenoe 
Should it be the case that individuals manage to communicate without 
satisfying the conditions outlined in Parts 2-5, some of the premisses of the 
arguments set out there will have to be shed. Of these, the principal one is 
the assertion that communication processes can be the proper subject matter of 
an investigation and that they can be understood by the individuals who use 
them. But if one were able to substantiate a claim that individuals manage to 
communicate without satisfying the conditions set out in Parts 2-5, one would 
Ipso facto be asserting that communication processes were capable of being 
understood - since one would be making a claim about a communication process. 
So any attempt to refute the claims made in Parts 2-5 would be parasitic upon 
accepting the main premise from which the arguments flow. The premisses of the 
arguments are, in this sense, immune from the attacks from possible contrary 
evidence. 
The same is not true of all the conclusions. The claim that experience 
Is always accompanied by expectations of their outcomes. Is dependent upon 
particular requirements placed upon conscious experience. Principal among these 
requirements is one which stipulates that conscious individuals should possess 
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the properties of 'persons' outlined In Chapter 2- the foremost of which Is the 
ability of the person to monitor her own conscious activities. The other 
conclusions drawn are supported by similar arguments. So both premisses and 
conclusions gain acceptability Independently of empirical evidence. They are 
accepted or rejected on the basis of one's willingness to sacrifice the 
possibilty that one could attempt to understand certain specified human 
activities. 
The arguments and conclusions drawn are independent of the need to be 
supported by empirical evidence. But the existence of any empirical 
applications of the theory developed from the arguments would render them more 
acceptable. They would not be left hanging in an abstract world like some 
abstruse theory in Topology. Such empirical application is found in brain 
physiology 026). 
PART So CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the importance of the subjective aspect of the self has 
been established. This has been achieved by focussing on the uncertainty which 
must form part of each cognitive experience. The uncertainty forms part of 
cognitive experience in order to make room for the operations of learning 
processes. This means that the arguments in the chapter need not be accepted by 
someone who claims that there can be a specified limit to the possible number 
and interpretations of concepts. The unacceptable consequences which flow from 
such a claim were outlined in Part 3. There it was pointed out that cognitive 
Interactions between individuals were only intelligible to the participants of 
the interactions if each assumed that the other was driven, or driving himself, 
to cope with his social and natural environment. The acceptance of the 
existence of such a driving force is itself only intelligible If It Is assumed 
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that the Individuals' understanding of their environments Is always Inadequate. 
Simply put. Individuals do not understand everything and have a need to try to 
understand everything. 
The rejection, in Part 2, of the atomistic analysis of conscious 
experience was justified by referring to the possibilty of expanding 
understanding beyond the boundaries set by the existing cultural environments. 
The uncertainty of the nature of experience was seen in Part 3 to lead to the 
requirement that each conscious experience be evaluated by the experiencing 
individual. This evaluation necessitates the existence of subjective elements 
in all cognitive Interactions between Individuals.. It was established that a 
person has an unanalysable capability to alter his own conscious stsfas and his 
conscious interactions with his natural and social environsents. 
In Part 4 the ground for the final part of the argument was prepared. 
The nature of some emotional aspects of experience was examined. Since 
subjectivity Is central to conscious experience and so to the formation of 
concepts, the way in which individuals react to their own experiences must also 
be central to the formation of concepts. The cognitive and emotional aspects of 
persons cannot be separated. These aspects were seen, In Part 6, to be linked 
together by the phenomenon of expeolaUon= a phenomenon which Is present in all 
cognitive experience. 
In Part 5 the function of the phenomenon of expectation was Investigated. 
it was established that it is present in all cognitive experience. This was 
achieved by an assessment of (1) the ambiguity which accompanies all those 
conscious experiences which have the potential to alter knowledge and (ii) the 
development of the individual's concept of, and sense of, her own selfhood. 
Both (I) and (ii) are notions which have been established as being central to 
discussions of Personal Identity In this and previous chapters. 
The arguments in this chapter have determined the sacrifices which have 
to be made if one Is to support the claim that an objective definition of the 
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self is possible. They have also established that there Is an unbreakable 
connection between the affective and the cognitive domains of human activities. 
The conclusions drawn here will now be amalgamated with those of earlier 
chapters in order to tie together the strands of the theory towards which all 
the arguments have been leading. 
w 
Addendum I (from *p. 166) Other Areas Of Human Activity 
There are two areas of human activity to which no allusions have been 
made: those areas concerned with meaning and those with value. Throughout this 
essay the references which have been made have been to an individual's 
interpretations of her experiences. These necessarily involve the ascription of 
meaning ; so any notion of conscious experience Is seen here as analytically (in 
the Kantian sense) related to some conceptualisation of the ascription of 
meaning. There is. here, no Intention to investigate the nature and Influence 
of this analytic relationship. 
Any notion of conscious experience Includes in It the notion that the 
experiencing being is ascribing awning to Images and/or syarbas which # efe to 
objects which are distinct f o. the Imageolsyebais. This. despite the fact that 
an Individual is also capable of bringing Into experience conoeptuallsations of 
the very Images and symbols which form part of the experience. 
Similarly, questions about the norms and values which govern conscious 
experience and which might be accepted,, reformulated, modified or challenged by 
Individuals will not be directly answered in this essay. Part of the purpose of 
this chapter is to show that the general methodological approach followed 
throughout the essay (and outlined in Chapter 3) is likely to produce some 
understanding of matters concerned with meaning and value which might otherwise 
not have been produced. It can readily be seen that the fact/value dichotomy 
(*27) cannot get off the ground If one accepts the rather Kantian methodology 
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adopted in this essay. 
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Addendum 2 (from *p. 168) The RestMvtlve Nature of Philosophy Which Ignores 
The Analysis Of Social Phenomena 
Some twentieth century strands of Anglo-Saxon Philosophical thought have 
tended to concentrate on the analysis of language and Its use. The empirical 
hook on which such an approach hangs Its credibility is the consistency of the 
analysed structure with observable phenomena - presumably the observable 
phenomena are described In terms used in the language whlohg Is being analysed. 
This approach might, however, not be sufficiently rigorous. A particular 
analysis of a given linguistic structure may be logically consistent with all 
observed examples of the use of the system but may render unintelligible a 
specific activity which does not directly Involve the system's use. 
For example, a less than adequate analysis of a primitive language might 
indicate that its use is restricted to the time when the language Is being used= 
the language might function without linguistic distinctions between past present 
and future events. The observation of linguistic acts might not provide any 
counter-examples to the theory that the linguistic structure Is restricted to 
what we describe as the present tense. However, the observed behaviour of a 
farmer who decides to protect the farm against a flood on being told that dark 
clouds are in the sky when the sky Is patently clear, indicates that there is a 
mechainism within the social structure for distinguishing future from present 
events. 
The inadequacy of the analysis of the primitive language would not be 
discovered if all empirical observations were restricted to occurrences of the 
use of language. 
Addendum 3 (from *p. 175) Conscious Experisnoss And Atomas. 
if conscious experience is taken to consist of discrete episodes the 
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expansion of knowledge and/or understanding beyond Its present bounds would 
necessitate the existence of a previously unrelated sense datum. A problem 
arises here about the nature of conscious experience in which it is possible to 
be consciously aware of two cognitiveiy unrelated sets of sense data. In order 
to sustain the unity of conscious experience as well as the theory that 
experiences are only contingently linked to each other, the positivist must 
claim that sense data is cognitively unconnected save by the conceptual link 
formed by conscious experience. This Indicates that the positivist's conception 
of experience must be such that the sensory impulses, but not the sense 
impressions - even the simple ones - must consist of discrete events. (The 
positivist will usually also make a similar claim about the nature of 
environment from which sensory impulses emanate; the implicit assumption being 
that discretely connected sensory impulses can only originate from discretely 
connected phenomena. This assumption is clearly not one which one is forced to 
accept. ) So, It the positivist wishes to make sense of the individual's 
apparent ability to learn how to operate beyond his previously limited 
experience, then she must assume that there are cognitive connections, made by 
the individual, between all the simple impressions which are present In the 
individual's conscious experience. This means that the existence of the sense 
datum with all its relations being external relations is a myth. 
One consequence which flows from the rejection of the myth is a 
realisation that the learning process cannot be one which is entirely externally 
Induced. Since the learner has to formulate the cognitive link between even 
already Interpreted sensory Information, the teacher is restricted to providing 
the information and attempting to facilitate the formulation of the link. 
A second consequence which flows from the rejection of the myth Is the 
rejection of the insistence that all aspects of experience need themselves be 
sensory. Once one accepts that relations between 'impressions' can be internal 
relations one allows for the possiblity that experiences can be qualified or 
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modified by, say, emotion or aesthitic sense or even by further cognitive 
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interpretations. One does not have to be incarcerated In the Humean prison 
where all component parts of experiences are impressions. It Is this 
consequence which provides the motivation behind the examination of the 
atomistic myth identified in this chapter. 
A third consequence which flows from the rejection of the myth is the 
release from the positivist's inability to distinguish what Kuhn (*28) has 
termed 'normal' from what he termed 'revolutionary' science. A Kuhnian 'normal' 
science operates in a given 'cultural environment', while 'revolutionary' 
science breaks out and formulates a new cultural environment. For the 
positivist no changes In understanding can consist of 'normal' changes since all 
changes take one to new levels of understanding; as such they are 
Indistinguishable from 'revolutionary' changes. 
Addendum 4s (from *p. 193) Experience Construct d On More Than One Levels A 
Justification 
The notion that mental experiences consist of more than what occurs at a 
conscious level was developed by Freud (*29). It was, however not a new notion 
in Freud's time so his contribution to knowledge In this area were developmental 
rather than Innovatory. His principal contribution consists of the construction 
of two edifices. The first is a philosophical argument which substantiates the 
claim that there exists a structure In which non-conscious events occur which 
can properly be termed mental. The second is a conprehensive package consisting 
of 
(i) a theory which explains Interactions between the conscious and 
non-conscious aspects of mental life together with 
(11) a means of testing the theory and applying the results obtained from it. 
The philosophical argument Is a powerful one (*30). It supports the 
analysis which sees experience as consisting of actual and potential processes. 
This 'powers' or 'tendency' analysis of conscious experience plays a pivotal 
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role in the development of the arguments in Chapter 3 above. It is of direct 
relevance to the acceptability of those arguments. The Importance of Freud's 
provision of a theory of the un- and pre-consolous is, by contrast, oblique. it 
is not the acceptability of his theory which Is Important, Indeed, there Is a 
strong debate among philosophers and psycho-analysts about Its acceptability! 
What is important is that Freud established firstly that the construction of 
such theories is an intelligible activity, secondly that it was possible to find 
Intelligible applications of the results of such a theory. He established the 
study of the mentally non-conscious as a branch of recognised science. He 
achieved this by demonstrating that the study of the mentally conscious Is 
Incoherent without an assumption that the mentally non-conscious can Influence 
the mentally conscious. 
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A CRITIQUE OF THE 0 BATE 
ON PERSONAL 1 OE NT I TY 
Parts 1,2 and 3 of this chapter serve a dual function: they both Introduce 
the arguments set out in this essay and provide a conclusion for them. 
PART 1e INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter two tasks will be carried out. In the first of these, to 
be developed in Part 2, the various elements of the arguments in Chapters 1 to 4 
will be brought together and synthesised Into a coherent basis from which a 
theory of Personal Identity could be constructed. The acceptance of this basis 
will involve the reader In accepting a relocation of the current debate on 
Personal Identity. Within the scope of this relocation the second task will be 
carried out in Parts 3 and 4. In Part 3 the issues raised In Part 2 will be 
brought together to show how the concept of a person may be developed. This 
will lead, in Part 4, to a critique of some current and traditional theories. 
Bringing together the various elemen is of the arguments in Chapters 1 to 4 
will enable one to focus on the main principle which has underpinned those 
arguments. It is the acceptance of this principle which leads to the relocation 
of the debate on Personal Identity. The principle was not explicitly stated 
until Chapter 2. Part lt 
The Identity of the self I. not a spealfic Ins noe of soae general 
notion of Identity, but general notion, of Identity reat upon an 
already existing grasp of the notion of Personal Identity. ... (P1 
It will be demonstrated that the arguments in this essay have themselves 
ratified the principle which underpins them. This means that any theory of 
Personal Identity Is built on the somewhat paradoxical proposition that the 
209 
Part is Introduction Chapter 5 
concept of Identity Is logically posterior to the concept of Personal Identity; 
In other words Personal Identity and non-person Identity are distinct types of 
concepts which need to be analysed differently. 
It will be shown that the arguments in the previous four chapters have 
demonstrated that the paradox is unavoidable; Indeed, one of the few certainties 
when dealing with questions of identity Is that this particular paradox is 
unavoidable. The source of the paradox is found In the relationship which 
exists between Individuals and social structures - the social structures being 
those which operate in the cultural environments within which oonoepts of 
Identity are developed. It is this relationship which lies at the oentre of the 
relocated debate on Personal Identity. 
The paradoxical nature of the subject-matter Is derived partly from the 
conceptual constraints Imposed on It by the methods of analysis - methods which 
cannot but affect the content of the analysis. The methods of analysis are 
Interlinked with the medium within which the analysis is developed. The medium 
within which any analysis is developed is language. By its nature language is 
one-dimensional. Sounds and/or words are used sequentially In analysis in order 
to encapsulate an idea. During any one utterance only a single element Is 
captured so that the multi-faceted nature of the subject-matter may elude one 
because of the single-faceted, uni-dimensional nature of the means of analysis. 
The analysis is often forced to Invite one to use some of one's own second-order 
Interpretative faculties in order to achieve a multi-dimensional perspective of 
the subject-matter (see note (*1) of Ch. 1). 
Analysis using language operates according to a model by which one starts 
with a proposition and moves logically onto further propositions. It therefore 
militates against the very notion that a principle can both ratify and underpin 
a set of Ideas. This limitation of 'linear' analysis may also give an 
Indication why some writers on philosphical Issues, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, 
have taken to writing novels where each Idea will contribute a brush stroke to a 
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large canvas -a canvas which cannot be seen by focusing either on single or on 
sequences of brush strokes. Such an approach Indicates a desire to relocate the 
debates in which such philosophers are participating. 
Accompanying the acceptance of the relocation of the debate on Personal 
Identity is an alteration In one's perspective of what constitutes a 
comprehensive theory of Identity. The alteration In perspective arises from the 
acceptance of principle (P1). 
Part 4 of this chapter will consist of a discussion showing how the 
understanding gained from adopting the perspective being advocated here can be 
used to form a critique of some of the current. and traditional, theories of 
Personal Identity. In criticising other theories the objective is not to 
denigrate them. The purpose is rather firstly to Identify their strengths and 
weaknesses, and secondly to show how they might be amended in order to cope with 
the requirements which the discussion In this essay has exposed. The 
identification of their strengths and weaknesses will assist in the 
determination of the limits of the scope of application of such theories. The 
determination of these limits will also give an indication of the nature of the 
amendments which have to be made if the theories are to cope adequately with the 
requirements which flow from attempts to render certain social Interactions such 
as concept-communication Intelligible. 
A comprehensive critique of all known theories will not be attempted. The 
focus will rather be on a few arguments which have particular characteristics 
and upon some arguments which represent certain traditions. While such a 
seemingly limited critique may seem restrictive, it has the merits of focusing 
on certain traits which ar e representative of particular breeds of Personal 
Identity theories. As such, the acceptance of the critique will enable one to 
apply the criticisms to all theories belonging to the given 
breed. 
Breeds of theories may be classified under various headings. Classification 
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under the same heading may either be achieved through noting the adherence by 
the proponents of a given group of theories to a particular method of analysis 
or be achieved through the agreement of the conclusions which are drawn by the 
proponents of the theories. 
The critique will start by showing that the genre of argument, in which 
thought experiments involving either Identity fissions/fusions or brain/neurone 
transplants are invoked, all suffer from a common defect. This consists of the 
tacit acceptance of two assumptions1 firsty, that Individuals are being defined 
In a stable cultural environment where the meanings of concepts (and thereby the 
effects of the use of those concepts In given social environments) are fixed; 
secondly, that the individuals are being defined In an equally stable natural 
environment - an assumption which their very arguments often contradict! The 
use of this genre of argument does not seem to allow for the possibility that 
Invoking the thought experiment may alter the parameters which determine the 
boundaries of the cultural and natural environments In which the Investigation 
into Personal Identity is being carried out. By contrast, the strengths of such 
arguments may lie in their power to sharpen one's understanding of some 
concepts. Including the concept of Personal Identity, In specified stable 
cultural environments (*1). 
A detailed critique of Lucas' 'Gödel' argument will be developed - not 
entirely because of the contribution his argument may have made to the debate on 
the strengths of Personal Identity theories. The motive Is rather to put a 
spotlight on the hook on which Lucas hangs his argument: the notion of 
self-reference. The focus in this chapter will be on the differences between 
two uses of self-referential functions, their use in arguments about the nature 
of abstract structures, and their use in the applications of processes which 
Involve changes in conceptualisations. 
Following this there will be an examination of one traditional theory of 
Personal Identity: the memory theory. This theory may be considered to be 
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representative of all those theories In which attempts are made to find the 
criteria of the Identity of persons. The main weakness of such theories will be 
identified In the examination and the conclusions extended to other 'criteria' 
theories. It will be demonstrated that the arguments in this essay show that 
'criteria' theories suffer from a weakness: a tendency to ossify concepts In any 
cultural environment, leading to the possible negation of the possibility that 
changes In the corpus of knowledge could be effected. 
In the final sections of Part 4 two brief critiques will be carried out. 
In the first a set of theories which comprise variants of the main position 
being adopted in this essay will be examined. These theories all support the 
claim that the self is an unanalysable entity, or at least that there is an 
unanalysable aspect of the self. It will be seen that the arguments set out in 
this essay support the main tenets of the position supported by these theories. 
The arguments also identify significant areas of analysis which proponents of 
the theories have tended to Ignore, leaving the theories liable to criticisms 
which they might otherwise rebut. 
The second critique will Involve an examination of the analytical approach 
which involves the use of possible worlds. The main proponent of this approach 
to analysing modal aspects of human activities has been Saul Kripke. It will be 
seen that the analysis in this essay falls under the umbrella of possible world 
analysis, while taking into account some criticisms which have been made of the 
'possible world' approach (*2). 
* 
Sisf -_i-ssi_ls__sti=-SS_a/-f-sii_a-t_--/-_/A-ftai_s_t_it_/____. a_. fs_r_i__a__ * 
PART 2s A FOUNDATION FOR A CRITIQUE OF THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
(Iuamarlsed) 
The Contexts In Which Theories of Personal Identity Arise 
The investigation in this essay started with an examination of the contexts 
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in which questions of Personal Identity arise. The emphasis placed here on the 
relationship between the concept of a person and the contexts In which the 
concept Is developed and used places this Investigation outside the current 
mainstream debate. 
The contexts in which the concept of a person is developed and used are 
those In which concept-communication occurs. Without the Interactions Involved 
in concept-communication there Is no need for the question of the identity of 
individuals to concern any given individual. Further, any enquiry Into the 
subject must occur in such a context. This means that, ab /n/M6 there Is an 
assumption in this essay of the Irrelevance of any Identity theory which can be 
formulated without an analysis of the interactions between Individuals. 
Concepts of the Identity of Individuals developed in so-called private languages 
are excluded from this enquiry (see Chapter 2 note (*35)). No apology Is made 
for this exclusion, nor should one be necessary, especially if one Is attempting 
to communicate the results of one's enquiries to others. 
The need to consider the context In which Individuals Interact does not 
stem solely from the Intelligibility of communicating the results of one's own 
enquiries to others. The need stems also from the nature of the communicative 
processes themselves. These processes were seen, In Chapter 1, necessarily to 
incorporate operations involving individuation. The Implications which flow 
from this necessity formed the cornerstone on which the arguments In Chapters 1 
to 4 were built. 
The operations which Involve Individuation must be carried out by the 
participants in communicative processes. Each participant must also have some 
means by which to judge whether W /the participants are employing individuating 
processes adequately - he must be capable of assessing whether any putative 
communicator is a good-enough lndivlduator (see Ch. 1 note (*22) and *p. 36). 
The argument in Chapter 2 showed that the acquisition of the capability to 
assess putative communicators is itself only possible if an individual has the 
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opportunity of being a third party witness In a communicative process between 
other individuals - the Individual must be capable of developing a notion of the 
i Ial context in which she is operating. Binary interactions alone cannot form 
the basis of a changing cultural environment since binary Interactions alone 
cannot sustain the assimilation of evaluative processes (*3). In other words an 
Individual cannot become a member of the set of persons who sustain the social 
kinds which define a cultural environment solely by becoming Involved in one to 
one interactions - he must have some notion of the general context In which 
interactions occur. if the individual is restricted to Interacting on a one to 
one basis with a single other Individual then the abilities of the individual, 
which enable him to become a social being, dissipate; and this dissipation Is 
accompanied by the Individual's Inability to sustain a concept of his own 
Identity. 
The requirement that the Individual should be able to assess the adequacy 
of participation in processes involving Individuation means that evaluative 
procedures are built Into the very fabric of Interactions between cognitive 
Individuals. They must consequently also be built Into the processes whereby 
the notion of identity Is used. The Individual's subjectivity cannot be 
divorced from the operations of processes involving Individuation. This means 
that the application of the concept of identity is not value-free. Further, the 
operation of an evaluative procedure carries with It the need for the existence 
of some other person/s who is/are not participating in the Interactions between 
the two individuals. So the context in which an Interaction occurs Is. of 
necessity, always wider than the one in which the interaction Itself can be 
perceived by its participants. 
The Requirements Generated By The Studies Of The Contexts In Which Persons 
Operate 
it becomes clear that the examination of processes Involving Individuation 
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generates a need for a close analysis of the nature of the contexts in which 
Interactions between individuals occur. This does not vitiate the need for the 
analysis of other more commonly analysed aspects of the Individual's behaviour 
and characteristics. On the contrary, the need for at least two other 
Investigations is itself generated by the examination of the contexts In which 
Individuals Interact. The necessity for an examination of the role played by 
the agency of the individual is sharpened by the requirement that Interactions 
involving processes of individuation are analysed. Further, the necessity for 
the examination of the role played by the Judgearent of the Individual is more 
poignant in this relocated debate than In the traditional scenario. 
In many of the traditional forms of analysis, the Individual's agency, and 
the use of her judgement, are often treated as objective phenomena. Attempts 
are made to find criteria by which one might Identify an individual as being the 
same Individual who was identified on a previous occasion. Such an attempt must 
rely on the identification of aspects of the individual's behaviour to find the 
criteria. In this 'traditional' scenario. the role of the judgement of the 
analysed individual is relegated to that of a postulated, observable, causal 
factor which is thought to have a given effect on the behaviour of the 
Individual. A similar, objectified, analysis of agency is offered. 
There are four main reasons why, in the relocated debate on Personal 
Identity, there Is a more poignant need to analyse the roles of the judgement 
and of the agency of an Individual. The four reasons flow directly from the 
focus of the relocated debate; this focus being the interactions between 
Individuals. These Interactions can only operate with an acceptable degree of 
success if at least four needs are met: firstly, there Is the need that 
Interactions between individuals should occur In relatively stable environments 
(Identified in Chapter 1 and analysed In Chapter 3); aeoondly, the need for 
evaluative procedures to be built Into the fabric of Interactions -between 
Individuals (identified In Chapter 1 and analysed partly in Chapter 2 and In 
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detail In Chapter 4); thirdly, the requirement that an individual should 
Interpret the signals which represent concepts In the cognitive interactions 
between an Individual and the objects he finds In his environments (Identified 
in Chapter 1 and discussed throughout the essay); and fourth/y, the requirement 
(specified In Chapter 4. Part 5, and also discussed throughout the essay) that a 
person needs to be able to form a sense of self If she is to be capable of 
Interacting with others. 
The process of meeting the requirements produced by the need to make 
interactions between Individuals Intelligible generated certain a prior/ 
requirements which any concept of a person has to satisfy. These processes 
started by Identifying two distinct environments in which persons operate and by 
Indicating the distinctions between the natures of the objects which operate in 
these environments. The process of meeting the four requirements also Included 
the Identification of some of the characteristics which persons and their 
environments have to possess if the two environments are to sustain 
intelligible, cognitive Interactions between Individuals. 
The Social And Material Aspects Of The Context Distinguished 
The argument in Chapter 1 showed that there were two aspects of the context 
in which communication occurs which have to be distinguished by communicating 
Individuals. Each of these consists of structures which facilitate the 
processes of communication. The individual has to be able to differentiate 
between two types of object (and/or structure) which facilitate 
concept-communication. She has to be able to differentiate between objects 
and/or structures whose operations are dependent upon the conceptualisations of 
Individuals and those whose operations are not. These structures were 
characterised as 'social' and 'natural' respectively. * 
f NOTE: The term 'natural' has only been used here because of its widespread 
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It was noted, also In Chapter 1, that an Individual has to be capable of 
operating both sets of structures in order to participate intelligibly in 
concept-communication. Since the intelligible participation in 
concept-communication is a necessary condition for the proper ascription of the 
status of 'person' the relationships between, on one hand, individuals and, on 
the other hand, social and material objects (operating in contexts in which 
concept-communication occurs) have to be Investigated in order to gain a 
reasonable understanding of the nature of the Identity of persons. 
The Social Aspects Of The Context And The Impact Of Changes in Knowledge 
(I) Changes In The Social Context 
The objects whose operations are dependent upon the conceptual lsatlons of 
individuals were characterised in Chapter 2 as 'social kinds'. A detailed 
itemisation of the characteristics of social kinds was not offered; compiling 
such a taxonomy Is seen as the task of the social scientist. Further, the scope 
of such a taxonomy would be restricted to the cultural environment in which it 
was formed. The philosopher's task Is viewed as the specification of the a 
priori features of objects while giving an Indication of the source of the a 
priori nature of the features. The characterisation of the 'social kind', found 
In Chapter 2, Is the result of pursuing the philosopher's task. The ascription 
f acceptance. Where possible preference is given to the term 'material' since 
this does not have as many value-loaded implications as does 'natural's the 
letter term, If contradistinguished from 'social' tends to Indicate that what Is 
social Is somehow not natural. The terms 'socla/ kind' and 'natural kind' are 
used in two distinct ways throughout this essay, they are used either to refer 
to types of object which are either $oc/al or natural or to refer to examples of 
such objects. The context of each use of the respective term will suffice to 
indicate which use Is Intended. 
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of properties to a specific set of social kinds is the task of the social 
scientist. The characteristics of the social kind as specified in a 
philosophical enquiry need not be context-specific. In examining the contexts 
themselves in which social kinds operate a similarly logical, non-context- 
specific perspective is taken. 
To this end a social kind is viewed as an object whose operations are 
dependent, In some way, upon the conceptualisation of at least one Individual. 
The social kind must have some enduring properties; and the operations of the 
mechanisms which possess the enduring properties must be such that they can be 
consciously experienced (discussed also In Chapter 3). "Conceptualising 
individuals" are necessarily embraced by the notion of a social kind since the 
operations of a conceptualising individual are dependent at minimum upon the 
Individual's own conceptualisations - and communicable conceptualisations are 
dependent upon the conceptuallsations of individual. 
The context In which a person operates needs to be seen as more than the 
'social space' in which he finds himself; it consists of more than the locations 
in which conceptualisations of, and by, the individuals with whom he Interacts 
can be altered. The context in which a person operates has to be examined also 
In terms of the operational parameters of those social kinds whose operational 
mechanisms the person helps to sustain. 
The context In which a person operates could consist of, say, the cultural 
environment defined by the use of the French language. The fact that the 
Individual also helps to sustain the operations of the French monetary system 
needs to be taken into account when considering the context in which the person 
operates. The person's own conceptualisations help to specify the boundaries of 
the cultural environment as well as helping to sustain the operational 
mechanisms of the French monetary system. 
Both features of the context in which persons operate need to be considered 
when attempting to form a concept which can adequately be used to Identify a 
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person. In other words the dual role of a person has to be considered: the role 
of the Individual who interacts with others, by using concepts, in a given 
social environment and the role of the Individual who sustains the social 
structures which help to specify the boundaries of the given social environment. 
However. it is not the reciprocal relationship between the concept of a 
person and the structure of the person's environment alone which provides the 
basis for the justification for the claims made in this essay. This basis 
centres on the possibility that one can alter any individual's understanding of 
the operations of objects in general and of social objects in particular; in 
other words on the possibility that teaching and learning about natters 
affecting oogn/t/ve Interaotiona; can occur. If such learning processes are to 
be permitted to operate then the boundaries of cultural environments cannot be 
fixed - for such learning alters the social behavioural properties of persons 
and so may alter the operations of the social kinds which that behaviour 
sustains. Two consequences were seen to flow from the relationship between the 
operation of learning processes and the nature of the boundaries of cultural 
environments. The first consequence was identified in Chapter 2 and the second 
in Chapter 4. 
The first consequence concerns the possible natures of cultural 
environments. While some cultural environments may have properties which 
justify their being termed social kinds, not all cultural environments can be 
social kinds. In particular 'society' cannot be considered to be a social kind. 
'Society' does not have properties, only the social kinds operating in society 
do; yet society can only be defined in terms of the scope of Influence of a set 
of social kinds which operate through the use of a set of concepts by a given 
set of Individuals. In other words society consists of a 'social environment' 
which is also a 'cultural environment' but it does not possess causal 
properties. ('Social' and 'cultural' environments where distngulshed In Chapter 
2 as being generated respectively by the operations of social kinds and by the 
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uses of a given set of concepts. ) 
The second consequence concerns the properties of social kinds In general. 
and persons In particular. The absence of mechanisms whose use promotes 
learning about the operations of social processes would have the effect of 
ossifying the properties of social kinds. It Is an effect which would make the 
need for concept-communication redundant. The redundancy is consequential upon 
the intelligibility of concept-communication. The Intelligibility depends upon 
the operation of a double driving forces one which pushes an Individual to alter 
the conscious experiences of another individual; and one which pushes the 
Individual to attempt to make sense of his environment. Each aspect of this 
dual driving force relies on the existence of the possibility that Individuals 
can change their own understanding of their natural and social environments. 
The alteration of conscious experiences of a person alter that Individual's 
state of understanding of her environment and so alter her behavioural 
properties. This would at minimum alter the properties of one social kind. 
However, the alteration of the properties of a person may alter the properties 
of all those social kinds whose operations are partly sustained by the 
conceptualised behaviour of the person. So the absence of a learning process 
carries with It the consequence that no social kind's properties will alter - In 
other words that social change is impossible. 
The converse of this claim Is not neccessarily true. The existence of 
learning processes does not guarantee social change. Learning processes may be 
structured so that the effect is to change Individuals in the social group while 
leaving the structure of the group unaltered. The social group would operate In 
much the same way as does a beehive with ageing bees altering their functions 
and properties in order to restain the balance between worker and non-worker 
bees. 
(11) Changes In The Non-Social Context 
Objects whose operations are conceptualised as independent of the 
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conceptualisations of individuals were characterised as 'natural kinds'. The 
conceptualisation of some objects whose operations are independent of 
conceptualisations was seen in Chapter 1 to sustain the intelligibility of 
concept-communication. The participants in concept-communication can only make 
sense of their interactions if they conceptuailse their environments as being 
affected by the operations of both natural and social kinds. 
There is. however, a paradox associated with the very notion of the natural 
kind. The process of encapsulating and retaining a concept In consciousness 
must affect consciousness. This means that the very process of bringing a 
natural kind concept into consciousness seems to have the effect of turning the 
natural kind Into a social kinds the operations of the natural kind have Indeed 
affected the conceptualisations of at least one Individual. 
This paradox Is an unavoidable aspect of conceptualisation processes. it 
must always colour any claim regarding the Independence of explanations of the 
behaviour of natural kinds. But It Is a paradox which must be faced If sense is 
to be made of Interactions between Individuals - not least by the individuals 
themselves. This is achieved by amending the notion of a natural kind. The 
amendment involves restricting the Independence of the operations of natural 
kinds to only one aspect of causal processes connected with conceptualisations: 
the operations of natural kinds may be Interpreted as affecting but not being 
affected by the conceptualisations of individuals. So a natural kind concept 
will refer to an object whose behaviour is interpreted as remaining unaffected 
by the conceptualisations of any Individual - yet whose behaviour is seen as 
affecting conceptualisations. 
Objects, such as brain cells, whose operations facilitate oonceptualisation 
present a problem. One might ask whether a neurone could properly be called a 
natural kind. If so, then can the brain be a natural kind? The specific answer 
to either of these questions is one which an Investigation of their behaviour 
may reveal. However, the notion that all objects can be viewed as natural kinds 
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cannot be sustained without making the process of concept-communication 
senseless to the participants in the process. 
Conoeptuallsations Of Agency And The Interpretations Of Environments 
Chapter 5 
The operations of Individuals In their social and material contexts cannot 
be examined adequately without an analysis of the role played by the agency of 
individuals. The reactions of an individual to the constraints Imposed on her 
behaviour by the operations of other objects In her environment have to be 
examined if an adequate understanding of what it is to be a person is to be 
gained. These reactions result from a triple combination of factors: (1) the 
Individual's interpretations of the sensory Information which Is affected by 
both the behaviour of social and material objects and the structures of the 
material and social environments; (11) the Individual's perception of his power 
to affect changes In the behaviour of social and material objects; (ill) the 
individual's motivation and/or reason for Interacting with her environment. 
(/) The Individual's InterpretatIons Of sensory /nfbrostlon 
The restrictions which are placed on an individual's possible 
Interpretations of the environment are not as severe as Is sometimes assumed. 
In neither the material nor the social environment Is the Individual constrained 
to only a single Interpretation of experienced phenomena. Contrary to the 
claims of philosophers in the Kantlan tradition, the possible Interpretations of 
the nature of material environment are not restricted to those of Euclidian 
geometry. The structure of the material environment and the structure of the 
individual's sense perceptors do not combine to restrict the possible 
interpretations of the structure of material environment to that of a Euclidian 
three-dimensional world. 
As Is shown In Chapter 3 above, the Ilberating factor (underanalysed by 
Kant) Is the conceptualised agency of the individual. It was argued there that. 
since they occur In temporal dimensions, agency and conceptualisations can 
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Interplay with objects whose dimensionality Is non-temporal to enable 
individuals to generate a virtually Infinite set of possible Interpretations of 
natural phenomena. This is not to say that any interpretation Is possible from 
a given set of sensory stimuli which result from the behaviour of a given set of 
objects in a given environment. There may be only a restricted range of 
feasible interpretations of the given phenomena: but one cannot Infer anything 
specific about the nature of either the Individual or the environment by 
examining the restrictions imposed upon the Interpretative faculties of 
individuals. Those Interpretative faculties cannot be finitely constrained 
without the payment of a price. This payment involves the sacrifice of the 
intelligibility of attempting to alter the corpus of knowledge In a given 
cultural environment. 
The content of this large set of possible interpretations is, however, 
itself subject to some constraints. The constraints are Imposed by at least two 
types of social kind: those which facilitate concept-communication and those 
which facilitate concept-development, or learning processes. The restriction of 
our interpretations of natural phenomena to three Euclidian dimensions is 
therefore at least In part social rather than, as Kant would have us believe, 
material. Social animals also have the power to alter their interpretations of 
natural phenomena. There is no reason to suppose that any interpretation. along 
with the one currently accepted of natural phenomena and/or processes, Is also 
entirely constrained. In some Kantian fashion, by natural processes. 
Individuals possess a similar type of constrained freedom to Interpret the 
social environment. The dimensionality of the social environment is not, 
however, non-temporal. The boundaries of social space are specified by the 
possible extent of the cognitive experiences of individuals. Temporality Is 
Intrinsic to the fabric of social space. The dimensionality of social objects 
cannot be conceptualised as atemporal. Social objects cannot be static, 
unchanging objects.. one cannot paint a still life of a social object. But just 
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as the Individual's own temporal sense allows a large range of Interpretations 
of natural phenomena. so that same Individual temporal sense will permit the 
generation of a large range of Interpretations of social phenomena. 
The same constraints of communicability as applied in the interpretation of 
natural phenomena also apply in the case of the Interpretation of social 
phenomena. It Is the appreciation of the impact of these constraints which 
allows one to develop arguments which underpin claims about the relative 
stability of social and material structures. 
The Individual possesses an extended, yet constrained, freedom to Interpret 
phenomena In her social environment. The extended freedom stems partly from the 
fact, established in Chapter 2, that an Individual's conscious behaviour forms 
part of the very operational parameters of social kinds - including those social 
kinds which constrain possible Interpretations of changes in the social 
environment. The extended freedom stems also In part from the link between the 
Individual's conscious experiences and her behaviour. This link was 
demonstrated in Chapter 4 to be such that a person's conceptualisation was seen 
to have causal influence over the person's behaviour In a social environment. 
This means that the individual's conceptualisation of his behaviour in part 
constrains the possible Interpretations of his Interactions with others. Taken 
In conjunction with the arguments in Chapter 4, one can conclude that the 
Individual is not restricted (by factors which are seen as Independent of her 
interpretations of her interactions with others) to a single interpretation of 
those interactions. This lack of restriction enables one to justify the claim 
that there is always an element of subjectivity in all Interpretations of the 
social and material environments. The subjectivity of individuals was seen to 
extend beyond conceptualised interpretations and on to the self-monitoring 
agency of individuals. 
(li) The Individual's Perception of HIS Power To Affect Social And Material 
objects 
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The second aspect of an individual's Interactions with his environment 
which Is in need of examination Is his conceptualised agency. The discussion in 
Chapter 1 identified the Importance of both the interpretation of experience and 
the Interpretation of the attempt to affect the environment. In Chapter 3 the 
examination of Poincare's analysis of the development of, and application of 
concepts to, the material environment highlighted the importance of the 
self-monitored agency of the Individual. This self-monitored agency was seen to 
be needed In order to sustain the development and application of spatial 
concepts. 
The ability cognitively to manipulate the material environment was seen in 
Chapter 1 to be a necessary condition for the participation by Individuals In 
cognitive Interactions with other Individuals. One can readily conclude that 
the Individual needs to be able to manipulate, and consciously monitor her 
manipulation, of her material environment It she is to operate In a social 
environment. Individuals possess and need self-monitoring devices which monitor 
both their interpretations of sensory Inputs and the exercise of their powers of 
interference In the material environment. 
The argument relating the individual's self-monitoring of his manipulation 
of his social environment was somewhat different. This argument was based on 
the possibility that the individual could substitute for what was characterised 
in Chapter 1 (Part 4) as a 'Paradigm Individuator' In a given cultural 
environment. The ability to make such a substitution was seen to Involve two 
assumptions: firstly that there are social kinds which can be manipulated, and 
secondly that the individual can recognise that they can be manipulated. 
(111) The individual's Motivation for Interacting With Her Environment 
There is a third aspect of an Individual's Interactions with her 
environment which is in need of examination. This concerns what motivates her 
to interact with social and material objects. Inasmuch as an Individual needs 
to have some understanding of the behaviour of the objects with which she 
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Interacts. she also needs to bring under some form of conceptualisation the 
behaviour of the other Individuals with whom she Interacts - the need to operate 
the self-monitoring mechanism referred to above Indicates a need also to bring 
under some form of conceptualisation her own behaviour. 
Two features of these forms of conceptualisation were examined in Chapter 
4. Both features were seen to be derived from the adoption, by an Individual, 
of the role of 'Paradigm Individuator' (whose characteristics were identified In 
Chapter 1). The first feature was derived from the Individual's conscious 
assumption of the active role of individuator in her cognitive Interactions with 
others. The second feature was derived from her assumption that the individuals 
with whom she was interacting were assuming the same role. 
It was seen in Chapter 4 that the intelligibility of the adoption of the 
role of Paradigm lndividuator obliges a constructor of interpretations of social 
phenomena to accept at least three propositions - this obligation exists even if 
the adoption by the individual is not undertaken at a conscious level. The 
three propositions are concerned with the evaluative aspects of the nature of 
participants in cognitive Interactions. The penalty paid for the negation of 
the validity of the propositions was seen to be the sacrifice of the 
intelligibility of the cognitive interaction itself. 
In outline the three propositions were found to consist of the following: 
firstly, individuals with whom one Interacts have a sense of their own selfhood 
which they are driven to project Into their environments; secondly, Individuals 
with whom one interacts are motivated to sustain the social structures which 
facilitate the Interactions; and thirdly, Individuals with whom one Interacts 
are driven to attempt to come to understand the operations of the objects which 
are found in their social and material environments - and since Individuals are 
themselves both social and natural objects they will attempt to understand their 
own operations. The Intelligibility of an Individual's continued participation 
in concept-communication would be sacrificed If one were to negate these 
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propositions. Further, an individual must, for the same reasons, Impute the same 
characteristics to herself as she does to others. 
in other words, Individuals are essentially subjective, essentially Bevis/ and 
essentially knowledge-seeking. 
These features of cognitive interactions between individuals can lead to 
the identification of the sources of some of the value systems developed In 
various cultural environments. Indeed, since the characteristics are context- 
and content-Independent. It may be that the value systems derived from their 
analysis have a degree of universal applicability. 
The paradoxes built Into the nature of cognitive Interactions may also help 
to explain the often self-contradictory aspects of human behaviour. The value 
associated with protecting others and condemning actions which harm others can 
be seen to be consistent with sustaining the social structures which permit an 
individual to project his sense of selfhood Into his environment. The same 
projecting force also leads to the possibility that (through Inadequate 
understanding of the function of others in sustaining one's own ability to 
project one's sense of self) an Individual may Impose her own will on another, 
thereby restricting the possibilities for that other Individual to project his 
sense of self. 
It Is this aspect of the Interactions between Individuals which underpins 
the importance of the first person perspective in the use of language (examined 
below In Part 5). But what is added here is the realisation that the first 
person perspective cannot operate unless there are also second and third person 
perspectives. It may also enable one to justify the proposition that human 
value systems must paradoxically be simultaneously self-focusing and 
other-focusing (*4)> 
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PART 31 PERSONAL IDENTITY 
In Part 3 the discussion will focus on the Issues Involved In the formation 
of the concept of a person. In Part 2 the underlabour/ng task for this 
discussion was carried out. Both the underiabouring and the discussion draw 
upon the arguments and characterisations which have been set out in Chapters i 
to 4 above. 
Persons And Their Contexts 
Given that the operations of social kinds In general (and persons In 
particular) affect, and are affected by, the environment in which they find 
themselves. the processes by which the concept of a person Is developed must 
take these effects into account. The fact that persons are themselves social 
kinds makes the need more urgent. 
Further, the processes by which concepts are developed must provide 
criteria, or at minimum some guiding principles, which enable one to Individuate 
the conceptualised object. These criteria need to be such that an adequate 
attempt at individuation of the conceptualised object can be carried out. In 
order to carry out such Individuation adequately the criteria should at minimum 
specify something about the possible behaviour of the objects In the 
environments in which the objects are likely to be located. In the case of a 
person this puts a double requirement on the conceptualisation. It means that 
the person has to be capable of being, as well as being individuated as, a 
good-enough indivlduator (Ch. 1 note (*22)). This means that the better the 
understanding of the relationship between a person and his environment the 
better will be the understanding of the nature of Personal Identity. 
The relationship Is such that it is Impossible to sustain the claim that a 
concept of a person, devoid of subjectivity, can be developed without Incurring 
significant penalties. It has been argued In earlier chapters that these 
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penalties Include the absence of the possibility of the operation of learning 
processes as well as the lack of intelligibility of interactions which Involve 
concept-communication. 
Of central significance in the relationship between a person and his 
environment is the person's ability to affect that environment while perceiving 
(and conceptualising the perceptions of) those effects. His power to affect his 
environment is constrained In two ways: by the limitations of the Individual's 
own conceptualisations of his causal powers and by the causal properties of the 
other objects in that environment. 
This latter constraint Is not unique to persons. The presence and 
properties of other objects restrict the scope of the causal powers of any 
object In a given environment. A person's actions in her environment are also 
made possible by the operations of these other objects - for without their 
presence she could not Interact with any object whatsoever. This means that the 
concept of a person cannot properly be formulated without reference to the 
social and the material environments In which the person's powers are to be 
exercised. The person's behaviour Is constrained and enabled by objects whose 
behaviour is dependent upon, and by objects whose behaviour Is Independent of, 
conceptualisations. 
The Conceptualisatlon Of Material And Social Objects In Their Environments 
The differences and similarities between the requirements placed on the 
conceptualisations of material objects and social objects Is instructive to 
anyone wishing to understand the operations of processes by which 
conceptualisations of either type of object develop. Such understanding was 
seen in Chapter 1 to be a necessary factor in the operation by an individual of 
the processes by which the use of concepts in general is learned. As such, this 
factor forms a necessary condition for the ascription of personhood to an 
individual. 
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The differences stem from material and social objects' differing 
relationships with conceptualisations. The relationship between the properties 
of either material or social objects and the conceptualisations of Individuals 
is analytic (in the Kantian sense). The respective independence and dependence 
- of the manifestation of the properties - on conceptualisations Is Incorporated 
in the concept of what it is to be either a material or a social object. 
The similarities stem from the need for which either of the attempted 
formulations of concepts has to cater. This Is the need to account for the 
object's relationships with its environment. The constraint the environment 
imposes on the conceptualisation of an object Is clearly demonstrated in the 
natural sciences. The definition of an electron could not be expressed without 
at least an implicit reference to an electrostatic 'field' in which the 
electron's behaviour (and the Impact of that behaviour on other objects) could 
be detected. A change in the conceptualisation of the notion of an 
electrostatic field would automatically call for a revision of the definition of 
the electron. Similarly a change in the conceptualisation of an electron would 
automatically call for a revision of the definition of an electrostatic field. 
A similar symbiotic relationship exists between the definition of social kinds 
and the definitions of the various environments in which the social kinds 
operate. 
However. the symbiosis in the case of social kinds is complicated by the 
often unrecognised (*5) assumption that the structure of part of the environment 
In which the social kind operates is sustained by the cognitive 
conceptualisations of persons. The complication does not arise because of the 
fact that the relationship with the environment Is symbiotic; otherwise It would 
have arisen with natural objects. It arises rather because the symbiotic 
relationship is not itself independent of the nature of the related objects - at 
least it is not, and cannot be. perceived as being Independent. 
The symbiosis between conoeptualised object and the environment in which 
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the object operates stems from the conceptualisation of the object and 
environment. Social kinds are objects whose operations are, by definition. 
affected by conceptualisations. This means that the symbiosis Is endogenous to 
the relationship between a social kind and Its environment. The process by 
which the concept of a given social kind Is generated may affect the social 
kind's own operational parameters. By contrast the formation of the concept of 
any specific natural kind is Independent of the natural kind's operations - in 
these cases the symbiosis between the concept of the object and the 
conceptualisation of Its environment is independent of the properties of the 
object. 
The Uniqueness Of The Concept Of A Person 
It Is not difficult to see why the symbiosis, referred to above. presents 
its most acute problems In the case of the formation of the concept of a person. 
A person's conceptualisation of her own selfhood affects the behaviour of the 
social kinds which operate in the same social space as she does. The concept of 
a person which is used In a given cultural environment must take this factor 
Into account. It must allow for the person's first person perspective. 
Further, as the argument In Chapter 4 shows, this self-definition by a person 
helps to sustain the structure of the cultural environment in which the person 
Is defined. So the concept of a person must also take Into account the person's 
second and third person perspectives. This constraint is unique to the concept 
of a person. 
The behaviour of persons in social environments must, therefore, Include an 
element of self-reference. It must Incorporate some factor which recognises the 
fact that a person's conscious behaviour partly sustains the possibility of its 
own progress through time. In other words, formation of the concept of a person 
must Involve a recognition of the fact that a person's behavioural processes 
sustain the operations of social kinds which operate In the same social space as 
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the person. This means that any adequate concept of a person must Incorporate 
an account of self-referential processes. This is a point which is explored In 
Part 4 below when discussing Lucas' GIdel argument and elaborated when 
discussing the 'first person perspective' argument. 
This need for the element of self-reference enables one to give support to 
the claim, (P1) above, which underpins the arguments set out In this essay. If 
(P1) were to be denied then the process involved in forming concepts would be 
Independent of the social structures by means of which the conceptualisations of 
individuals are developed - which Is patently self-contradictory. 
A Model Within Which The Concept Of A Person May Be Developed 
A model or conceptual structure has been built In this essay. It Is an 
abstract structure waiting for some content so that it can properly be utillsed. 
As it stands the structure can only be used either In a negative or In a 
restricted fashion. It can be used to show that a given concept of a person is. 
on logical grounds, either unacceptable or that it has passed the first test of 
acceptability. Other more stringent tests would have to be passed if a given 
theory of Personal Identity were to become acceptable In a given cultural 
environment. 
At the core of the model one finds the cognitive Interaction between 
persons. This cognitive Interaction is located simultaneously in a social and 
In a material environment. it Is not logically possible for a person validly to 
conceptualise her own behaviour as occurring entirely in a material environment: 
conceptualisations must occur In a social environment. 
Each of these two types of environment is respectively affected by the 
relationships between those objects which operate in the respective environment. 
Since the operations of objects in social environments are dependent upon the 
conceptualisations of persons, a unique and symbiotic relationship develops 
between the concept of a person and the structure of the environment in which 
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the person encapsulated by that concept finds himself. The concept of a person. 
developed In any specific cultural environment. needs to take Into account the 
unique nature of this relationship. 
It remains possible that In any given cultural environment the word used to 
Individuate persons may also individuate objects whose behaviour does not 
sustain the operations of social kinds - as was the case when Caligula declared 
his horse. Incitatus. to be a Consul of Rome. This possibility does not affect 
the arguments put forward in this essay. It will only be when one attempts to 
understand the nature of individuals capable of cognitive Interactions with 
other individuals that one also feels the need to restrict the scope of the word 
'person' (or its equivalent) to Individuals with the characteristics outlined 
above. 
Towards A Critique Of Theories Of Personal Identity 
The function of the model which has just been described is to provide a 
basis from which one may assess the acceptability, not only of a theory of 
Personal Identity, but also of any given social theory. The assessment of a 
social theory would be limited to discussions of the coherence of the theory's 
assumptions with the points made so far in this essay. The basis of the 
assessment is a logical rather than empirical one. There Is no pretence towards 
formulating a specific description of what it is to be a person. Neither is 
there any attempt to provide evidence to support a particular exposition of what 
It is to be a person in a particular cultural environment. 
The conclusions which have been reached are that a theory of Personal 
Identity must incorporate the following points - with associated penalties if it 
falls to do so: 
Firstly, the Identity of objects in general must be made logically anterior 
to the Identity of persons. This Is the principle underpinning the fulfilment 
of the remaining points so the failure to adhere to Its requirements carries 
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with it the penalties associated with the failure to meet the requirements of 
all the other points. 
Secondly, the theory of Personal Identity must Incorporate a recognition of 
the non-analysable, subjective aspect of a person. The attempt to develop a 
theory in which persons are comprehensively and objectively defined In terms 
which refer entirely to the environments In which persons operate has to make 
significant sacrifices (see Chapter 4 above). The two main sacrifices centre on 
a person's participation In cognitive interactions with other persons. The 
first of these is the relegation to insignificance of the function of 
expectation In all conscious experience, but particularly In 
concept-communication. The second is a similar relegation, to insignificance, 
of the function of judgement in the conscious Interactions of persons with the 
natural and social objects. Both these two relegations have the effect of 
rendering unintelligible a person's participation in cognitive Interactions with 
other persons. This lack of Intelligibility stems from a person's abandonment 
of her sense of self - an abandonment which accompanies the relegation of her 
judgement and her expectation of the progress of events to Insignificance. 
One of the most common Indications of the failure to meet this second 
requirement Is a desire to establish the possibility of the cross-cultural 
objective fact or proposition. This desire is often blind to the consequences 
of the operations of the relationship between the conceptualisations of 
Individuals and the social structures through which putatively objective facts 
are developed. 
Thirdly, within the theory of Personal Identity, a distinction has to be 
drawn between those objects which can and those objects which cannot formulate 
and communicate concepts - between 'Conceptualising Individuals' and other 
objects. The conflation of these two objects Into a single category also 
renders unintelligible concept-communication (see Chapter 1). The corollaries 
of the fulfilment of this requirement are the recognition that there is a 
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distinction between natural and social environments and that persons must 
operate in both environments. 
Fourthly, a further distinction has to be drawn. The distinction has to be 
drawn between those objects whose operations are Independent of the formulation 
of concepts and those objects whose operations would cease or change If concept 
formulation. and use, were to cease or change. The distinction Is the one 
between natural kinds and social kinds (which operate in natural and social 
environments respectively). Failure to fulfil this requirement would result in 
the failure to fulfil the third requirement above with payment of the 
corresponding penalty. 
Fifthly, as a corollary of the fulfilment of the third requirement, a 
theory of Personal Identity needs to Incorporate a recognition that there Is a 
distinction between natural and social environments and that persons must 
operate in both environments. Coupled with the symbiotic relationship between 
the conceptualisation of an object and the environment In which the object 
operates, the fulfilment of this fifth requirement leads to the recognition of 
the unique relationship which exists between the concept of a person and the 
person's abilities to formulate and use concepts. 
Sixthly. there must be a recognition. either Implicit In or explicitly 
expressed In the theory, of the need for the existence of at least three persons 
whose conceptualised behaviour sustains the operations of social kinds. The 
binary interaction between two Individuals is insufficient to sustain the 
operations of those social kinds which facilitate processes of Individuation. 
This means that the abandonment of this requirement carries with It the 
sacrifice of the possibility of the operation of a process of Individuation 
which is capable of sustaining the Identification of the same person during 
different Interactions with another person. 
Finally. there must be a recognition by the person who develops a theory of 
Personal Identity that the stability of the cultural environment in which the 
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theory is constructed is guaranteed only if no learning processes occur within 
the cultural environment. The operational parameters of those social kinds 
which are to be found in the cultural environment are likely to change if 
conceptualisations change. This means that the constructor of a theory has to 
be aware of two dangers. The first Is that the absorption of the theory may 
itself alter the cultural environment in which the theory claims application 
thereby either negating or amending the applicability of the theory. The second 
danger concerns the assumptions and claims made within the theory Itself. The 
assumptions and claims may Involve the alteration of the conceptualisations of 
some persons thereby altering the symbiotic relationship between defined object 
and its environment. This may lead to the self-destruction of such a theory. 
The degrees to which a theory of Personal Identity meets these seven 
requirements can be used as a grid against which to assess the theory's 
acceptabiility. In the assessments which follow In Part 4 constant reference 
will be made to this grid. 
"NOTE: DC. At this point the reader should refer back to the Preface. Parts 1, 
2 and 3 of this chapter have served simultaneously as an Introduction to the 
essay and as a summary of the arguments developed In it 
:* 
PART 4: A CRITIQUE OF THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
Introduction 
As was stated In Part 1 of this chapter, there Is no intention to offer a 
comprehensive critique of all the variants of all the theories of Personal 
Identity. The Intention. rather, is to Identify the ways in which the failure 
of a theory to meet the seven requirements set out at the end of Part 3 weakens 
the claims of the given theory. 
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The discussion will start with an examination of the use of a particular 
technique in the development of some theories of Personal Identity. The 
technique involves the use of thought experiments In which the respecification 
of the relationship between an Individual and his environment Is Postulated. 
The examination will be followed by a brief criticism of a specific argument in 
which an attempt is made to counter the claims of materialist theories. In the 
third element of the discussion In this part of the chapter there will be an 
examination of one of the theories which attempt to offer criteria of Personal 
Identity. The theory to be examined Is the memory theory of Personal Identity. 
An attempt will be made to generailse the discussion to embrace all theories 
which attempt to discover criteria of Identity. Fourthly, there will be an 
examination of an argument which supports the general position adopted in this 
essay. 
This general position is Incorporated In the second requirement of a theory 
of Personal Identity as outlined at the end of Part 3. This requirement 
stipulated that a Personal Identity theory should Incorporate a recognition of 
the non-analysable, subjective aspects of a person. 
The chapter will finish with an examination of a type of analysis not 
covered in the first four discussions. This is the possible world analysis 
undertaken by Saul Kripke. The examination will Inter alta also indicate that 
the discussion in this essay consists of a minor critique of Kripke's own views 
regarding the general question of identity. 
Thought Experiments And Theories Of identity 
There has been a tendency In recent years to Invoke startling thought 
experiments as evidence which purports to Justify certain claims about the 
nature of individuals. Some of these merely attempt to construct a possible 
world within which individuals operate, the purpose being to discover those 
features of individuals and their environments which are necessary for 
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facilitating certain tasks. Most notable in this category is Peter Strawson who 
constructed theoretical models of a world in which only sounds could be 
experienced (*6). Such a thought experiment may indeed give Insights Into 
features of individuals and their environments which are necessary for 
particular tasks to be possible. It may enable one to determine characteristics 
which are necessary for the performance of specified tasks; in which case not 
only is the a priorl nature of the necessary characteristic known. the source of 
the a priori nature is also known. However, the applicability of many other 
thought experiments is riddled with difficulties which have not been faced by 
those who invoke their use. 
The thought experiments which have dominated much of English language 
Philosophy of Mind have fallen Into of rather different category from 
Strawson's. Typical of these are the thought experiments constructed by writers 
such as Bernard Williams and Derek Parflt (*7). These writers have tended to 
assume the presence of existing stable social structures and relationships. 
Within the contexts of these structures changes in the relationships between 
Individuals and either their social or their natural environment have been 
postulated. On the basis of postulated outcomes of these postulated changes 
attempts have been made to draw conclusions about the nature of Personal 
Identity which existed prior to the postulated changes. 
The difference between the acceptability of the Strawsonian and the 
Williams/ Parfit experiments has Its roots In the objectives which each of the 
respective theorists had in mind. The Strawsonlan objective Is a logical one: 
his intention was to say something about the relationships between concepts and 
the conceptual scheme in which the concepts are developed and used. The 
Williams/Parfit objective is to determine something specific about the nature of 
the self. Williams wishes to argue that the self Is defined in terms of some 
bodily criterion, while Parfit argues that the self is objectively defined In 
terms of psychological continuity: each aims to establish some form of 
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reductionism of the self. 
Chapter 5 
An examination of two of Parfit's thought experiments will demonstrate the 
dangers of constructing such experiments. It will also demonstrate the way in 
which a thought experiment Involves a presupposition of the conclusions which It 
Invites one to reach. Where the conclusion is a logical one the circularity Is 
harmless; indeed. It helps to clarify relationships between concepts, a purpose 
for which the thought experiment was constructed. By contrast, where the 
conclusion makes a claim about the nature of the empirical world the circularity 
Is not harmless: it will be seen that the theory supported by the experiment 
cannot be refuted - the results of the experiment are embedded In the 
assumptions of the theory. 
Two Thought Experiments Described 
Parfit has two distinct purposes In mind In constructing his two 
experiments. The first experiment Is designed to demonstrate the Indeterminate 
nature of the self while the second Is designed to support the conclusions of 
the first by showing that Personal Identity, as it is commonly conceived to be, 
Is not what really matters. In the first experiment he postulates a gradual 
change in body cells from a current Parfit to a configuration of Greta Garbo at 
the age of 30 (*8). In the second, he postulates the transplant of two halves 
of the brain of an individual whose body is no longer functioning Into the heads 
of his two identical triplets who have both suffered brain death but have sound 
bodies. One half of the original brain goes Into one triplet while the 
remainder goes Into the other (*9). The first experiment is the crucial one as 
it is the one in which the indeterminate nature of the self Is discussed, the 
second Involves an attempt to add Psychological acceptability to what would 
otherwise be a difficult theory to accept. 
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The First Experiment 
Chapter 5 
Here Parfit asks us to suppose that some scientists had made a complete 
record of all the cell types and configurations of Greta Garbo when she was 30 
years old. This means that with the appropriate technology they could recreate 
her from scratch with their recorded blueprint. It would also mean that they 
could, by a series of operations, do a gradual switch from Parfit to Garbo. 
Each operation would Involve the substitution of some Garbo cells for some 
Parfit cells. After the last operation we would be presented with a person who 
was completely Garbo. with no Parflt component, yet we started with a complete 
Parfit with no Garbo component. 
Parfit bases this experiment on the example of the Ship of Theseus quoted 
by David Wiggins (*10) who culled It from Thomas Hobbes. Theseus' ship is 
changed plank by plank so that eventually all the planks have been replaced. In 
Parfit's example. however, the final object does not have the same properties as 
the original yet it retains characteristics which make It of the same type: it 
is still a person. Taking the changes in the ship to be analogous to Parfit's 
experiment we would be gradually changing a sloop into a cutter or a brigantine 
Into a brig, retaining the ship but altering Its properties as a ship. The 
changes would Involve a move along a spectrum from object A to object B where it 
is never clear during the Intermediate stages whether we had object A or B. 
Similarly, during and In between the cell transplant operations, it would 
never be clear whether the Individual was either Parfit or Garbo. Par-Fit 
suggests that If the total switch were to Involve, say, 100 operations then, 
after 42 operations there would be an individual with part of Parfit's memory 
and part of Garbo's. The smaller the number of operations which have been 
carried out the greater the preponderance of Parfit. The greater the number of 
operations the greater the preponderance of Garbo. There would, therefore, be a 
spectrum stretching from Parfit at one end to Garbo at the other. The existence 
of such a spectrum would preclude the possibility of a determinate self. Parfit 
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can see no alternative to the scenario he is. painting (*11)a "if we could carry 
out these operations, the results would be what / have described. " 
But would they? The world of no alternatives, while easy for some 
politicians to find, is a difficult one to locate when dealing with the outcomes 
of experiments. In this case we can show that if there Is no alternative then 
Parfit has presupposed the result for which he is arguing. If we return for a 
moment to Theseus' ship we can there justifiably assume that any plank which is 
replaced in the first operation will not change Its characteristics or function 
purely because on subsequent operations other planks are replaced. Neither will 
the replacement of a plank alter the structural relationships between the other 
planks. The replacement of a plank which supports the main mast cannot cause a 
plank supporting the steps to the bridge to age and wither or even to become 
stronger: neither can it alter the Inter-relationship of tensile stresses and 
strains between the planks. Ex-hypothesi these planks are performing the same 
tasks as the ones they replace. If we take the modified analogy of change in 
ship from brigantine to brig then some planks may be replaced by beams and vice 
versa but It cannot be claimed that a plank, say No. 57, can change the 
properties of an existing plank, say No. 138, merely by being placed somewhere 
else on the ship. The properties of No. 138 remain the same whether or not No. 
57 has been replaced. Even if the new No. 57 is different from the old one (in 
order, say, to accommodate the square rigging required in the brig) the spectrum 
thesis assumes that at the end of all the changes plank No. 138 will not have 
altered its properties so it should perform precisely, and only, the function 
for which it was designed in the ship. 
Parfit assumes that in a similar way a Garbo cell, say No. 193, which has 
replaced a Parfit cell during operation 28 has to be unaffected by the continued 
presence of Parfit cells which are not replaced until operation 73. Now If cell 
No. 193 helps to control memory or even emotional stability it Is reasonable to 
assume that It will be affected by the presence of Parfit memory cells. The 
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presence of the Parfit cells could alter either Garbo's memory or her emotional 
stability. The supposition that Garbo cell No. 193 will have the same 
properties at the end of all the operations as it had before and during 
operation 28 presupposes that these properties are dependent solely upon the 
external relations which hold at the time of operation 28. In other words there 
is a presupposition that Garbo cells will not change their properties because of 
their experiences in encountering Parfit cells. But this Is the very point at 
issue, it is the one which the argument is attempting to establish. 
For the results to be as Parfit has described them we have to make one of 
two assumptions. We have to assume either that the component parts of the body 
are passive recipients of external stimuli and whose prperties cannot change or 
that at each operation the previously implanted cells are reprogrammed. The 
first alternative presupposes his result while the second destroys his spectrum 
thesis. Each alternative leaves us where we started with no reason for 
accepting either of his claims about the nature of Personal Identity - the claim 
that the self can be objectively defined (presumably across all cultural 
environments) and the claim that the Identity of the self is indeterminate 
(presumably in any given cultural environment, but at least In the one In which 
Garbo and Parfit find themselves). 
The Second Experiment 
Parfit's second thought experiment will now be examined. Its purpose is to 
do more than break down the psychological barriers which make us resist his 
thesis that the self can be objectively defined. For the purposes of ensuring 
the acceptability of the argument in this essay such an examination is 
important. If the success of the outcome of the thought experiment were to be 
confirmed one would be obliged to accept Parfit's reductionism. 
In the second experiment (*12) Par-fit postulates the division of a single 
self Into two separate selves. The separation he suggests Is of a single brain 
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one half of which Is transplanted Into an Identical triplet while the other half 
transplants into a second triplet. He then asks, which, if either, of the two 
new persons Is the original one. 
Parfit presents us with four possibilities. The first that the person does 
not survive, the second that one specific half survives as the person, the third 
that the other half does and the fourth that both halves do. He does not even 
consider the possibility that the triplets may survive or that a new person is 
born. 
He dismisses the first of his possibilities by pointing out that there are 
examples of Individuals who have survived without one half of their brains. 
How, he asks, could a double success be a failure? The second and the third 
possibilities he dismisses by stating that "each half of the brain Is exactly 
similar, and so, to start with is each resulting person" (*13). In making this 
claim he has, on the previous page already asserted that "the division of a 
person's consciousness Into two separate streams - Is a feature that has 
actually happened". This leaves him with the fourth possibility namely that the 
Individual survives as both new selves. 
He concedes that this would Involve a distortion of our everyday concept of 
a person. It would show us that our Identity Is not what matters to us since it 
could branch. What really matters Is psychological continuity with a causal 
connection holding the two together. The justification for this claim centres 
on the rationality of one's concern for one's future which rests on the 
assumption that this kind of continuity holds. 
The various strands of Parfit's second argument make It, at first sight 
more compelling that the attempted Identity switch along a spectrum. Here the 
thought experiment seems much more plausible. There seems to be no presupposed 
Reductionism. yet the implausibility of the alternatives seem to oblige one to 
believe that the only explanation for the apparently Inevitable success of the 
experiment is a Reductionist one. A more meticulous look at each stage reveals. 
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however, that the overall structure of the argument is not completely sound. 
Let us now consider the first phase of the experiment. A brain Is split In 
two and each half is said to have a stream of consciousness which Is continuous 
with the original brain. As such each half is said to be "exactly s/m/lar" by 
Parfit. He asserts that there can be no significant initial difference between 
the two new persons, each with half of the original brain. 
Assuming for a moment that the experiment succeeds the claim that the two 
new persons are "exactly similar" depends solely upon the similarity of the 
streams of consciousness which each has Inherited. Parfit omits all discussion 
of other aspects of the self which are found In differing degrees in the two 
different sides of the brain. The aesthetic sense Is said to be more pronounced 
on the right side while the rational, deductive abilities more pronounced on the 
left; other differences also exist. 
By allowing this thought experiment to succeed Parflt Is presupposing that 
the only constituent component of a person's Identity which Is significant to 
Personal Identity Is the stream of consciousness, something which can be 
objectively described. So even here he seems to be presupposing the result for 
which he Is arguing, namely his form of Reductionism. 
There are, however, documented cases of one sided brain damage where the 
undamaged side took over the functions which It normally left undeveloped (*14), 
but there seems to be a out off age of about seven years after which the 
take-over process is impeded or impossible. If the thought experiment were to 
be carried out on a five-year-old and his two Identical triplets It would still 
be an open question whether the dormant characteristics of the left side were 
"exactly similar" to the existing manifest characteristics of the right, and 
vice versa. It may be that 'Lefty' is potentially an III-tempered brute while 
'Righty' is in actuality a pleasant sort of person and that the conjunction of 
the two - the pre-experiment Individual - Is an even tempered Individual given 
to the odd emotional outburst. Parfit's "double success" presupposes that all 
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these other characteristics are unimportant or even not essential In discussions 
of Personal Identity (*15). 
But this double success also raises a further question about the 
experiment. Should one accept the assumption that because either half of the 
brain had survived In some people. both halves could subsequently continue to 
survive independently of, and separately from, each other? There is no 
empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. People with split brains have 
retained single bodies while developing separate streams of consciousness. But 
separate streams of consciousness have also been observed in schizophrenic 
Individuals whose eventual 'cures' have rested on the assumption that there Is a 
single individual underpinning these streams. 
Parfit is here In the true realms of thought experiment where not only the 
procedures but also the outcomes are conjectural. The possibility that there is 
a unique, essential and unanalysable factor associated with Personal Identity 
remains. This factor may at some point in the experiment either choose to 
sustain, or be forced into sustaining, only one of the two half brains thereby 
leaving the other half devoid of the essence of the Individual. The deserted 
half may then either find or formulate Its own unique factor or fall to survive. 
In assuming his double success Parfit seems here to be presupposing the 
impossibility of a rival theory; an impossibility which is not yet supported by 
empirical evidence. Such evidence could Indicate that the case is "deeply 
Impossible" rather than merely "technically Impossible" (*16). 
But since he believes his first argument establishes the absence of a 
unique factor associated with Personal Identity he feels justified In assuming 
that the second Involves merely a technical Impossibility. Indeed he Is aware 
that the case of the double brain transplant does not directly support his 
'Reductionist' claim that Personal Identity Is Indeterminate. "The case of 
division supports part of the Reductionist view: the claim that our Identity is 
not what matters. But this case does not support another Reductionist claim: 
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that our Identity Is Indeterminate" (*17). What is clear, however, is that the 
case of division rests upon the validity of claims based on his first thought 
experiment. We have seen that the argument used In support of those claims is 
less than compelling. 
Thought Experiments Assessed 
The analysis of Parfit's two thought experiments helps one to focus on the 
problems associated with all such approaches to gaining understanding of the 
nature and behaviour of objects. The difficulties stem from the limited 
capacity of the imagination, isolated from praxis, to establish results which 
have application beyond the scope of operation of the imagination itself. 
The capacity, In thought experiments, of the imagination to establish 
Incontrovertible results is not limited to Parfit's two experiments. It extends 
to all thought experiments. These experiments have their roots In discussions 
on the nature of necessity and Its relationships with concepts such as "a/l 
possible worlds" (*18). Clearly if something Is necessarily the case it must be 
so not only in this world but In all possible worlds, so a test of necessity can 
be based on the possibility of finding a counter-example. 
It is also possible to consider a concept of conditional necessity, that is 
given a precondition P, the existence or possibility of P2 may be necessary. So 
P2 is necessarily the case provided Pi holds. This form of conditional 
necessity Is widely used. It Is used by scientists In underpinning the 
Intelligibility of processes of scientific discovery. It forms the basis of the 
structure of many philosophical arguments. 
Considerations of possible worlds can work well when moving from the actual 
world, where phenomena can be experienced and explained or described In the 
context of currently held theories, to a possible world where theoretical 
stresses are put on explanation& In the Parfit experiment referred to above, 
along with others such as the Williams thought experiments (*19) stresses are 
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put on an Individual's conception of herself, a stress which may have the effect 
of changing all concepts. 
The practice of placing stresses on explanations constitutes one of the 
stages of scientific development (and perhaps even constitutes one of the stages 
of the development of an Infant's conceptual understanding of the world). 
Stress is placed on an explanation by the creation of abnormal situations 
concocted In laboratories (or the Immediate environment in which an Infant finds 
himself) where theories are tested. The transfer from experienced world to a 
possible world and back is licensed by the artificial creation of a facsimile of 
the possible world In the laboratory experiment. But the holding of such a 
licence depends upon the possibility of creating such a facsimile, and the 
proper use of the licence depends upon the experimenter being able to 
demonstrate that the facsimile has been created. As long as the actuality of 
the creation of a facsimile of the possible world Is not achieved, the 
principles discussed in that possible world remain hypothetical with no 
compelling force for their acceptance in the experienced world. 
Without the achievement of a facsimile of the possible world, the thought 
experimenter is attempting to move from an imagined world to the experienced 
world without using the check of experience to justify the move. In Parflt's 
case we have an imagined world where Personal Identity Is seen as a spectrum 
along which it is possible to move. His claims for a licence of transfer are 
based on the assumption that the imagined world Is a mutant of the experienced 
world, a mutant whose laws of nature and whose principles of concept-development 
are the same as those which hold In the experienced world. But his mutation 
Involves assumptions about the laws of nature which can only be justified by the 
establishment of a facsimile of the possible world he describes. It further 
Involves an assumption that the processes of concept-development remain 
unaltered In the mutant world. The second assumtion does not, prima facie. seem 
to be justifiable. it seems unlikely that a group of individuals each of whom 
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conceptualises his or her Identity as Indeterminate could sustain the social 
structures by means of which processes of individuation are carried out. 
The Strawsonian thought experiment referred to above (see note *6) Involves 
placing a stress on concept-development. The conclusions he draws are not 
concerned with the nature of a concept but with the nature of the development; 
and even the development Is limited by him to what has developed rather than 
what might develop. He restricts the scope of application of his conclusions to 
the particular cultural environment in which the thought experiment Is 
formulated - he does not wish to Indulge In what he describes as "revisionary 
metaphysics" (*20). Similarly this essay consists of a large thought 
experiment; but its conclusions are conditional - their acceptability depends 
upon the lack of acceptability of the denial of the intelligibility of certain 
practices such as concept-communication. 
Further complications may exist. If the possible world Is one In which the 
laws of nature are postulated as being different from those which are 
operational In the world we experience, it may be that the concepts which were 
needed to describe phenomena In that world cannot be applied to phenomena in the 
experienced world. A world In which the fission and fusion of individuals, and 
possibly of material objects, were normal occurrences may need different 
(perhaps stratified) concepts of Identity and number from those applicable In 
our experienced world. The nature of scientific explanation and theory 
construction would be so different in such a world that It would be difficult to 
justify the transference of any conclusions (drawn from such theories and 
explanations) from that possible world to ours. It may be impossible to make 
the requisite transfer: the world Into which the analysis Is to be transferred 
may be one in which each of the transferred concepts can be given no meaning 
which corresponds to its original meaning. 
It Is Incumbent upon the users of analyses involving such transfers to 
establish the applicability of the concepts they are using in all the possible 
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worlds they are citing. It Is not Immediately obvious that the concepts we 
employ, embedded as they are In our scientific (and explanatory) theories, could 
be adequately transferred to a possible world in which Identity fission and/or 
fusion occurred. The arguments In Chapters 2 and 3 above show that the 
applicability of concepts is dependent upon the possible Interactions between 
persons and objects in their social and natural environments; but particularly 
with the objects in their social environments. It Is reasonably safe to assume 
that social Interactions would be radically different If the premisses of 
thought experiments similar to Parfit's were to hold In the experienced world. 
The general problem faced by all constructors of thought experiments ties 
in the restricted application of the thought experiment. The mere fact that the 
Imagination can be used to conceptualise the possibility of, say, the identity 
fission of persons, Is Insufficient to guarantee the applicability of such a 
conceptualisation In an actual world. The successful application can only be 
assumed if the descriptions of the objects and their environments Is accurate. 
In the case of the description of the properties of a person, and the 
person's social environment, the very question of whether It Is possible to 
formulate an accurate description Is in question. This means that the thought 
experimenter is likely to be assuming the truth of one of the results which is 
at issue. 
(Two illustrative examples in Addenda to Chapter 5 *p. 266) 
Beyond Thought Experiments 
The strength of the thought experiment lies In Its ability to put 
conceptual stresses on conceptual structures. Such stresses can point the 
constructor of a theory of the nature of a given object towards factors which 
need empirical investigation. The methodology of thought experiment 
construction can also direct a scientist away from a particular line of 
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Investigation. A given line of Investigation may put Intolerable Internal 
stresses on a given body of knowledge. 
The main thesis pursued in this essay consists of an attempt to direct 
Investigations away from the Idea that it is possible to construct objective 
descriptions of persons. Such an objective description would put an Intolerable 
stress on any body of knowledge. It would prevent It from changing and so 
prevent it from performing the function which permits one to describe It as a 
body of knowledge: the function consisting of facilitating changes In the states 
of understanding of persons. The source of this stress Is the requirement that 
an Individual's conscious processes perform a dual function: they are 
simultaneously self-referential and refer to objects other than the self. 
The next subsection will consist of an examination of J. R. Lucas' 
ingenious attempt (*21) to show that the Incorporation of this self-referential 
function Into an objective description of a person leads to a contradiction. 
The purpose of Lucas' argument is to show that an objective description of the 
self cannot be achieved. 
There are two purposes motivating the analysis of the Lucas argument. The 
first is to Indicate that there is a paradox associated with Lucas' very 
enterprise. The paradox is found In the process of setting up the reductlo ad 
absurdlum In which the contradiction Is to be formed. The operation of this 
process itself involves the possibility of the formation of an objective 
description of a person; a possibility which the operation Is attempting to 
negate. The second purpose Is to demonstrate that the paradox is unavoidable. 
This means that the contradiction contained in the premisses of any such 
reductio is sufficiently strong to prevent the development of the very reductio. 
The objective description of a person is necessarily elusive - the 
self-referential processes in consciousness defy objective descriptions which 
can then be coherently used in an argument. 
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Beyond Thought Experlarents: (1) Lucas' GJdel Arguwent 
Lucas' target is the physicalist description of the Individual. He 
attempts to undermine such descriptions by invoking Gödel's incompleteness 
theorem. He tries to show that a mechanical description of the mind possesses 
the same sort of Incompleteness as that which Gödel discovered In formal 
systems. A detailed understanding of G6del's theorem Is not needed for one to 
follow Lucas'. In essence Gadel managed to formalise the statement 'this 
formula Is underivable' In the formal system where 'derivable'. 'Immediate 
consequence' and 'formula' are all themselves formalised In the system by means 
of reeurs! veness Recursiveness Is not Itself formailsed (*22). This Gödel 
statement Is true, since it states Its own underivablltty; so truth In formal 
systems Is separate from derivability. 
Lucas takes the Gödei argument and fits it Into a reductlo ad absurdum 
which follows the scheme: 
(A) Suppose the physicalist reduction of mind to machine is correct 
(B) then the mind could be completely described by a Iogico-mathematical formal 
system S. S has a set of propositions P:. No P3i... capable of being formalised 
and of being derived from the axioms of S. 
(C) The machine can determine as true, of the formalised propositions, only 
those which are derivable from the axioms of S. that Is P1, P2# No... 
(D) The proposition G 'This formula is underlvable' Is not derivable so the 
mechanical mind cannot see It as being true. 
(E) There exist some humans who can understand 0 in any formal system since they 
can follow the steps of Gpdei's proof. In particular these humans can 
understand it in the system S whch purports to describe them and they can see it 
to be true. 
(F) Statements (D) and (E) contradict each other so the initial claim (A) is 
false. 
252 
Part 4: A Critique of Theories of Personal Identity Chapter 5 
The main weakness of this argument Is to be found in statement (C). But to 
be fair to Lucas it should be pointed out that this Is also a weak link In the 
physicalist/determinist thesis. Such a thesis needs to maintain that the 
ascription of truth to propositions is a mechanical process and so susceptible 
to physicalist description and subsequently to reduction Into a formal system S. 
The separation of truth from the structural completeness of S places a 
requirement on the determinist to explain how truth is ascribed. Lucas holds 
that physicatists are restricted to ascribing truth In the same way as they 
ascribe consistency (or derivability) since they are Imprisoned in the formal 
systems which describe them. Only those concepts which can be formalised within 
the system are available to the machine described by the system. 
If this were so then the physicatists would not be able to avail themselves 
even of the means by which they formalise derivability In their format systems 
since these means use the unformalised notion of recurslveness. Lucas' reply 
might suggest that physicalist theories themselves presuppose an acceptance of 
recursiveness as since this presupposition forms the basis upon which prediction 
and determinism are built. However, once we permit a machine to use one 
unformalised concept, our grounds for forbidding the use of further unformallsed 
concepts, such as truth, are seriously weakened. Conversely if we restrict, as 
Lucas does, mechanical mind completely to using only formalised concepts, then 
one of two possibilities presents Itself. Following one possibility one may 
find that Gödel's theorem cannot help us as it Is constructed entirely from one 
unformalised concept. Following the second possibility one finds that the 
invocation of Gädel's theorem Involves one in overelaboratlon. The fact that an 
Individual can conceptualise a concept, such as happiness, which cannot be 
formalised In a loyico-mathematical system will suffice: such a person cannot, 
ex-hypothesi, be described completely by propositions formalised In the system. 
Other arguments (*23) which claim to refute Lucas have been collated by 
Douglas Hofstadter. These are, in general, over-elaborate and rely on applying 
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Lucas' own analysis back onto his own argument. They do not point out that the 
reason Lucas may face difficulties when his argument Is turned on Itself is 
precisely because of the problem Identified above: the problem associated with 
the needed revision of the function of concepts which accompanies the 
assumptions which a physicalist description of the mind entails. Lucas' only 
fault is to use these assumptions in order to attempt to show that they lead to 
a contradiction without examining the full consequences of such a use. 
Hofstadter himself criticises Lucas (*24) by negating proposition (B) 
above. In his argument he points out that there are some so-called Artificial 
Intelligence programs which defy description under a formal loglco-mathematical 
system. This means that the Lucas argument cannot get going since not all 
machines are susceptible to 'Gödellsation'. As in the other criticisms of 
Lucas. Hofstadter could have reached the same conclusion rather more directly. 
We have already seen that nothing which handles concepts which cannot be 
formallsed is susceptible to being exhaustively described In a logico- 
mathematical system in which the Lucas argument can gain purchase. 
The failure of the Lucas enterprise does not Invalidate the Importance of 
the paradox upon which It directs us to focus our attention. The paradox 
springs from the simultaneous operations of two process: the conceptual Isatlons 
of Individuals and the conscious Interactions between Individuals In given 
cultural environments. They must also form part of conscious, cognitive, 
communicable experience which. In part, necessarily refers beyond the scope of 
its immediate content. This means that the processes are, of necessity. partly 
self-referential and partly other-referential. 
Being self-referential they cannot be encapsulated by objective 
descriptions formulated within the cultural environments In which they operate; 
at least they cannot be so encapsulated without ossifying the boundaries of that 
cultural environment. Lucas' reductlo argument starts with the assumption 
embedded in the physicalist theory which he is attacking: the assumption that 
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such objective descriptions are possible. However, it is a starting point which 
Incorporates an attempt to push the scope of the use of some concepts beyond the 
limits of the cultural environment in which the concepts claim application. 
This means that Lucas' reductio starts with a self-contradictory premise, 
rather than with one which is empirically false. Self-contradictory premisses 
can be used to expose the limitations of a proposition embedded the abstract 
formal systems in which the premisses are formulated. They cannot, however, be 
used to justify propositions which claim application beyond the abstract 
structures. Lucas identified a self-contradictory premise in the physicalist 
theory of the mind, but his argument failed to pinpoint the source of the 
self-contradiction. The arguments in this essay identify that source. 
Beyond Lucas 
The failure of a Lucas type argument does not oblige one to accept its 
contrapositive. namely that It Is possible to formulate objective descriptions 
of persons which permit a reasonable understanding of human processes. A firm 
rejection of this contrapositive was developed In Chapter 4 above. The argument 
there focused, as does Lucas', on the requirement that a person needs to be 
capable of making a conscious appraisal of her own conscious experiences. 
Given that a conscious being has this capability, the Chapter 4 argument 
does not preclude the possibility that a non-organically controlled object could 
perform all the functions which a person performs. But to do so such an object 
would have to convince the other 'persons' that it also has all the 
characteristics which are needed to sustain the operations of social structures. 
In order to convince these other persons such an object would have to 
demonstrate that it is a 'good-enough Individuator' of objects (as argued in 
Chapter 1); It would have to convince them that it Is driven to make cognitive 
sense of its environments (as argued In Chapter 4); It would have further to 
demonstrate that, not only does it conceptualise Its expectations of the 
progress of phenomena. It also has to be capable of evaluating degrees to which 
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such expectations have been fulfilled. In other words It would have to convince 
persons that it is essentially subJectlve, essentially social and essentially 
knowledgtseeking (see Part 2 above). 
One is driven to conclude that the criteria for the ascription of 
personhood are not themselves determinate. They depend upon the operations of 
social kinds which are themselves dependent upon the conceptualisations of 
persons. There is an inevitable circularity In the relationship between the 
specifications of the procedures by which persons are Identified and the 
development of those procedures. It Is this circularity which lies at the heart 
of the paradox referred to above. It Is the circularity which is faced most 
directly by theories of Personal Identity which claim that the self Is 
inellminable from adequate descriptions of human behaviour. These theories will 
be examined below, but first there will be an examination of a group of theories 
which involve claims that adequate objective criteria for the ascription of 
Personal Identity can be found. 
Beyond Thought Experiments: (II) Criterion Theories Of Personal Identity And The 
Meaory Theory 
in this sub-section a variant of a group of theories of Personal Identity 
will be examined. The characteristic by which members of this group of theories 
are selected is the claim made by the respetive proponents of each theory that 
some factor or other - memory. Psychological connectedness, bodily continuity, 
etc. - can serve as a criterion by which an individual can be Identified as the 
same individual at different points In time. 
The discussion will lead to the conclusion that such theories are not 
Inconsistent with one of the central tenets of the argument developed In this 
essay. This tenet Is encapsulated by the assertion that objective, determinate 
definitions of a person cannot be formulated In cultural environments In which 
the learning of new concepts can occur. The problem faced by a 'criterion' 
256 
Part 4: A Critique of Theories of Personal Identity Chapter 5 
theory is the possible ossification of the cultural environment In which a 
specific criterion is applied. The application of the criterion may have the 
effect of thwarting any possible changes In the cultural environment's corpus of 
knowledge. The advantages enjoyed by a 'criterion' theory are found In Its 
pragmatic nature: the theory gives one some of the rules by which an Individual 
can assume the role of 'Paradigm Individuator' and qualify for the epithet of 
person. The particular criterion theory which will now be examined is the 
memory theory. 
The Memory Theory 
One of the foremost exponents of the Memory Theory of Personal Identity was 
John Locke (*25). A more modern exponent, who develops and sharpens the Lockean 
theory, is David Wiggins (*26). Wiggins combines the memory theory with a 
theory of identity based on an analysis of relationship between the use of 
sortal concepts and the notion of substance. Using the characterisations put 
forward in Chapter 1 above, one might say that Wiggins analyses the rules which 
govern the correct behaviour of a paradigm Individuatori he analyses the 
processes of individuation. 
Unlike the one In this essay. Wiggins' analysis does not Involve an 
examination of the conditions which have to hold If changes in knowledge are to 
occur. He, like Locke before him, sets himself a descriptive task. In carrying 
out this task, it seems he succeeds in showing that the memory of an individual 
is used in the formulation of the sortal concept which Individuates the 
individual. But this does not tell us what the criteria are for individuals to 
be classified as persons - where 'persons' are seen as those Individuals who 
have the ability to alter the corpus of knowledge within the cultural 
environment analysed by Wiggins. According to his procedures one could easily 
Individuate a computer as a person using the sortal concept which Is applicable 
If the memory of the Individuated object comes up to scratch. 
In order for Wiggins' criterion to function in such a way as to Individuate 
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those Individuals characterised In this essay as 'persons' (Ch. 2 *p. 73). a 
modification to his memory theory would have to be Introduced. This 
modification would have to allow for the assessment of both the potential of the 
Individual and her history. The problem which such an expanded assessment faces 
is one of incompatibility with the assertion that a fixed criterion can be 
found. Ex-hypotesi the potential to contribute to changes In the corpus of 
knowledge cannot be described: the fact that some Individual has made such a 
contribution In the past may be a good Indication that he possesses the 
potential. but it cannot per se suffice as a criterion to justify a claim that 
the potential to do so again exists. 
it should be noted that the ability to make a contribution to the expansion 
of the corpus of knowledge is not restricted to those who make breakthroughs In 
research. The individuals who subsequently come to understand the alterations 
which have taken place are also making such a contribution. The changes in the 
corpus of knowledge brought about by the development of Relativity Theory in 
Physics needed scientists other than Einstein to understand them in order for 
them to constitute alterations to the corpus of knowledge. Similarly the 
formation of a new social grouping with previously unknown social powers needs 
to be understood and utilised by more persons than the originator of the Idea 
(which led to the formation of the group). 
Criterion Theories 
The question of Incorporating the potential to contribute to the expansion 
of the corpus of knowledge is one which has to be faced by any 'criterion 
theory'. The common feature possessed by criterion theories is the objective 
description of the characteristic which enables one to individuate an Individual 
as a person. This leaves them Inadequate to the task of accounting for the 
possibility that the concepts which specify the cultural environment in which 
the individuals operate might alter their meanings and so alter the properties 
of the to-be-identified persons. All changes in the meanings of terms which 
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refer to social processes would be inexplicable. 
Beyond Thought Expert entsr aii The Self As An Unanalysable Entity 
Critics of the memory theory, who do not have a criterion of their own. 
tend to conclude that it Is not possible to formulate an objective concept of 
the self. Personal Identity is. at root. unanalysable. Perhaps the best known 
classical proponents of such a theory are Thomas Reid and Bishop Butler; some of 
their modern followers Include J. M. E. McTaggart, Sydney Shoemaker, Anthony 
Flew. and Geoffrey Madell. 
The theory of Personal Identity they propound has many meeting points with 
the one set out In this essay, but differs in some Important respects. it is 
not being suggested here that the self Is necessarily unanatysable. Rather, it 
is being suggested that the self is Inellalnable from adequate 
conceptualisations of social behaviour. Further, the grounds put forward by the 
'unanalysable' school for rejecting the memory, and Indeed any other 'criterion' 
theory, seem to be Insufficient to the task they are expected to perform. 
These arguments are generally variants of one put forward by Butler (*27). 
In this he claims that memory cannot constitute Personal Identity for memory 
presupposes the identity of the self. This criticism smacks a little of the 
politician who Imputes an untenable policy to an opponent then proceeds to show 
that the policy is untenable. The memory theorists do not claim that memory 
constitutes Personal identity, they claim that it serves as a criterion for 
indicating the Identity of an individual. It remains perfectly feasible for 
Personal Identity to presuppose memory while simultaneously using it as a 
criterion of identification. 
It is even feasible to claim that the self is unanalysable and to use 
memory as a criterion of Personal Identity. All one has to do is to claim that 
those aspects of Personal Identity which are analysable give one sufficient 
grounds for being able to Identify and re-identify individuals. 
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From the acceptance of the validity of the conclusions of the 
'unanalysable' school, one can derive the validity of the following statement: 
an objective conceptualisation of the self cannot be sustained without some form 
of penalty. The validity of this statement can also be derived from the 
analysis in Chapters 1 to 4 above. This does not mean, however, that the 
arguments of the 'unanalysable' school and those developed In this essay are the 
same; nor that they are equally acceptable. To assert that they are would 
involve the commission of the fallacy of the assertion of the consequent. 
However. the arguments used In this essay can be employed to support a 
claim that the self Is unanalysable, but only In restricted circumstances. 
These circumstances have been frequently stated above as being those In which 
changes in the corpus of knowledge in a given cultural environment cannot be 
brought about by the individuals who operate In that cultural environment. This 
argument has many meeting points with one of the more recent additions to the 
'unanalysabie' school's repertoire; the recent addition being made by Geoffrey 
Maddell (*28). it is worth dwelling for a little while on this argument as it 
is the only one in the 'unanalysable' school which is not a variant of Butler's 
argument cited above. 
Madell develops an argument which consists of a particular Instance of the 
general argument in this essay. He argues that within the scope of Influence of 
the use of the English pronoun 'I', all demonstratives are parasitic upon upon 
the use of 'I'. He argues further that '1' cannot be eliminated by using a set 
of objective descriptions. He builds his case upon an examination of the 
psychological relationships between an individual on one hand and the 
Individual's own perceptions and conoeptuallsations on the other. Invoking 
arguments by Shoemaker and others he points out that the objective description 
of an Individual's behaviour cannot form the grounds for her ascription of 
certain perceptions (linked causally to her behaviour) as belonging to her. She 
would always be left with the problem of ascribing the perceptions Involved in 
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the ascription process to herself; and If she had already ascribed these 
perceptions to herself then the objective description of her behaviour could not 
have formed the grounds of the ascription. 
The argument is persuasive. However, the grounds for Its persuasiveness 
are not examined by Madell. What he does not seem to have realised is that the 
compelling nature of his conclusions Is not solely consequential upon the 
accuracy of his description of the psychologocal relationships between an 
Individual and his perceptions. It rests rather on the reader's realisation 
that Madell's. and anyone else's. communications with her would themselves be 
unintelligible unless she were to accept the ineliminablllty of the self. In 
other words Madell is tacitly ultilising the results of the arguments set out in 
this essay: arguments which centre on the Interactions between Individuals and 
point out the need for the operations of social structures. 
Madelt comes close to recognising the Importance of social structures when 
he considers Geach's claim that '1' Is eliminable In sollloqul (*29). Here he 
notes that In soliloqui the individual is Isolated from cultural environments. 
Indeed he Indicates that there may be a case for stating that concepts In such 
an environment are not concepts at all. 
If Madell. along with other members of the 'unanalysable' school. wish to 
apply arguments in cultural environments other than those of the English 
speaking world. then they need to examine the forces which facilitate changes in 
any cultural environment. Their criticism (of those who claim that determinate 
descriptions of the self are possible) is restricted to stating that an 
Individual who is objectively defined cannot, by using the English language, 
find adequate grounds for ascribing any given set of experiences to herself. 
This may be because the English language is so structured as to accommodate the 
possibility that the corpus of knowledge it encompasses may change. indeed, the 
cultural environment generated by the use of concepts In English covers an area 
of social space in which social kinds operate whose specific purpose is to 
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facilitate changes In the corpus of knowledge. But this does not mean that 
every cultural environment has these characteristics. 
It can be seen that the 'unanalysable' school. Ilke each of the 'criterion' 
schools. succeeds in capturing at least one aspect of the concept of Personal 
Identity. The arguments In this essay show that these two allegedly opposing 
schools do not oppose each other in the same battlefield; the battles they fight 
seem to be with opponents they construct rather than the proponents of the 
alternative theory; and when they do meet, they are found not to be In 
opposition. 
possible world Analysis 
The critiques of theories of Personal Identity, which have been developed 
in this chapter, have all flowed from the arguments and methodology which have 
been employed In Chapters 1 to 4. In this the the final subsection of the 
essay, an alternative form of analysis will be criticised. This alternative is 
the one constructed and used by Saul Krlpke (*30). 
Kripke's methodology consists of the construction of possible worlds. 
These are used as devices for putting stresses on theories and concepts In order 
to discover the points at which they collapse. This is a somewhat similar 
process to the thought experiments discussed above (hp. 238-250). Kripke does 
not attempt to reformulate the laws of change in the possible worlds, as do 
Parfit and Williams. rather he restricts himself to the examination of 
abstractions such as the concept of Identity. As such, his conclusions should 
have some validity and, inasmuch as they are directed towards Personal Identity, 
should be pertinent to the discussions held In this essay. 
The methodology coheres with essentialist conceptualisations of objects; 
Indeed, It may even presuppose, and be presupposed by, such a conceptualisation. 
It is only with an essentialist conceptualisatlon of an object that one can 
Intelligibly discuss the operations of that object In distinct possible worlds. 
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Conversely, the intelligibility of discussions of possible worlds cannot be 
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sustained with anything but essentialist conceptualisations of at least some 
objects which appear in more than one possible world: If no objects appear in 
more than one possible world then possible world analysis becomes vacuous. This 
essentialist view of the nature of objects, and Indeed of persons, underlies 
most of the discussion in this essay. It Is likely that the assumption that the 
possibility that the properties of objects apply across the boundaries of 
different environments obliges one to hold some form of an essentialist 
conception of the objects. This assumption Is common to Kripke's analysis and 
the one undertaken here. 
There are two questions regarding Kripke's analysis which are relevant to 
the arguments set out in this essay. The first concerns the question of the 
analysis of the Identity of objects In general and the second concerns the 
analysis of persons. Kripke does not make a distinction In principle between 
these two. The central tenet of this essay Is that there is such a distinction 
and that it is a significant distinction. 
Before examining the differences between the Kripkean analysis and the one 
In this essay it may be worth discussing the similarities. A Kripkean possible 
world In which persons operate Is closely connected to the notion of a cultural 
environment developed In Chapter 2 above. The main differences between a 
cultural environment and a possible world Is that It must be possible for an 
Individual to affect changes in a cultural environment whereas the individual 
may be restricted to postulating changes In a possible world. 
This difference does not prevent the argument in Chapter 3, Part 4 from 
being applicable to possible worlds as well as to cultural environments. There 
it was argued that If some Individual retains her identity In more than one 
cultural environment, then there must be some natural and some social kinds 
which operate in all the environments n which she retains her Identity. The 
same holds In the case of the retention of an individual's Identity across the 
2133 
Part 4s A Critique of Theories of Personal Identity 
boundaries of various possible worlds. 
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The problems which arise In the case of the possible world analysis stem 
from attempts to sustain a distinction between natural and social kinds In a 
possible, conjectured world. The distinction was seen to be one which has to be 
made if one is to sustain the Intelligibility of concept-communication. The 
problem with a possible world is that, basing Itself on conceptualised entities 
whose existence is not even seen as being Independent of conceptualisations, one 
cannot sustain a distinction between natural and social kinds in any world other 
than the one in which experiences actually occur. 
The Individuation of conceptualising Individuals depends upon sustaining 
such a distinction. Further, the formation and development of all concepts is 
dependent upon the operation of processes Involving the Individuation of 
Individuals. One can conclude that a possible world analysis cannot make a 
significant contribution to our understanding of persons; the conclusion being 
based on the contention that persons are conceptualising Individuals. Only 
Inasmuch as a possible world forms an extension of social (but not of natural) 
space from within a given cultural environment can it be a useful device for 
improving our understanding of the concepts used in that cultural environment. 
And even here, it is debatable whether the device helps us to understand notions 
such as the Identity of natural kinds; or whether, as David Wiggins suggests 
(*31) possible world analysis is parasitic upon a prior conception of Identity. 
In not distinguishing between the nature of the identity of persons and 
natural kinds the Kripkean analysis restricts the scope of application of its 
conclusions. The restriction prevents application of the results of the 
analysis beyond the boundaries set by the use of the concepts which specify the 
cultural environment in which the analysis occurs. The analysis In this essay, 
by contrast can claim such extended application since it is concerned with the 
nature of the relationships between cultural environments. One of the main 
claims being made here is that the possibility that objects move from one 
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cultural environment to another places requirements upon the nature of the 
concepts of Personal Identity and of object identity. 
" 
PART 5i CONCLUSION 
The arguments in this essay have all been directed towards one goal. This 
goal consists of the relocation of the debate on Personal Identity. It is 
Intended that, with the relocation of the debate, it will be possible for social 
scientists to become more aware of the Implications of any assumptions they make 
regarding the nature of Personal Identity. Underpinning the arguments which 
lead to the acceptance of the relocation has been the distinction drawn between 
the epistemological and ontological concepts used In social scientific, or 
Indeed in everyday, explanations of social change. This distinction Is 
encapsulated by the distinction. made in Chapter 2. between a 'cultural 
environment' and a 'social environment'. 
The analytical methods employed have been Kantian In nature. There has 
also been a return to some traditional metaphysics. Both these approaches have 
tended to be Ignored both by some philosophers who develop theories about 
Personal Identity and by some social scientists. By following the arguments and 
the methodology adopted In this essay, a social scientist will be able to assess 
the price to be paid for adopting any particular assumption about the nature of 
Personal Identity. It has been argued throughout that the main price, paid by a 
social scientist, for the adoption of any fixed criterion of Personal Identity 
is the sacrifice of the Intelligibility of the social science Itself. Fewest 
sacrifices seem to be made by the social scientist who assumes that persons are 
essentially subjective, essentially social and essentially knowledge-seeking. 
0w 
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Two cases, one real the other fictitious. Illustrate the necessity of 
incorporating considerations of the relationships between persons and their 
social environments in any theory of Personal Identity. The first Is the 
Chapter 5 
celebrated case of Phineas Gage who, In 1848, while helping to lay a railway 
suffered an accident which caused a yard long steel rod to pass right through 
his skull. Both rod and skull are now preserved In a Boston museum. Gage or, 
as Colin Blakemore puts it, "the body which bore his name" (*32) survived with 
relations of bodily continuity intact. According to the Williams analysis cited 
above Gage would still be the same person. Psychological connectedness and 
continuity were not broken and his memory was Intact. The accident had, 
however, induced a personality change so severe that those who knew Gage before 
the accident said it was not the same man. He had changed from a likeable, 
sociable person to an anti-social, bad-tempered man. The relationships between 
Gage and other Individuals changed; and consequently so had his relationships 
with many of the social objects, such as railway companies, which he 
encountered. Whether or not the changes were sufficient to warrant the claim 
that the body which bore the name of Gage was no longer the same person Is open 
to question. However, the Intelligibility of the debate regarding whether or 
not Gage retained his Identity indicates that It Is necessary to discuss the 
relationship between a person and his social environment when formulating a 
theory of Personal Identity. 
The second case is a fictitious one. Let us suppose that in 1950 one could 
convince the actor Humphrey Bogard that a set of beliefs, and their accompanying 
practices, similar to those held by the Lamas of Tibet were going, In 1956, to 
become predominant in the U. S. A. In general and In theatrical circles in 
particular. Suppose further that It were possible to convince him that through 
the sort of research which establishes the Identity of the Dalai Lama it would 
be discovered that Humphrey Bogard Is the reincarnation of the Greek Atomist 
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Democritus. Bogard's relations with his natural environment would, one assumes. 
remain unaltered. Assuming that he did not want to be venerated as one of the 
fathers of modern positivism he may object to his new identity. His rational 
concern for the future could not be divorced from his being related by social 
links to the future individual known as the reincarnation of Democritus any more 
than it could be divorced from his being related by physical links to someone 
who was to develop a fatal illness. 
The case of Phineas Gage shows that the exercise of the processes Involved 
in the cognizance and communication of concepts requires, in our conceptual 
scheme, that Personal Identity both depends upon and underpins social 
relationships. The Bogard-Democritus reincarnation shows that the Individual's 
conception of self-identity itself Invokes social relationships. 
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2 (*1) in this essay a 'linear' argument refers to an exposition which 
attempts to convince someone that something Is the case by using a deductive 
model of explanation. (see, for example, C8 Hempel and P Oppenhelm, Studies in 
the Logic of Explanation, PhlkwWhy of Slolenoe (1948)) In such a model It Is 
thought that explanations follow the schema of a proof In mathematics where 
axioms are invoked along with accepted forms of deduction In order to reach a 
conclusion. If such a model Is assumed then one also must assume that the 
concepts which are available to the formulator of the explanation must be fixed 
in meaning during the process of explanation. 
This assumption carries with it at least two restrictions. The first 
restricts the operational scope of the objects whose behaviour Is being 
explained: their behaviour cannot extend beyond the limits set by the concepts 
being used in the explanation. Such a restriction would prevent one from 
attempting to offer explanations which cross the boundaries of cultural systems; 
Indeed, it would make cross-cultural explanations logically Impossible to 
formulate. The second restriction would prevent any learning processes from 
occurring as a result of the communication of the explanation; such an 
occurrence would contravene the starting assumption of the linear explanation 
that concepts retain their meaning during the exposition which constitutes the 
explanation. 
It is argued throughout this essay that neither of these restrictions is 
acceptable to a student of the behaviour of persons and other social objects. 
One might say that the problem faced by a student of the Social Sciences is also 
met by anyone undertaking a study into the basis upon which Social Scientific 
study Is carried out; both exercises Involve attempts to describe a non-linear, 
multi-dimensional process using a linear one-dimensional medium means of 
communication, namely language. The problem has had to be faced In compiling 
the arguments In this essay. One might say that any collection of arguments 
which is intended to throw light on the nature of social Interactions is doomed 
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to failure - an argument can only capture a single view of a multi-dimensional 
object. This point was poignantly put by Umberto Eco when Interviewed about his 
literary successes. He was asked to describe one of his novels. His reply was 
succinct: "If I could have described what It was about I would not have written 
a 503 page novel! ". He went on to say that novelists are condemned to express 
themselves in many pages because single sentences always leave something out. 
He indicated that he believed that even a novel cannot quite capture the essence 
of the human condition. 
(See also *page 11 where further reference is made to the consequences of 
using 'linear' arguments in the social sciences. ) 
3 (*2) The refusal to recognise the need to analyse concepts Is only 
intelligible in a cultural environment in which the development of concepts is 
itself not recognised. One assumption underlying the recognition of such a need 
is that there is more than one 'self' to be specified; another Is that there are 
mechanisms, or means, by which the analysis can be oommunicated by one 
individual to another. The justifications for the acceptance of these 
assumptions are offered below in Note 4 and in Parts 3.4 and 5 of this chapter. 
3 (*3) The rigorous justification of such a claim Is not necessary at this 
stage. The arguments which follow in this and later chapters will serve to 
refine as well as to support the claim. 
5 (*4) Solipsism rejected 
Should the presupposition consist of the existence of only one 'knowledge- 
able being' then that being would be the only one needing to be Individuated by 
the use of the concept and the application of any definition. Such a 
solipsistic being would also be the only arbiter regarding which 
non-'knowledgeable beings', if any, were to be defined as persons. The use of 
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the definition would. In such circumstances, necessarily be a process of 
sett-Individuation. Arguments in support of such conclusions will be found in 
Chapters 2 and 5. In such a case the possibility of having a yardstick against 
which to measure the putative definition would dissolve since the use of the 
yardstick involves the interpretation of a process. 
In this solipsistic case there would be only one interpreter who could, at 
any time alter the interpretation. The proper application of meaning to 
voncepts In these circumstances would be determined merely by the decrees made 
by the same being who Is then to apply them; the purpose of using a process to 
determine a meaning would recede into insignificance (see note (*34) In Ch. 2). 
This means that if the use of a concept is to have any purpose - and the need 
for concept application Involves the assumption of a purpose - then it must 
spring from characteristics or properties of the users of the concept. The 
identification of one such characteristic lies at the heart of the argument in 
Chapter 4. 
A comprehensive analysis of the concept of a 'knowledgeable being' will 
not be given In this chapter whose main purpose Is to prepare the ground for the 
remaining ones. All that Is Meant by a 'knowledgeable being' at this stage is a 
being which can understand the concepts used In the body of knowledge which is 
being used - no other characteristic Is as yet ascribed to 'knowledgeable 
beings'. As further sets of characteristics are added to 'knowledgeable beings' 
In the discussions which follow, so the Justifications for the additions will be 
offered. In each case the justification will take the form of specifying the 
price to be paid for not accepting the need to Incorporate the characteristic. 
8 (*5) See for example Personal Identity, John Perry ed. and Geoffrey 
Madell, The Identity of the Se/!: In the Introduction of the former. and In 
Chapter 1 of the latter, surveys of Personal identity theories are undertaken 
which confirm the impression that the possession of a mechanism by which 
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earning occurs is not a matter whose impact is investigated. 
8 (*6) The constraining effects do not have a similar effect on the 
setting of sufficient conditions. The sufficient conditions for developing a 
concept of an individual who is a member of a group which utilises a given body 
of knowledge, are contingent upon the mechanisms for concept formation which are 
operated by the group. These mechanisms may permit the exclusion of an 
individual who possesses the necessary characteristics (a)-(d) from being 
individuated by the use of either the codified, or the implicitly understood, 
conceptualisation of what it is to be an individual. Insane people may be 
defined as non-persons. The mechanisms may also allow for degrees of status of 
personhood as experienced by men, women, slaves and children In various 
cultures. 
10 (*7) e. g. Bernard Williams 'Imagination and the Self' Studies In the 
philosophy of Thought and Action ed. P. F. Strawson 
10 (*8) e. g. Derek ParYitt 'Personal Identity' Philosophical Revier (1971) 
also Reasons end Persons p. 245-265 
10 (*9) e. g. Geafrrey Madeli op. cit. P. 84-90 
17 (*10) In Chapter 4, the focus of the argument will be on other aspects of 
experience. In particular the emotional content of experience, along with some 
reference to the aesthetic content. is examined. 
17 (*11) Much of current discussion on personal identity is taken up with 
considerations of fission. fusion and body-swaps - see, for example, texts to 
which reference is made in Notes (*5). (*7) and (*8). The arguments in this 
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assay sustain the claim that these considerations contravene the constraints 
imposed. by the need to 'facilitate concept communication, on a cultural system. 
18 (*12) Since the term 'Intentionality' has been used by different authors 
In different ways, it will perhaps have been noted that, in the analysis of 
experience and interpretation (Part 4), one of the uses has already been 
usurped; this being 'intentionality' as the character of a modality which points 
back onto the original object of which it is a modification, so remodifying it. 
f$ (*13) The operations, In the natural and social environments, of the 
mechanisms used to affect the conscious states of others, are not unconstrained. 
The constraints are investigated in Chapters 2 and 3. 
19 (*14) Laing R. D. Ths Divided Seif p, 12 
20 (*15) A point made by Umberto Eoo II None de//a Roma Italian edition 
p. 507 
"Un narratore non deve fornire Interpretazioni della propria opera, 
aitrimenti non avrebbe scritto un romanzo, the e una macchina per generare 
i nterpretazion i. " 
A narrator ought not to provide interpretations of his or her own work, 
otherwise he or she would not have written a novel, which is a vehicle for 
generating Interpretations. 
20 (*16) An analysis of the impact of the forces which drive Individuals to 
point to something beyond themselves is carried out in Chapters 4 and 5 
22 (*17) For Hume and Kant an examination of the nature of the beings was 
limited to phenomena in Hume's case and to phenomena plus rational thought in 
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! Kauf's. In both cases any claim about the nature of an 'experiencing being' 
would have to be carried out at the levels of phenomena and thought and so could 
Etat escape the ontological limits of these 'modes' (used here In the 
Aristotelian sense of a "determination of being In general"). 
24 (*18) The Importance of an individual being both cwnoeptnallsed and 
60peeptualla/ng will be seen in Chapter 2 to extend to the areas of Interactions 
between Individuals and between individuals and social structures. In Chapter 1 
the two characteristics are seen as being necessary for an Individual to be able 
to take on the role specified by a P1. 
25 (*19) The regress would take the following form. Suppose a 
'knowledgeable being' Hi is communicating with another 'knowledgeable being' H2 
and H2 is operating a process g, In order to affect Hi's experiences. If process 
gi were facilitated by a 'social kind' as defined in Chapter 2, then some aspect 
of its operation would be experienced and interpreted by a 'knowledgeable being' 
Ha, if this experience and Interpretation were to be conceptualised by the 
`knowledgeable being' H2 who was triggering the operation of gi, then such a 
conoeptualisation could modify the operation of g, and Involve H2 In 
interpreting the operation of gi as altering the experiences and Interpretations 
of both Hi, with whom H2 Is communicating deliberately, and H3, with whom H2 Is 
communicating incidentally. So in communicating with HI, H2 also communicates 
with Ha. The communication with H3 could also generate a further communication 
with H4 so generating a possible regress. 
31 (*20) Similar problems occur over the assessment either of the validity 
of any given individuating process or of the competence of a given Individual to 
act as an Individuator If the cultural system does not allow for the distinction 
to be drawn between objects of Type-2 and objects of Type-1. The absence of 
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T. ype-2 objects would preclude any concept-developing mechanism from operating 
dogenously to the cultural system - alterations in individuating processes and 
in the criteria for assessing the competence of a given individual to act as an 
J1pdividuator would necessarily be determined by some exogenous Influence. 
32 (*21) The argument does not preclude a marxist analysis of history 
whereby ideas of which individuals are not consciously aware have causal Impact 
pn the development of relationships between individuals. What it does preclude 
lig an analysis which claims that such ideas are either in principle inaccessible 
to the individuals or that the processes by which the Ideas change are 
inaccessible to the Individuals. It rejects the theory of the inevitability of 
history. 
36 (*22) The limitations of the models, which are necessarily 
simpifications, exist and are to be found in three areas. 
Firstly, they do not seem to allow for ambiguity of interpretation either 
by the Paradigm Individuator or by a 'knowledgeable being' who can substitute 
for a P1. It is often the case that Individuals shift their interpretations of 
experiences and the interpretations of a PI are not always specific enough to be 
codified precisely, although within limits this can usually be done. 
In order to cope with the difficulties generated by shifting 
interpretations a term will be borrowed from D. W. Winnioatt who, In Playing and 
ReaNty. explores the Idea of good-enough mothering. If one had a concept of 
good-enough Individuating and a 'knowledgeable being' could substitute for a PI 
if it were a 'good-enough individuator' then the burden of coping with 
alterations In Interpretation would move from the level of concept analysis of 
the idea of a PI to the practical level of whether a 'knowledgeable being' could 
actually operate the structures and mechanisms Involved In the process of 
individuation. The P1 would then be merely a heuristic device to test whether a 
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given 'knowledgeable being' is a 'good-enough Individuator'. Such a praxis 
steed means of determining even what appears to be a fundamental concept in the 
operation of a cultural system, does not lead to problems regarding the 
development or modification of the concept of a Pl. If the use of Model(C) 
Were in a specific case to modify the notion of "licensed to individuate" in 
such a way that most licensees failed to communicate with each other then the 
cultural system would disintegrate; indicating that the praxis based means of 
doWrinining the concept of a PI not only is workable but also acts as a 
ponstraining Influence on the possible operations of Model(C). 
Secondly, the models, especially Model(B) and Model(C), do not allow for 
the representation of any relationship which the individuated object of Type-2, 
in Model(l), or the other 'knowledgeable being', In Model(C), may have with 
objects of Type-1 - although this might be incorporated Into experiences E3. 
This could become critical in the individuation process of an object of Type-2 
in determining whether it should be Included among those who could substitute 
for pis and become "good-enough individuators". If an object of Type-2 saw no 
distinction between itself and say, a tree, then Its relationship with trees 
might be considered to be significant. This may be sufficient for the 
concept-developing mechanism Model(C) to be used to exclude such an individual 
from the group whose members are competent to use the mechanism, pace the fact 
that this was not done in the case of George III who reputedly discussed matters 
of state with a tree. 
Thirdly, the analysis using models indicates that it might not be possible 
to be at the same time an object of Type-1. one of Type-2 and an individual 
competent to operate the mechanisms of Model(C). Prima facie this triple 
identity does seem poosible: medical teams in operating theatres often look upon 
their patients as objects of Type-1. There is no reason why a PI should be 
restricted to Identifying a conscious Type-2 object using only Model(A) unless, 
in the specific case, the prior use of Model(C) had instituted rules of 
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hidividuation which forbade such a restricted use; but this would be a 
contingent characteristic of the particular cultural system. In other words 
there is no reason why you should not individuate me solely by using the 
evidence gained from observation; you do not need to communicate with me in 
order to identify me. 
40 (*23) e. g. HP Grloe 'Personal Identity', Mind (Oct 1941) p. 340 where he 
states that "the self Is a logical construction and is to be defined In terms of 
memory" 
40 (*24) Peter Strawson. Individuals. Part 1 
41 (*25) e. g. AJ Ayer In Persona, Chapter 4, Indicates as much although It 
, is sometimes difficult to discern exactly what position Ayer attributes to 
Strawson. 
41 (*26) Joseph Butler, in The Analogy of Religion and Thomas Reid In The 
intellectual Powers of Man. 
41 (*27) ßellffrey Modelt op. cit. p. 
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(*1) George Herbert Meld Mind, Seff and Society p. 357 
41 = (*2) Pabn Berger Invitation to Sociology p. 124 
03) Steven Rose The Conscious Brain p. 179 
41 (*4) Donald Davidson Enquiries Into Truth and InterpraL. tlona p. 157 
43 ;" t*5) This is a distinction familiar to psychiatrists. See for example J. 
0. Lichtenberg Psychoanalysis and Infant Reesaarch 
43 (*6) See David Huse A Treatise of HUMAN NATURE p. 633-636 
q, S (*7) As argued partially in Chapter 1 when it was established that there 
is a link between individuation and the behaviour of the individuated object, but 
much more extensively discussed by David Wiggins In Saweneaa and Substance 
45 (*8) Hilary Putnam in 'The Analytic and the Synthetic' Mlnneaota Studie. 
in the Philosophy of Science takes this view. 
45 (*9) Roy dhasksr A Realist Theory of Science p. 202 f. 
, fig (*10) The difference between mathematical objects and natural kinds can be 
found in the differing methods used to determine their respective properties. 
Since mathematical objects are governed by their conceptual, often logical, 
relationships with other mathematical objects (even if one considers their origins 
to be dependent upon the culture in which they are developed), the 'single 
instance' method of discovery of the properties of mathematical objects is 
appropriate= the examination of a single case of a finite sub-cover of an Infinite 
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cover of a given space is sufficient to determine the properties of all finite 
sub-covers since the context cannot be changed - it is given in the description of 
a cover of a space. By contrast natural kind concepts do not specify the contexts 
in which the objects they designate are to be found, so the 'single Instance' 
method of discovery will only give Information about a natural kind in the context 
in which the single instance is situated. Another way of seeing the distinction 
is by noting that mathematical objects do not have accidental properties; all 
their properties are necessary so deductive forms of explanation and discovery are 
both appropriate and justified. 
For a more detailed examination of the single instance method of discovery of 
properties see Kenneth Cralk The Nature of Explanation p. 3-5. 
46 (*11) For an extended examination of the preconditions of and consequences 
of these see Roy Bhaskar op. cit. P. 1-250. 
46 (*12) The price will be seen to be, as it was in the case of a refusal to 
accept the distinction between objects of Type-1 and Type-2, the forfeiture of 
concept-communication and concept-development. 
50 (*13) The behaviourist, and other similar reductionist claims, were 
rejected in Chapter 1 (see note (*16)) on the grounds that they prevented the 
individuals (who sustain the cultural system from evaluating the competence of any 
given individual) from using the mechanisms by which the individuals communicated 
with each other. 
50 (*14) Andrew weigert Society and identity p. 121 
51 (*15) See Roger Tripp who, in Reason and Conalta+ent4 argued that the 
debate between cultural relativism and an absolutist stance could not be settled 
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and so apparently swung towards untranslatabillty between cultural systems. In 
his later Understanding Social Science he takes a rather anti-relativist stand. 
51 (*16) Barry Barnes and David Biour 'Relativism, Rationality and the 
Sociology of Knowledge' In Relativity and Rationality ed. Martin Hollis and 
8t ven Lukes 
51 (*17) An attempt to find such a yardstick would be the "deep structures" 
postulated by Nomm Chowsky - Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Ch. 3. C hom sk y 
argues that each grammatical sentence exhibits features which are derived from 
"deep structures" and "surface structures". The former are "structures generated 
by the base component" of the grammar. The indications are that the elements of 
any set of grammatical sentences which have meaning adhere to the constraints 
imposed by the deep structures. 
The argumentd in Chapter 1 above show that the penalty to be paid by anyo 
who attempts to deny the existence of some form of constraining structure is the 
sacrifice of the intelligibility of concept communication. However, neither the 
arguments in Chapter 1, nor any others developed in this essay, can be used to 
support the validity of a cllam like Chomsky's that the Transformational Grammar 
he describes provides an accurate account of the structure which constrains and 
enables us to communicate. 
53 (*18) As Indicated in Chapter 1, p. 10, Geoffrey Madell uses an argument 
citing the first-person perspective use of language. The argument being put 
forward here is deeper In that it attempts to explain why language use should make 
a first-person perspective so Important. While the argument set out In this essay 
is in broad agreement with Madell that an account of Personal Identity should not 
be seen as an extension of the Identity of physical objects through time, the 
justification given Is fundamentally different: any account of the Identity of 
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physical objects should be seen as an extension of the account of Personal 
Identity rather than vice versa. 
(*19) Herbert Biumer 'Society as Symbolic Interaction' In Human Behavior 
ajnd S Ia/ Prooesaaa ed. Arnold Rome p. 181 
56 (*20) Harold Garfinkel Studies in Ethnomethodo%yy p. 79-94 and ch. 5 
57 (*21) e. g. In Arnold Rose ed. op. cit. 
62 (*22) For an extensive examination of the relationship between symbol and 
meaning see either Kenneth Cralk op. cit. ch. 5 or George Herbert Mead op. cit. 
63 (*23) e. g. Richard Rorty In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature ch. VIII 
63 (*24) It is worth examining an example of the Inter-relationships between 
the understanding of the meaning of a concept and the contexts in which they are 
used. This will have the effect of highlighting the fact that the distinction 
between natural and social kinds is a very narrow one: there Is a sense In which 
all objects are social kinds, or rather, the natural/social kind distinction is 
one of degrees of difference rather than a bifurcation. 
One might consider a concept referring to the behaviour of an object whose 
properties are Investigated by natural scientists, such as an electron. The 
concept usually associated with such behaviour is causation. J. R. Lucas in Space. 
Titre, and Causality attempts an analysis of the concept of causation without 
reference to the contexts In which it is used. He argues, both forcibly and 
convincingly, that the concept is Inextricably linked to the notion of continuity. 
This would mean that one would have to be able to trace the path of an electron 
In order to justify any claim that a causal Influence had affected It. 
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By contrast. Roy Bhaskar (op. cit. ) Indicates that, because scientific 
application of the concept of causality makes use of 'closures'. causality is 
linked to the boundary conditions of the space in which It is considered to apply. 
in this case the claims that causal Influences were at work would be justified on 
the basis of the confidence which the scientist had in the efficacy of the system 
which established the closure. 
interestingly enough. these two analyses can be brought together by 
Invoking the Heine-Bore) theorem in mathematics which, broadly speaking, states 
that if a closed space can be covered by infinitely many small neighbourhoods then 
It will always be possible to find a finite number of the neighbourhoods which 
will also cover the space (see also ch. 4 note (*13)). 
This does not apply to an open space. So the boundary conditions of a 
given space are determining factors in permitting one to move from an infinite to 
finite analysis of the space. The move to a finite analysis of space allows one 
to enter the world of Humean (as contrasted with Lucas') causation, which depended 
on a discrete analysis of space. But what Is interesting to us now Is that the 
understanding of the meaning of causation Is dependent upon its application. As 
the knowledge gained from experimental activity in determining the properties of 
the electron is applied beyond the limits of the boundaries set in the experiment, 
so the notion of causation will alter to encompass an unbounded space - and with 
it a continuous space - but it cannot divest Itself of the impact of the boundary 
conditions which helped to formulate the concept. Lucas' abstract analysis will 
have application only In the abstract world in which It is formulated - even If he 
incorporates the Heine-Borel analysis into his model. As soon as the concept Is 
applied it comes under the Influence of the interpreted experiences of individuals 
and as such is dependent upon a process such as that represented by Model(C) to 
obtain meaning. 
If the meanings of concepts which help individuate natural kinds are 
dependent upon their contextual use then it is very likely that the same will be 
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the case with concepts which help one to Individuate social kinds. The meaning of 
the concept 'marriage' is affected and affects the operations of social kinds such 
so families. Changes in both the meaning and the operation have gone hand in hand 
during the recent history of Western Europe. Similarly, the meaning of the 
oonoept 'justice' has changed as the institutions such as government departments 
administering social security benefits have altered their operations. As Social 
Security departments have extended the scope of provision for members of the 
population who are deemed to be in need so people's expectation of what is due to 
individuals has changed. Accompanying this change there has been a change in the 
perception of responsibility and justice. Neither of these two cases refutes the 
platonic theory of fixed universaiso what they help demonstrate is the fact that 
the actual meanings associated with given concepts by the individuals who use 
them are heavily dependent upon the operations of the social kinds which are 
affected by that use (see also note 10 above). 
as (*25) An example of (i1) might be a person who Is a traffic warden. The 
traffic warden would be a constituent Cl of the person. Such a Cl would operate 
in a social environment defined by the Interactions between Cis which are affected 
by the operations of the social structure (social kind) which enforces traffic 
regulations. The concepts used by the traffic warden, and Indeed those used 
within his social environment such as 'regulation', 'fine' and 'summons' generate 
one or more cultural environments. The person must be capable of distinguishing 
between the social environment and the cultural environments. The warden must 
be capable of realising that he is not dust a traffic warden. 
70 (*26) A thesis postulating entities which are defined by an Infinite 
series of recursive relationships Is outlined by Douglas Hofstadter' Godel, Esher, 
Bach, an Eternal Golden Brad p. 138 
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Tp (*27) See Roy Rhaskar op. olt. p. 171 for an argument supporting the notion 
that 'ultimate' entftitles can never be known to be ultimate in natural science. 
73 (*28) In the biological sciences evolutionary changes, which may be 
emergent characteristics of the entities which undergo the changes, are 
postulated. Such Postulates Involve the assumption either that the entity which 
is to change cannot be ultimate. since its changes result from evolutionary 
proeeses, or that the emerged property Is truly novel and so Inexplicable in terms 
of the original putatively ultimate entity. In such a case the behaviour would 
have to occur as a result of the external agents triggering the operation of some 
of the causal and dispositional properties of the putatively ultimate entity (the 
some is not true of the behaviour of a social kind). Both the triggering process 
and the operation of the properties would themselves need to. be explained. We now 
have an ultimate entity whose behaviour Is entirely explained by reference to 
other entities, which Is clearly self-contradictory. Since the need to explain 
the triggering process and the operation of the putatively ultimate entity's 
causal and dispositional properties cannot be simply wished away, the existence of 
an actual ultimate entity would leave the scientist in a perennial state of doubt 
regarding the explanation: there would be no way of knowing that it was needed. 
it is true that at the sub-atomic level some physicists take It as given that 
electromagnetic waves/ particles/ wavicles move with no external agency. But in 
such cases a conceptual shift has occurred. In these scenarii the env/ron. ent in 
which the movement of the objects is measured is Itself that of the 
electromagnetic wavicle's movement: space itself is defined in terms of the 
wavicle. It may be that the domain assumptions of the theoretical physicists 
ensure that some of the particles conceived by them are 'ultimate', but for the 
present (as chess grandmasters say when confronted with a tricky position) "things 
are unclear". See also note (*31) below. 
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(*29) See Malcolm Pines Mirroring In Group Analysis Spheres of Group 
An Iysis T. E. Lear ed. for a psychoanalysist's perception of the relationship 
between action and the affirmation of self-identity. 
73 (*30) David Niven The Moon's a Balloon p. 130 
e (*31) The argument supporting the validity of a conception of secondary 
social forces which are not at the same time primary ones rests on two 
propositions. Firstly, that non-Cl social kinds exist and secondly that these can 
interact with each other at a level which is Independent of the Individual Cis 
which sustain their operational matrices. These are the propositions which 
concern themselves both with the refutation of methodological individualism and 
with the separation of the disciplines of psychology (the study of the operations 
of cis) and sociology/economics (the studies of the operations of non-Cl social 
kinds). Justification for such refutations has been varied. Roy Bhaskar in The 
possibility of Natural/sir bases his on the possibility of generating new social 
scientific theories while Steven Lukes in Methodological Individualism 
Reconsidered The British Journal of Sociology x/x 19M bases his on the dilemma 
individualistic explanations face of being either Inadequate or vacuous. 
The justification offered here Is is based on the mutual ontological 
dependence which exists between Cis and non-CI social kinds. If a CI's 
ontological status depends upon the existence of non-CI social kinds then 
explanations of the behaviour of these Cls cannot be given without reference to 
these non-Cl social kinds then Individualistic explanations (even of individuals) 
are, at best, inadequate. This means that any primary social force inducing a 
change in a CI must either also be, or trigger off, a secondary social force 
inducing changes In non-Cl social kinds. 
By the same argument holistic explanations are Inadequate. Secondary social 
forces must also Induce changes in Cis and so also trigger primary social forces. 
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The necessity of accepting that such inductions occur means that the conception of 
a secondary social force is not only justified but may also be a useful tool for 
explaining social phenomena. It tells us that the matter of the reduction of 
sociology and/or economics to psychology is a question which cannot be decided a 
prior!. But if it is justified by the adequacy of psychology In explaining social 
phenomena, then the earlier argument leads one to conclude that sociology/ 
economics and psychology will have merged (rather than that one has been reduced 
to the other). They will have become two aspects of a much broader study In which 
all social forces Inducing changes In social kinds would be simultaneously both 
primary and secondary social forces. 
77 ( *32) Underlying the claim that a scientist's concern with the formation 
of laws Is subservient to the search for an understanding of the operation of 
forces (or agents of change) is the conception of causality which focusses on the 
realm of efficient causes. Such a concept Is developed by Kenneth Cralk op. cit. 
ch. 4 and encapsulated by a single sentence on p. 47: "We are supporting the idea 
of causal interaction in nature, not of isolated and precise objects and events 
which may be labelled as causes or effects. " So the realms of material and final 
causes are subservient to efficient causes in that the latter need to be 
investigated in order to justify claims about the former two. Similarly formal 
causes stand blindly Isolated until they are Investigated by examining the 
efficient causes which constitute any Instantiation of the formal cause. 
Newton's great achievement was not merely the formation of the laws of 
motion. thermodynamics and gravitation, it was also the realisation that they work 
in the way they do. Central to this realisation was his liberation from the 
restrictions Imposed upon intellectual thought by the notions of agents of change 
which preceded him. The agent of change, or 'force' as he called it, became 
central. Other concepts became subservient to it to the extent that some, 
including Newton himself, considered the Idea to be occult (see Karl Popper 
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It might be argued at this point that the developments resulting either 
from relativity theory or from quantum mechanics negate the point just made 
regarding the primacy of the concept of force. Newtonian notions of force, 
encapsulated in his gravitational theory and his laws of motion, break down 
according to quantum and relativity theories. Both of these last two theories 
seem to start with change as a given phenomenon. Such a standpoint with either 
electromagnetic radiation as self moving or 'bare particles' propagating from one 
point to another seems to be suggesting that precise objects may be labelled as 
causes and supports a notion of material causes as being the fundamental ones in 
need of investigation. But when one digs deeply into both theories one finds that 
efficient causes are, even here. what the scientist is searching for. 'Bare 
particles' which propagate from one point to another are hypothetical entitles. 
Propagation, when it occurs. Is seen in terms of interactions with other 
particles: the electron Is conceptualised as moving through, or Interacting with, 
'virtual photons' which are emitted then reabsorbed by the electron. It seems 
that the electron has an Internal 'motor' which enables It to propagate, but this 
depends on Its interactions with other particles - even though they are emitted 
and absorbed by the electron. The reason behind such an introduction of another 
particle and the interaction with it lies in the vacuousness of an explanation 
which centres on a material cause; such an explanation which cannot be supported 
or refuted as Investigation is, a priori, excluded. 
go (*33) Peter Strawson in Individuals throughout the text but particularly 
on p. 98-103 argues that the concept of a person is a primitive concept. Stage 2 
In the current text helps to show why this should be so. 
so (*34) William Shrooder in Sartre and his Predecessors, the Self and the 
other suggests (p. 225-6) that an experience of a social self can be obtained from 
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s- natural phenomenon and so can be externally Induced as well as be distinct from 
any social structures. The example he gives Is of a Crusoe figure who has lost 
au his (sic) memories and is left with only "sentience and goal-directedness". 
Such a Crusoe might. upon learning to survive, some day have his discouragement 
reinforced by, say, a clap of thunder. In this way the Crusoe could develop a 
use of itself as a social self. 
Now, this argument presupposes either that there is an inherent social 
sense in the individual which can be activated by an external trigger or that the 
social sense is somehow developed by the process of reinforcement (or perhaps both 
of these two options simultaneously). The first option, taken alone, involves a 
proposition which cannot be tested since the testing process would take one into 
the second option. The second option, if it is not to degenerate Into the first, 
involves the association by the Crusoe figure of the clap of thunder with his 
discouragement which he has to see as already different from usual experiences: he 
has to conceptualise both that the thunder is a contributory factor in his 
discouragement and that the discouragement Is categorically different from other 
sensations such as hunger - otherwise the clap of thunder must be seen by the 
Crusoe as just another phenomenon like any other with a physical cause and a 
physical effect. A requirement of Crusoe's ability to differentiate sensations 
and to conceptualise the thunder's contribution In generating the different 
category of sensation would be Crusoe's ability to test his conceptualisation 
(described In Chapter 1 above as involving the use of Model(C)) - but the ability 
to test a conceptualisation which involves one's being a social being carries with 
it the assumption that one already Is a social being. This means that Schroeder 
presupposes the result he wishes to establish at the point at which the example is 
actualized. 
81 (*35) The argument in Chapter 1, Parts 4 and 5, supporting the claim that 
objects of Type-2 (*p. 28) who can substitute for Pis Indicated that a second 
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order monitoring facility was needed in order merely to operate Model(B). What is 
being suggested now Is that the competence to operate Model(C) hangs on the 
individual's possession of a second order monitoring facility. The reason now is 
slightly different: In the case of Model(B) the second order facility was needed 
in order to Interpret series of Interpreted experiences; In the case of Modei(C) 
the second order facility is needed in order that the Individual can distinguish 
the proper use of the concept whose meaning is being determined from the context 
In which it determines that proper use. 
83 (*36) See Chapter 1, Part 4. Communication And Cognitively Interpreted 
Avtlon where it is argued that the acceptance of the possibility that the 
Individual might not be unified in all his modes of experience carries with it the 
penalty that concept-communication becomes Incoherent. 
85 (*37) The phrasing is that used by Row Harre Social Being ch. 11 
87 (*38) It may be argued that the rejection of the possibility of an 
objectively defined self and/or person is embedded In the definition of a 
Conceptualising Individual and of a social kind. This is quite likely to be the 
case, but supporters of the possibility would then have to do without the 
possibility that interactions between conscious beings can be both meaningful 
(where a recognisable structure in which to operate Is needed) and constitute a 
vehicle which facilitates any learning processes. 
as (*39) Derek Par? tt, op. cit., argues that not only Is an objective 
definition of the self possible. but the acceptance of Its objectivity Is somehow 
liberating p. 281 f. He does not actually attempt any specific objective 
definitions of Individuals but claims them to be possible. Chapter 5. Part 4, 
below will Include a demonstration that Parfit's own arguments In support of his 
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as (*40) In such a case the conceptualising process whereby a person 
oonceptuallses the activation of its own component parts (in this case further 
persons) would seem to be too cumbersome for an individual in our culture to 
grasp. Usually such individuals are schizophrenic and are unaware of the embedded 
structure of their personalities and normally the eventual awareness removes the 
em beddedness. 
89 (*41) As Is Indicated In the introduction/conclusion to this essay 
(*p. 223), there is a difference between the space in which material objects 
operate and the space in which social objects operate. The former space Is 
conceptualised as having a structure whch is independent of any specific material 
object which occupies it. By contrast. the structure of social space (which 
partly constrains/enables social Interactions) is not Independent of the social 
objects which occupy part of It. 
93 (*42) Note (*38) Is also appropriate here. 
95 (*43) The requirement that an individual has a sense of being with other 
Individuals in order to Interact with them Is supported by the empirical findings 
of some clinical psychoanalysts. See for example JD Lichtenberg, op. cit., who 
has found that the mothering function. which Is conceptualised as the one which 
provides a sense of being with rather than the sense of Interacting with others 
(which is provided by the father). Is the one which predominates even when the 
primary care giver is a man. It ought to be emphasised that psychoanalysts do not 
assume that these functions are sex stereotyped, neither are they exclusively the 
preserve of either parent figure. The terms "mother" and "father" are used as 
they represent the persons who noraally undertake the given functions with respect 
to their offspring. 
P"* Made/ref Chapter 2 
100 (*44) See Richard Shweder and Joan Miller The Social Construction of the 
Person, How Is it Possible? In The Social Construction of the Person Kenneth 
espen and Keith Davis ed. 
100 (*45) The concept of the non-person Cl Is similar the one generated by the 
picture of the self which emerges from Hume's writings and causes him so many 
problems (The Treatise of HUMAN NATURE Selby-Bigge edition p. 633). The problems 
stem from Hume's desire to separate the exercise of a power from the 
conceptualisation of that exercise; even in the object which exercises the power. 
The argument set out in this chapter, by contrast, suggests that the separation of 
the conceptualisation of the exercise of power from the exercise Itself by the 
agent who exercises it, prevents that agent from gaining any understanding of any 
exercise of power whatsoever - even if, In Hume-like fashion, the agent 
conceptualises the exercise of power in terms of mere constant cojunetions of 
events. 
101 (*46) Roy B hask ar The Possibility of Naturalism and Reclaiming Reality. 
102 (*47) This phrasing Is also borrowed from Rom Harre ibid. 
103 (*48) Peter Berger An Invitation to Soolology ch. 6 
103 (*49) Roy Bhaskar The Possibility of Naturalism p. 40-42 
103 (*50) Ibid. p. 42-47 and Sclent/fic Realism and Human Emancipation p. 
118-135. 
103 (*51) The PossIblllty of Naturallsar P. 45 
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104 (*52) Scientific Realism and Human Eaancipat/on p. 132-5. 
106 (*53) The intelligibility of much of psychoanalytical treatment hangs on 
the possibility that the patient has the capability of affecting his/her own 
social conditioning. Indeed, the intelligibility of parental attempts to 
socialise their offspring by means other than pavlovian conditioning also rests on 
the possibility that the child can contribute to her/his own social conditioning. 
see Note (*43) 
117 (*54) The pivotal role of understanding and control of natural kinds is 
identified by Roy Shaskar In A Realist They of Science where the intelligibility 
of the Interference with the operations of natural kinds under closed conditions 
is argued to be central to the understanding of those operations. 
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122 (*1) Immanuel Kant The Critique of Pure Reason B225-232 
122 (*2) Henri Polnoarö In Science and Hypothesis 
124 (*3) Poincare Is asking a question like "What makes it possible to 
Chapter 3 
develop and apply concepts of space? ". By contrast, the types of question being 
asked in this essay are: "Why do Individuals develop and apply concepts of 
space? " and "What are the consequences of satisfying the requirement that both 
the development and application should be intelligible? ". It Is clear that 
answers to these questions are parasitic upon the prior answers to Poincare's 
question. 
125N. (*4) It will be seen that Kant's attempt to substantiate claims that the 
material world (which It is possible to perceive) must exist in a 
three-dimensional (3-D) space, is flawed. This claim is too specific for a 
substantiation to be possible on a priori grounds: Kant needs to show not only 
(1) that the perceptual apparatus of humans Is such that It can only 
receive 3-D signals but also 
(ii) that the interpretative faculties of Individuals are so restricted 
that they cannot take those 3-D signals and Interpret them as 
originating from a non-3-D source. 
The fact that (ii) needs to be established forces Kant to have to establish (i) 
on empirical grounds, which is precisely what he Is attempting to avoid. It 
will be argued below, in note (*12), that even (i) does not hold and that even a 
perceptual apparatus which receives single dimensional signals can be used to 
Interpret mufti-dimensional inputs. 
125 (*5) Immanuel Kant op-oft. B274-279 
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126 (*8) The integrated nature of conscious experience will be investigated 
in some detail in Chapter 4. 
127 (*7) N. H. Walsh Kant's Critolso of Alataphyslcs p124 
128 (*8) Jonathan Bennett Kant' Amlyt/c Ch. 5. The discussion of Anthony 
Quinton's example. cited on *p. 129, takes place on *p. 64-67. 
129 (*9) Some argument is needed to substantiate the claim that the 
singularity of the object captured by an a priori intuition cannot be equated 
with the singularity of objects referred to by proper names. If it were then 
there would be no difference between the process of referring which Involves the 
use of a proper name and the posmslon of an a priori Intuition. The mere fact 
that one is a conscious process and the other is a state of affairs, albeit in 
consciousness, indicates that there are deep differences between them. Indeed, 
had Kant wanted to talk about a process such as proper-name referring, it is 
probable that he would have done so. It seems more likely that, in talking 
about a priori Intuitions, he was aware of the fact that there is a logical 
problem involved in attempting (by referring to it) to bring into consciousness 
that which one claims to be part of the basis of consciousness, as soon as one 
refers to it and It enters consciousness, it ceases to form part of the basis of 
consciousness and so changes. Any discussions on its nature, including its 
putative singularity, have to take place without conceptualising it fully and so 
are limited to examinations of the various consequences of assuming that its 
nature is constituted in various ways. The notion of a singularity is not, in 
this case, a working notion similar to that encapsulated by the use of a proper 
name. It Is, Instead, more akin to a limiting notion - similar to the 
scientific notion of a universe with no energy inbalances between any two 
points: experience of such a universe would involve Its disappearance since 
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experience is only possible If there is a transfer of energy. One can 
doneeptualise, but not experience, such a universe. Similarly one can Intuit, 
but not conceptualise, the basis of conceptualised experience. 
136 (*10) Thomas Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chapter 2 
143 (*11) The discussion in Part 3 will be restricted to an examination of 
arguments concerning the dimensional nature of space. A reader who is familiar 
with Poincare's work is likely to have noticed that there are many points at 
which the arguments here are in harmony with those of Poincare. His own 
insights Into the relationship between 
(i) the nature of the material world; 
(ii) our means and our understanding of those means of gaining access 
to its operations and 
(Iii) our understanding of those operations 
are Insights which are in harmony with the Ideas developed here. 
Poincarb does, however, seem to end in a too heavily conventionalist 
position. Had he Investigated the reatrletIVe effect which the nature of 
(Iv) the Interdependence between the social and material worlds and 
(v) the possibility that 'persons' (defined in a manner similar to that 
used in Chapter 1 above) should be able to operate In both worlds 
have on the possible formulations of theories about the material world, then it 
is likely that he would have modified his conventionalist approach. 
144 (*12) Henri Polnoarb op. cit. p. 55 
While there is some merit in Poincarö's argument that the number of 
dimensions which can be perceived is heavily dependent upon the number of 
muscles (or the Individual's motor active sources of Interference within her 
environment) possessed by the Individual. he makes it do too much work. He 
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argues that the maximum number of dimensions which an individual can perceive in 
'motor space' is set by the number of muscles. The reason he gives is that the 
Individual has to gather Information from this multiple source In order to 
determine the number of independent variables from which the information 
originated. 
Since mathematical analysis requires an Independent piece of information 
for the determination of each independent variable (dimension in 
n(n-mathematical language), he suggests that an individual cannot provide 
herself with more independent pieces of Information than she has sources. Motor 
space is, accordingly, deemed to be restricted a prior/ to having a limited 
number of dimensions. 
The weakness of the argument is to be found In Its omission of 
Considerations of the importance of both temporality and the interpretative 
faculties of Indviduals - both of which have already been seen to be 
inter-related. Modern developments in computer technology have demonstrated the 
ease with which a single dimensional series of signals can be interpreted as 
originating from multi-dimensional sources. This can be Illustrated simply by 
imagining all series of signals as arriving in batches of, say, fifty. The 
first ten of each batch of fifty might indicate the dimension to which the 
remaining forty referred. The number of dimensions would then be restricted to 
the number of distinct dimensions to which a batch of ten signals could refer - 
if the signals were restricted to binary coding the number would be 1,024 
dimensions. It can readily be seen that there is no theoretical restriction on 
the number of dimensions which could be differentiated by batches of 
one-dimensional signals; all one needs to do is to alter the size of batch and 
size of the part of the batch which refers to the dimension. As long as the 
individual's interpretative faculties are sufficiently sophisticated to cope 
with decoding the batches of Information she will be able to interact with a 
multi-dimensional world using a single-dimensional temporal source of 
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tnformation. 
It will have been noted that this argument still relies on the assumption 
that the Individual's sense receiving equipment's operations can dovetail Into 
the operations of changes in the environment which the individual Is attempting 
to understand. In this respect it leaves both Kant's and Poincare's arguments 
unaffected. Indeed, It also lends support to the general Kantlan enterprise in 
this field. Neither does It in any way weaken Polncarb's argument which 
indicates that the existence of solid objects, and with this existence the 
ability to displace and deform such objects, are preconditions for an 
Individual's ability to develop and apply concepts of dimensions. 
The argument set out In this note also pinpoints a weakness in Peter 
Strawson's account of a purely auditory world - Individuals p. 59-86. The world 
he describes Is one-dimensional and temporal so an Individual could Interpret 
signals as originating from a multi-dimensional environment and so could develop 
and use concepts of material bodies enabling the Individual to Identify and 
re-identify objects. However, as Polnoar8's arguments demonstrate, a being in 
such a world would have to have motor-active abilities and so be capable of 
displacing and deforming the material bodies with which the individual 
interacted. Admittedly If Strawson's auditory world did not have material 
bodies - and it seems he considered It to be materially empty - then the 
Individual would not have been able to displace and deform such bodies. 
Strawson's argument cannot get off the ground, not merely because of the 
absence of material bodies, but also because of the absence of motor- active 
capabilities. The presence of material bodies In the natural environment, 
combined with the absence of motor-active capabilities, does not permit an 
Individual to develop concepts of dimensionality; and the concept of 
dimensionality is one of the concepts which underpins any processes of 
identification and re-Identification. Strawson's failure to provide the 
hypothetical 'auditory' individual with the ability to interfere with the 
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signals it received, prevents ab in/tlo any individual In that world from 
identifying and re-identifying objects and events. 
One suspects that, had Strawson had the benefit of the computer model 
with its 'fetch-execute-decode' cycle, It is likely he would have modified 
either his argument or his model. While he points out (Ibid. ), that his model 
may be inadequate, he does not give his 'auditory' Individual the ability to 
interfere with the auditory signals. 
146 (*13) George Berkeley A New Theory of Vision. 
Visual Space is not isotropic (I to XXX of A. N. T. of V. ) 
The fact that 'tactile space' and 'visual space' are not Isotropic 
relative to each other is illustrated by his example of the person born blind 
who can recognise some solid objects before gaining sight but has to be taught 
what they are In 'visual space' once seeing becomes possible (XLI fit. ). 
The relationship between 'tactile' and 'visual' spaces Is examined in 
(XXXXlX) if. But unlike Poincare. Berkeley does not use the terms 'visual', 
'tactile' and 'motor' space. Further, he does not separate 'motor space' from 
'tactile space'. 
147 (*14) Henrl Polnoari op. cit. p. 57 
148 (*15) Polncarb is here assuming that an individual has what Russell 
describes as "knowledge by acquaintance" of the two-dimensional retinal Image. 
There seems to be ample neurological evidence to suggest that the Individual is 
acquainted with one-dimensional Impulses which travel from the retina in 
single-dimensional paths. The fact that the one-dimensional signals are also 
temporal Is significant - see note (*12) above. 
148 (*16) Henri Poluri op. cit. p. 51-7 
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152 (*17) Roy Bhaskar in A Mew/at Theory of Science 
Chapter 3 
153 (*18) See Richard Schweder and Joan Miller 'The Social Construction of 
the Person: How Is it Possible? in The Scald Construction of the Person 
1Wnneth Jargon and Kettle Davies eds. for an account of taditlonal Hindu 
conceptualisations of the relationship between the Individual, the moral-social 
order, and the natural order. 
154 ("19) The absence of even one of these other individuals would prevent 
I, from being identified as the same individual in both environments. 
Identification Involves the existence of, and use of, processes such as those 
represented by Model(A) and Modei(B) described in Chapter 1, p. 27-28. it was 
seen there that the operation of these processes makes necessary (i) the 
existence of the possibility of Intractlons between individuals and so the 
existence of more than one individual and (ii) the possibility that an 
individual can learn and/or form a critique of the Interactive processes between 
Individuals. Condition (ii) Involves the possibility of witnessing the 
interactions and so must involve the existence of an individual other than those 
who take part in the identifying processes. This means that any cultural 
environment which can sustain a learning process must Itself be sustained by 
more than two individuals. The condition that a 'cultural environment' has to 
be sustained by more than two individuals If learning In that environment is to 
occur was discussed at some length In Chapter 2. It was seen there that the 
role of an individual who is not the prime carer of an Infant is seen in some 
psychoanalytical circles as essential for the socialisation of the individual 
(in the language of this essay one would say that the existence of an observer 
who is separate from a given interaction between Individuals is essential for 
functioning of the learning of the mechanisms which operate in a given 'cultural 
environment'). See Chapter 2, Parts 3 and 4. 
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158 (*20) The possibility of concept communication without the facilitating 
functions of either a natural or a social kind have been explored in science 
fiction works. A well known example is found In the writings of John Wyndham. 
In his novel Chocky, he describes the interactions between a young boy and an 
'intelligence', named Chocky, which occur entirely In the mind of the boy. 
The communicative process is a telepathic one and the Interface between 
the boy's understanding and that of the 'intelligence' is not described. The 
boy does not have access to the mechanisms which enable communication but it is 
hinted that, not only does Chocky have such access, but so do all the other 
'intelligences' who/which operate In the same world as Chocky. The boy's lack 
of access to the mechanisms which facilitate concept communication, prevents him 
from being able to establish and retain his identity as a separate Identity from 
Chocky's in the world in which he communicates with Chooky. By contrast Chocky 
seems to have such access and with it can substantiate her(? ) claim to retain 
Identity in both her and our worlds. 
158 (*21) Immanuel Kant op. cit. B37-73 and B275 
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163 (*1) For the definitions of 'social kinds' and 'persons' see Chapter 2 
(*p. 55 and 71) 
163 (*2) In Chapter 1 It was seen that the unacceptable consequences were the 
prevention of the communication of concepts. In Chapter 2 the consequences were 
seen to be the prevention of the possibility that Individuals can learn both how 
to use concepts and how to interact with other individuals. 
164 (*3) This distinction was embedded In the definition of a 'person', and 
the existence of 'persons' was seen to be essential for the possibility that 
processes Involving the learning of concepts can occur. See Chapter 2 Part 5. 
164 (*4) R 41 Colllnpwood's exposition Is found In The Principles of Art and 
Sir John Eocles' theories are to be found in J Eocles and K Popper The Self and 
the Brain. 
167 (*5) David Hume In A Treatise of Human Nature considers the 'simple 
impression' to be the building block from which all experience Is constructed. 
It is isolated and, initially at least, unconnected to any other phenomenon; it 
is seen as an atom of experience. Connections between simple impressions are 
made by the mind in response to the ways In which the Impressions are presented 
to the experiencing Individual. The connections help to form 'complex 
impressions' and 'ideas'. Hume's starting point is the atom of experience, the 
'simple impression'. In this essay, therefore, Humean metaphysics and atomism 
In experience will be treated as Interchangeable notions. 
169 (*6) Note 5, above, deals with this point. 
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174 (*7) 6E Moore Principle Ethics p. 13 
174 (*8) ibid p. 10 
Chapter 4 
174 09) Errol Bedfbrd Ar stoWlnn S Iety Proowdings. LV! / (16'f6-57). 
reprinted In The PhIIo pby of Mind VC Chappell ed. 
174 (*10) In Ea iys In the Active Powers of Man Chapter VII. Thomas Reid 
argues that moral approbation cannot be equated with feelings. His 
justification for this claim lies in the fact that one can disagree with an 
approbation "without any ground of offence, ..., to a reasonable man", since one 
Is disagreeing with the man's opinion. By contrast, disagreeing with a 
statement about a man's feelings questions his veracity. If Reid's argument is 
inverted, the parallel with the Bedford question is immediate. 
175 (*11) Geoffrey Medell in The Identity of the Self (throughout, but 
particularly in Chapter 2) argues in favour of the unanalysability of aspects of 
the self. He Invokes the uniqueness of the first person perspective and its 
function in language usage to support his claim. 
178 (*12) See Harold Garfinkel Studies In Ethnoiethodology Ch. 3 where he 
describes 'The Counselling experiment' in which the participants demonstrated a 
marked reluctance to relinquish their expectations of the possibility that their 
experiences in some way could be explained according to discoverable principles. 
179 013) The concept of a 'closure' is referred to by RN Career-Hunt in The 
Thoa'y and Prsctloa of Coomunism p. 53 where he identifies the central role the 
concept plays in Marx's explanation of scientific Investigative processes. 
Roy dhaskar In AR IIat Theory Of Science points out that the concept underpins 
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much scientific practice. He goes on to investigate the consequences which the 
application of the concept of a closure has on the view of reality which is 
presupposed by that application. He argues convincingly that this view of 
reality is one in which events are seen as determined by the operations of 
mechanisms; and that. In closures, constant conjunctions of events result from 
(rather than constitute) the operations of causal processes. The 
intelligibility of the deliberate creation of closures together with the 
application (In non-closed environments) of knowledge gained in the closures, is 
sacrificed unless one accepts the view that reality is constituted of mechanisms 
whose operations generate events. 
179 (*14) This point Is made In the argument by Roy Bhaskar op. oit. referred 
to In note (*13). 
183 t*15) This categorlsatfon has been Dulled from W Lyons' Emotions, 
183 (*16) This view of consciousness is similar to that expressed by 
ellbert Ryle who oateyorlsed emotions as "turbulences in the stream of 
consciousness" - The Concept of Mind p. 166. 
184 (*17) RW Hepburn The Arts and the Education of the Emotions NUQ Winter 
low 
185 (*18) R6 Co111ngwood op. cit. p. 166. 
186 019) ibid. 
ISO (*20) op. oft. Ch. Vii 
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1-8g (*21) op. cit. p. 231 
IST (*22) op. cit. p. 232 
189 (*23) Dante as quoted by RD Laing The Self and Others p. 125 
190 (*24) Desonrta. SsWnd Meditation 
Chapter 4 
192 (*25) The scope of operation of a social kind was defined in Chapter 2 as 
a 'social environment': see Chapter 2 (D4) (*p. 59) 
too (*26) See for example Sir John Eooles op. cit. In The Self and Its 
Armin` he puts forward a theory of perception which Is the same as the one which 
has been developed in Chapters 1-4 above. The picture Eccles paints of the 
operation of perceptive faculties involves the perceiving Individual 
constructing and utilising a perceptual framework. This framework is believed 
to be located in the neurones at the rear of the temporal lobes - Its precise 
location is not important to the argument which Is being developed here. Within 
this physical location a normal brain retains a 'picture' of an external world 
and the relationship of the individual's body to that world. This picture is 
built up by inputting information drawn from all the sensory organs which 
constantly feed more information Into the system, thus constantly updating the 
picture. The picture Itself is not built afresh each time the Individual 
resumes conscious experience after a break, however caused; rather, the 
individual uses learned and retained patterned structures around which the 
perceptual Information is fitted. Once the individual finds a suitable 
structure on which to hang her sense data, she is able to build a picture and 
then can constantly update it with further Information. 
Eccles' model is not only consonant with the position adopted in this 
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essay, it also offers it considerable support. The model has embedded in it the 
requirement that the individual has expectations of the likely progress of the 
perceptions he is experiencing. This requirement is fulfilled by the operation 
of a specific mechanism which Eccles describes as ante-dating (page 250). 
Ante-dating Is a process by which a conscious mind copes with the time lapse, up 
to 0.5 seconds, between the neuronal messages reaching the cerebral cortex and 
their being assimilated into the individual's 'picture' of the external world. 
The model Eccles describes Is all but Identical with the conception of conscious 
experience which Is outlined in Part 3 aboves sense Inputs modify rather than 
constitute experience. 
Eccles would undoubtedly support the acceptability of his model on 
similar grounds as those offered by most medical scientists. He would look to 
the application of the theories within which the model is resident. As Is seen 
in Parts 2 and 3 above, philosophical argument can also be offered in support of 
the acceptance of the model. A brief resume of the philosophical argument will 
demonstrate the very close similarities between Eccles' theory of perception and 
the theory of experience which is being developed in this chapter. 
The possibilities of continuous conscious perceptions broken by 
discontinuities, such as sleep, vanish unless one presupposes that the 
individual can gain access to a perceptual framework (which exists independently 
of the passage of time which is characterised by the break In consciousness) 
within which the individual can construct and sustain a 'picture' of his 
environment. This presupposition hangs on what is de facto a changing world. 
In a world where experiences could be Identically reproduced, In a laboratory 
fashion, the supposition would not be needed. But in a changing environment, 
each time one emerges from a state of lack of consciousness one Is faced with 
sets of sensory signals whose exact replicas one has never previously met: 
indeed it Is not only possible but highly likely that no two sets of sensory 
signals are Identical. The absence of a perceptual framework - whose form (in 
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the Aristotelian sense) pre-existed one's experience, and whose matter (also in 
the Aristotelian sense) consisted of sensory signals provided by sense organs 
and the Imagination - would necessitate the constant recreation of each 
suocessive experience. It would also necessarily Involve the experiencing 
individual having the Illusion that memory linked the current experience with 
previous ones. The absence of the perceptual framework would also render 
unintelligible any purposive conscious actions of Individuals. 
We are left with a general model of experience In which the Individual is 
seen as possessing conceptual structures (not stored at a conscious level in the 
mind) around which the information supplied by the senses is hung in order that 
the individual can build and continue to update a picture of external reality. 
The argument may be used, mutatis mutandfs, to establish the pre-existence of 
conceptual structures around which a picture of social reality can be built. So 
that if an individual were to walk into a room he would already have a 
conceptual framework which would determine parameters of possible spatial, 
textual visual and olfactory components of a room and Into which he could fit 
the sensory information constituent of the particular room. He would have a 
further conceptual framework which would determine possible social relationships 
between the Individuals In the room, and even of the relationships between the 
Individuals and the natural objects present in the room. His senses would then 
provide Information which would enable him constantly to update his natural and 
social pictures of the room. The Interplay between the sensory Information and 
the underpinning conceptual frameworks generates expectations of further sensory 
inputs. The need for the sensory information to be processed and located In the 
picture turns the existence of the expectation Into a necessity; without this 
need the expectation might be merely a more efficient way of generating 
experiences. 
(Addenda) 
198 (*27) David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature p. 469 ff. Identifies the 
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problem of moving from propositions Involving is to those involving ought The 
acceptance of the arguments which are being put forward here will involve the 
acceptance of the claim that no propositions involving is can be Independent of 
all propositions involving ought 
200 (*28) Thomas Kuhn The atruoture of Scientific Revolutions Chapter 2 
201 (*29) Virtually all of Freud's writings show parts of this development. 
He brings most of them together In his last book An Outline of Psycho-analysis, 
translated by James Strachey. 
201 (*30) See Sigmund Freud op. cit. p. 1-9. 
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205 (*1) It is possible that a critic of the type of analysis undertaken in 
this essay might consider that the theory outlined here suffers from similar 
restrictions; the theory is, after all, developed in a specific cultural 
environment. It may appear to such a critic that the valldidty of the conclusions 
drawn are themselves retracted to that specific cultural environment. 
Such a criticism might be compelling If the argument in the essay Involved 
an attempt to formulate a specific definition of a person; a definition which 
specified the criteria of what it is to be a person and which had application in 
all cultural environments. There is no attempt here to offer a definition of 
Personal Identity in this or any other cultural environment. What is offered Is 
an analysis which gives criteria by which one can judge whether any given concept 
of Personal Identity can cope with the possibility that learning processes can 
occur. This has the effect of giving culturally universal criteria, from within a 
particular cultural environment, which necessarily apply to concepts of Personal 
identity. it does not furnish one with a set of criteria which are sufficient to 
encapsulate the concept of Personal Identity In any given cultural environment. 
Cultural universality Is achieved by a knock-on process. If a concept 
formed within one cultural environment Is such that It Is possible for the 
individuals operating in that environnment to expand their sphere of social 
influence Into another environment, then conceptualisations within both the 
original unexpanded environment and the new expanded one must comply with the 
results of the analysis set out in this essay. The process of expansion from one 
cultural environment to a larger one will then permit one to apply the results to 
all cultural environments with which mergers are possible. Persons In all these 
cultural environments must be such that the conceptualisation of a person In 
completely objective terms cannot properly be formulated. The conceptualisation 
of a person in completely objective terms creates the mechanism which prevents the 
merger of two cultural environments and the formation of expanded cultural 
environments. 
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The other conclusions reached in the essay also apply to all cultural 
environments which are either expanded or merged with other cultural environments. 
Three of these are worthy of note. The first is that the definitions of objects 
in general will be dependent upon an existing understanding of what it is to be a 
person; Personal Identity will not be a special case of general Identity. The 
second consists of the claim that 'society' cannot itself be a social kind, it 
cannot have constraining and/or enabling powers with respect to the behaviour of 
persons. Rather than being a social kind, society is an ensemble of social kinds, 
each of which possesses such enabing and/or constraining powers. The third 
result, obtained in the analysis in Chapter 4, consists of the assertion that the 
fact-value dichotomy cannot be applied in any given cognitive experience without 
contravening the rules governing the operations of that experience. 
206 (*2) E. g. Saul Krlpke Semantical Considersat/ons on Modal Logic, In Aoft 
philosophica Fennica 
208 (*3) The need for a third person in interactions was established In the 
discussions in Chapters 2 and 4. 
221 (*4) Mary Daly in Gyn/eoo%Ry& The Metaethics of Rational Feminism p. 
374-7 argues that the value system which has been hitherto Imposed on women has 
been one of self-sacrifice which ties In with women's other-focused value system. 
She indicates, somewhat paradoxically, that it is only through becoming 
self-focusing (and so absorbing the value system she criticises as being male) 
that women can liberate themselves. She does not seem to appreciate that the 
tension which exists between self-focusing and other-focusing value systems Is 
built Into the very fabric of any cultural system. This lack of appreciation does 
not, however. detract from her analysis of the nature of the social structures 
found in the society she Is examining - these structures do seem to promote 
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self-sacrificing characteristics In women and self-enhancing ones In men. 
The arguments in this essay Identify the logic underpinning the tension 
between the self- and other- focusing aspects of social Interactions. The 
tensions cannot be avoided but it is possible, as Daly's arguments show, for the 
tensions to be either consciously or subconsciously manipulated to achieve a 
particular end. Since the fusion or harmonisation of self- and other- focusing 
value systems leads to a blurring of the distinctions between social and cultural 
environments (see Chapter 2, above) the price paid for harmoniously achieved 
emancipation Is the abolition of the expansion of social scientific understanding. 
This means that emancipation, whether social or sexual, Is faced with an 
unavoidable paradox. The process of emancipation relies on the drawing of a 
distinction between the epistemological and ontological aspects of social 
Interactions - the distinction underpinning the distinction between cultural and 
social environments - yet the emancipatory process is aiming towards the abolition 
of that distinction. If it succeeds, the emancipatory process will result In the 
construction of a social kind whose operations cannot be altered by the 
conceptualisations of any of the individuals whose behaviour reproduces the social 
kind - since it removes the perception of the distinction between the Individual's 
value system and the value system which drives the operations of the social kind. 
The social kind will have reached an ontological status similar to the Hindu Karma 
or perhaps of those in a Marxist society where there are no distinctions between 
any individual's value system and the value system of the social kinds which that 
Individual sustains and reproduces. 
In such cases social kinds would be difficult to distinguish from natural 
kinds. Furthermore, when one Is operating entirely within. them it is not even 
possible to know that they could be social kinds. The emancipatory process, If 
complete, destroys the prospects of any future emancipation. 
224 05) The arguments in this essay Identify the price paid by someone who 
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denies the claim that there is an assumption, even if unrecognised, that social 
kinds are sustained by 'persons' as defined in Chapter 2 above. The price paid 
was seen In Chapter 2 to be the negation of the possibility that social change 
could be understood. Since the development of any theory of Personal Identity 
involves an attempt to provide a basis on which the understanding of social 
phenomena can emerge, the construction of the concept of a person has to take on 
board the constraint of having to accept the schema of a 'person' as set out in 
Chapter 2. 
231 (*6) peter Strawson Individuals Ch. 2 
231 (*7) (i) Derek Parftt inReasons and Persons and (11) Bernard Wil llama In 
The Self and the Future. The Philosophies/ Review April 1970 
232 (*8) Derek MMIt op. cit., P. 236 
232 (*9) op. cit. p. 255 
233 (*10) David Wiggins SaReneaa and Substance p. 92-4 
234 011) Derek Parflt op. Cit.. P. 238 
236 (*12) op. cit. p. 255 
236 (*13) Ibid 
237 (*14) see for example Colin Blakeaore the Reith Lectures published in The 
Listener 25th November 1976 
238 (*15) Factors such as emotional stability could well be Included in 
3t0 
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Parfit's 'psychological continuity' as a criterion for determining whether 
Personal Identity has been maintained during the part brain transfers. But if 
they are and he assumes they are transferred in the part brain transplants, then 
he Is already assuming he knows what it Is to be a person. He Is assumning the 
result he wishes to establish. 
238 (*16) Derek Par it op. cit. p. 219 where he defines something as "deeply 
Impossible" If It contravenes the laws of nature. 
238 (*17) op. cit. P. 264 
239 018) E. B. Saul Kripke op. cit. 
239 (*19) Bernard Williams op. cit., and In Imagination and the Self, 
proceedings of the British Academy 19ft reprinted in Studies In the Philosophy of 
Thought and Action. Pete' Strawson ed. uses conjectures Involving brain and/or 
body and/or memory swaps to test the acceptability of his concepts. 
241 (*20) Pear Srawson Individuals In the Introduction 
243 (*21) 6. R. Lucas in The Freedom of the Will 
244 (*22) As ß. T. Kneebone puts its Mathematical logic and the Foundation, of 
Mathematics p. 236. when describing G6del's recursive relations: "Only the 
elements of recursive arithmetic were needed for this purpose, and G6del gave the 
following explanatlonof what he understood by recursive functions and relations. 
The explanation Is expressed intuitively, of course, not formalized In the 
system. " 
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(*24) Douglas FMT tsdfier op. cit., p. 577-78 
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(*26) David Wiggins Sameness and Substance Chapter 5 
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